People v. Matthews
| Decision Date | 28 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. F017310,F017310 |
| Citation | 16 Cal.App.4th 102,19 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 16 Cal.App.4th 102 16 Cal.App.4th 102 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Q. MATTHEWS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Appellant James Q. Matthews appeals from the denial of his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The sole issue presented is whether Penal Code section 4852.01, subdivision (c), which contains a three-year residence requirement, 1 violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and California Constitutions. Under the facts presented here, we hold that it does not.
Appellant pled guilty to violation of section 459, second degree burglary, on February 25, 1966. At sentencing, he was placed on probation for a period of two years. After successfully completing probation, on March 11, 1969, appellant was granted dismissal of the charge pursuant to section 1203.4. In June 1971, appellant moved from Visalia, California to Oregon, where he now resides.
On December 26, 1991, pursuant to section 4852.01 et seq., appellant, as a resident of Oregon, filed a petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon in Tulare County Superior Court. This petition was denied because appellant "wasn't a resident of the State of California for three years prior to the filing of the petition."
The general authority to grant reprieves, pardons and commutations of sentences is conferred upon the Governor by article V, section 8 of the California Constitution which provides in relevant part: "Subject to application procedures provided by statute, the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment." A full pardon operates:
"to restore to the convicted person all the rights, privileges, and franchises of which he or she has been deprived in consequence of that conviction or by reason of any matter involved therein; provided, that nothing herein contained shall abridge or impair the power or authority conferred by law on any board or tribunal to revoke or suspend any right, privilege or franchise for any act or omission not involved in the conviction; provided further, that nothing in this article shall affect any of the provisions of the Medical Practice Act ... or the power or authority conferred by law on the Board of Medical Examiners therein, or the power or authority conferred by law upon any board that issues a certificate which permits any person or persons to apply his or her or their art or profession on the person of another." (§ 4853.)
In order to apply for a pardon, a person convicted of a felony who is not currently imprisoned must first obtain a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. 2 Statutory provisions governing the issuance of such certificates are contained in sections 4852.01 through 4852.21. Section 4852.01, subdivision (c) provides:
"Any person convicted of a felony the accusatory pleading of which has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4 may file a petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon pursuant to the provisions of this chapter; provided the petitioner has not been incarcerated in any prison, jail, detention facility or any other penal institution or agency since the dismissal of the accusatory pleading and is not on probation for the commission of any other felony, and petitioner presents satisfactory evidence of three years residence in this state prior to the filing of the petition." (Emphasis added.)
Section 4852.06 gives further definition of the three-year residence requirement by stating, "No such petition shall be filed until and unless the petitioner has continuously resided in this state, after leaving prison, for a period of not less than three years immediately preceding the date of filing the petition."
Appellant contends this three-year residence requirement violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and California Constitutions by excluding nonresidents from applying for a certificate of rehabilitation, thereby directly penalizing persons who exercise their fundamental right to travel. He cites Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274. In Dunn it was noted:
(Id. at p. 334, 92 S.Ct. at p. 999.)
Were we to identify the issue solely as one of durational residence, we might be compelled to agree, not only as to the effect on the right to travel, but also as to the constitutional invalidity of the three-year requirement. However, implicit in the three-year residence requirement is that the petitioner (for the certificate of rehabilitation) must be a bona fide resident. It is in this regard that appellant's argument fails. "The Supreme Court has distinguished between bona fide residence requirements and durational residence requirements, finding only the latter violative of the right to travel." (Arredondo v. Brockette (5th Cir.1981) 648 F.2d 425, 428, affd.sub nom., Martinez v. Bynum (1983) 461 U.S. 321, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 75 L.Ed.2d 879.)
The equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions are "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." (Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 531, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549.) The provisions of the California Constitution guaranteeing equal protection are "substantially the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1965) 62 Cal.2d 586, 588, 43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321.) Hence, "where the charge is that equal protection is denied, the effect of both constitutions is the same." (8 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, § 603, pp. 57-58.)
When confronted with the question of whether a statute operates to deny one of the right to equal protection under the law, the reviewing court must first determine the appropriate standard of review. (Ayala v. Superior Court (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 938, 942-943, 194 Cal.Rptr. 665.) As discussed in Ayala at page 943, 194 Cal.Rptr. 665:
When reviewing legislative classifications under the equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, the classification is generally presumed to be constitutional. [Citation.] 'However, once it is determined that the classification scheme affects a fundamental interest or right the burden shifts; thereafter the state must first establish that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law and then demonstrate that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further that purpose.' [Citation.]" (Emphasis omitted.)
If a fundamental interest or a "suspect classification" is not at stake, 3 the As previously noted, appellant argues the statutory scheme embodied in sections 4852.01 through 4852.21 affects a fundamental interest as it directly penalizes persons who exercise their fundamental right to travel and therefore is subject to strict scrutiny. By his citation of durational residence cases, appellant appears to perceive the residence language as being exclusively durational. Such perception is not entirely misplaced. However, as we shall explain, there is a significant distinction to be made. Typically, durational residence requirements involve the right to travel because they tend to discourage migration to the state involved. (Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974) 415 U.S. 250, 257, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1081, 39 L.Ed.2d 306.) For example, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, the Supreme Court held that newcomers to Arizona, such as plaintiff, were being unconstitutionally denied basic necessities of life, such as free medical care, by an Arizona statute that included a durational residence requirement. It was observed by the court that one may hesitate to move to a state with a durational residence requirement if one has a medical problem since that person would be unable to rely on that state for aid. (Ibid.)
inquiry is less stringent because the reviewing court is merely "directed to the question of whether or not the statutory classification [16 Cal.App.4th 108] bears a 'rational relationship' to a conceivable legitimate state purpose." (Ayala v. Superior Court, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 943, 194 Cal.Rptr. 665; see also People v. Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 126, 221 Cal.Rptr. 382.)
In all of the cases cited by appellant, 4 the durational residence requirement was challenged by a person who had become a resident by moving to the state but was disenfranchised or otherwise unable to receive benefits because of insufficient time in the state. In other words, no issue as to bona fide residence was ever presented. In Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, the Supreme Court invalidated a one-year residence requirement for voting imposed on a law school professor who had recently moved to Tennessee but specifically noted no challenge was made to "Tennessee's power to restrict the vote to bona fide Tennessee residents." (Id. at p. 334, 92 S.Ct. at p. 999.)
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