People v. Matthews
| Decision Date | 13 November 1980 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 36420 |
| Citation | 112 Cal.App.3d 11,169 Cal.Rptr. 263 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Toby St. George MATTHEWS, Defendant and Appellant. |
David LaMonte Williams, Encino, for defendant and appellant.
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Juliet H. Swoboda and Donald R. Currier, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant appeals from judgment (order granting probation) entered on jury verdict of guilty of illegal transportation of marijuana (§ 11360, subd. (a), Health & Saf. Code). The appellate issues relate primarily to search and seizure of the contraband narcotics.
EVIDENCE TAKEN ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS (§ 1538.5, PEN.CODE)
Officer McCauley, a detector dog handler for the United States Customs Service was assigned to various areas to work with his dog Humphrey who is trained to alert for narcotics. 1 On December 26 he was assigned by Customs to Pasha car terminal, Pier J, Berth 242, Long Beach, a terminal for the importation of automobiles into the United States; 66 privately owned cars had been taken from the ship and stored at Pasha awaiting a check for contraband narcotics by Customs before delivery to the consignees. Officer McCauley's function was to check the vehicles for contraband narcotics by using Humphrey to sniff the air surrounding them; he and Humphrey walked past the cars in this fashion and Humphrey registered no reaction until he came to the last car, a 1970 Maserati to which Humphrey alerted-he picked up the scent at the front of the vehicle, proceeded toward the underside of the car, and when he got under it he started to bite and scratch-his normal training alert for narcotics. At this point Officer McCauley pulled Humphrey away, made no further inspection but radioed to an inspection team which arrived ten minutes later.
Officer McCauley told Inspector LaFata that Humphrey had alerted the Maserati, and ran Humphrey again; Humphrey alerted to the underside of the Maserati. Based on Humphrey's alert, LaFata drilled with a portable drill two or three one-eighth inch holes into the frame underneath the car; this produced a substance on the end of the drill bit "that appeared to be hashish" (Inspector LaFata had been trained by Customs and Federal Drug Administration to interdict narcotics); on the spot he ran a field test which reacted positive and confirmed his suspicion that the substance was hashish. The Maserati was then taken under seizure to the Customs house. An inspection of floorboards under the rear seat revealed alteration; when the altered plate was pried up, eight pounds of hashish were found wrapped in separate cellophane packages stuffed into an aluminum compartment in the frame of the car; the narcotic was removed. Officer Cleveland, United States Customs Patrol, removed and initialed one of the pieces of narcotics and replaced it in the Maserati; the vehicle was restored to its prior condition.
On January 3, 1980, Customs released the Maserati to defendant in Long Beach; he drove it to his home in Pasadena under the surveillance of Officer Cleveland and Long Beach police; defendant remained in the car and appeared to check various areas and to lift the rear seat. Defendant was asked to step out of the car and placed under arrest; the rear seat had been removed from its attachments.
Appellant's main complaint is that the search of the Maserati at the Pasha car terminal was illegal for lack of probable cause to believe it contained contraband narcotics thus it was an exploratory search violative of the federal and State Constitutions. We conclude in the circumstances here that the search constituted a Custom's search in a "border area" which must meet the Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness but requires neither a warrant nor probable cause; and that on the basis of those facts known to the Custom's inspector at the time, the search of the vehicle was reasonable.
The 1538.5 motion was heard de novo. Thus, vested in the trial court was the power to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences. (People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 602, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409.) On appeal presumptions favor the existence of that power and the findings express or implied on such matters must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Lawler, 9 Cal.3d 156, 160, 107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621.) Here the court had the duty to determine whether or not on the facts presented, the search was within the meaning of the federal Constitution. Where the evidence on such issue is not is dispute the issue is one of law to which the substantial evidence rule does not apply (People v. Bigham, 49 Cal.App.3d 73, 76, 122 Cal.Rptr. 252); here it appears to be a question of mixed law and fact. Thus we presume in support of the trial court's finding whatever inferences could have been reasonably drawn from the evidence by the trial court, and measure the facts against the constitutional standard of reasonableness. As to the issue of where defendant was arrested, there was some conflict; the trial court found he was arrested outside of his residence as he exited his vehicle. To this finding we apply the substantial evidence rule. Appellant seeks to invoke the rule of People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.3d 263, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333, because the arrest was made without a warrant. However, there is more than ample evidence to support the trial court's finding based on the testimony of Officer Northrup and defendant's sister.
That the Pasha car terminal at the Port of Long Beach is a part of the "border area" which "includes not only land border crossing checkpoints, but also checkpoints at all ports of entry" (People v. Superior Court (Randall), 33 Cal.App.3d 523, 529, 109 Cal.Rptr. 143), and Customs Officer McCauley and Humphrey had a right to be there for the purpose of checking the imported cars for contraband narcotics is established in the evidence. The Pasha Company lot (Pier J, Berth 242), is chain link fenced with gate and guard; although privately owned, it was approved by the United States Customs Service for Customs jurisdiction upon application of Pasha Company, and specifically is a terminal for importation of automobiles into the United States by ship. Such a lot is approved on application of a company to have imported cargo kept there by submitting to the approval of Customs, fencing it, providing a security system and posting bond. Those members of the public who have business with Customs or the shipping company are permitted on the lot, the general public is "not supposed to be there." The lot is a bonded area, a Customs security area operated "under the auspices of Customs"; it exists as a terminal "with the graces of Customs" and it must comply with Customs' regulations and be available to Customs for security reasons. The Customs Service has jurisdiction over the Pasha car terminal for the importation of cars. Upon arrival automobiles imported into the United States by ship are removed therefrom, checked for damage and kept by Customs in Pasha car terminal to be checked for contraband by Customs inspectors before being released to the consignees. Customs officials conduct inspections "routinely" through the Pasha Company lot; and it is Officer McCauley's function with the aid of his detector dog to check the cars for contraband narcotics; he is assigned by Customs to the lot for that purpose for which he is allowed into the area.
It is at once apparent that the imported automobiles kept at Pasha are under the dominion, custody and control of the United States Customs Service; and that the routine inspection of cars for contraband narcotics is made by Customs officials at Pasha car terminal, a place specifically approved by Customs for that purpose, as soon as the cars are transferred from the ship. Defendant shipped his Maserati from England to the United States; it arrived at the Port of Long Beach where it was removed from the ship and transferred to the Pasha Company lot where it was held in the custody of Customs for inspection for contraband by Customs officials. There is little doubt that the Maserati at Pasha car terminal was in the custody and control of Customs at the time the inspection for contraband narcotics was made (cf. People v. Whyte, 90 Cal.App.3d 235, 243-244, 152 Cal.Rptr. 280): and that Customs officials had a right to be there for that purpose. Thus the search of the Maserati at the Pasha Company lot was a Customs's search conducted in a "border area" at a port of entry.
A "border search," which Customs inspectors are authorized to conduct upon entry of persons or vehicles to the United States is of the broadest possible character and its validity must be determined in accordance with federal law, and there is no question of probable cause under state law. (People v. Kosoff, 34 Cal.App.3d 920, 930, 110 Cal.Rptr. 391; People v. Superior Court (Randall), 33 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-529, 109 Cal.Rptr. 143; People v. Eggleston, 15 Cal.3d 1026, 1029, 93 Cal.Rptr. 776; People v. Clark, 2 Cal.App.3d 510, 518, 82 Cal.Rptr. 682; People v. Mitchell, 275 Cal.App.2d 351, 355, 79 Cal.Rptr. 764.) (...
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