People v. Mattson

• Decision Date: 22 October 1984
• Docket Number: Cr. 21439
• Citation: 207 Cal.Rptr. 278,688 P.2d 887,37 Cal.3d 85
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 688 P.2d 887 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Dee MATTSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 278

207 Cal.Rptr. 278

37 Cal.3d 85, 688 P.2d 887

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Dee MATTSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 21439.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Oct. 22, 1984.

Ronald S. Smith, Beverly Hills, for defendant and appellant.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, and Eric S. Multhaup, Deputy State Public Defender, as Amici Curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Hahn, Norman H. Sokolow, Howard J. Schwab and Shunji Asari, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of the wilful, deliberate and premeditated first degree murders of Cheryl G. and Adele C. (Pen.Code, §§ 187, 189.) ¹ As special circumstances the jury found that the murder of Cheryl was committed during the commission or attempted commission of rape ( § 261, subd.(2)) and of lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 ( § 288); that the murder of Adele was committed during the commission or attempted commission of kidnaping ( § 207) and of rape ( § 261, subd.(2)); and, with respect to each victim, that defendant committed more than one first degree murder (former § 190.2, subd. (c)(5)). In separate counts the jury also found defendant guilty of kidnaping and raping each victim, in each case with the infliction of great bodily harm ( § 12022.7), and of lewd or lascivious conduct on Cheryl. Finally, defendant was convicted of kidnaping, raping, sodomizing, and orally copulating Kiz L. The jury found defendant to be legally sane and fixed the penalty at death. The court denied his motions for modification of the judgment and for a new trial. His appeal to this court is automatic. ( § 1239, subd. (b).)

We need recite only the facts relevant to the primary issue on appeal: On September 25, 1978, defendant was in custody in Ely, Nevada, on suspicion of the kidnaping, rape and armed robbery of a young woman in that state. Officer Dingle of the North Las Vegas Police Department advised defendant of his rights to remain silent and to counsel. Defendant replied that he did not wish to speak with Dingle and that he wanted an attorney. He was then placed under arrest and driven to North Las Vegas, some three or four hours away, and held in jail. On September 28 defendant was arraigned and again advised of his rights, but subsequently agreed to talk with Dingle about the Nevada rape and implicated himself in the crime.

On October 3 Officer Dingle again interrogated defendant. The questioning was initiated by Dingle and prompted by inquiries from officers of the Police Department of Huntington Beach, California, concerning the rape of Kiz L. Dingle advised defendant of his rights and then questioned him about the California crime. Defendant implicated himself, giving a detailed description of his conduct with Kiz. Dingle testified that before he asked defendant about Kiz he made no attempt to ascertain whether defendant was represented by counsel. In fact, a Nevada public defender was appointed that same morning to represent defendant on the Nevada charges.

Over the next few weeks Officer Dingle repeatedly questioned defendant on "a number of areas," each time advising him of his rights; most of these conversations were initiated by Dingle and all seem to have taken place in the absence of counsel. Throughout this period Dingle kept in close contact with various California law enforcement agencies.

On November 7, 1978, Officer Reed of the Los Angeles Police Department went to North Las Vegas to question defendant about the death of Cheryl G. He first spoke with Officer Dingle, who informed him that when defendant was arrested in Ely he had invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and had asked for counsel. Reed then asked Dingle to contact the Nevada Public Defender--not, he testified, to secure counsel's consent to the questioning, but merely to inform him of the interrogation as a matter of "courtesy" or "protocol." Dingle telephoned the public defender's office but was unable to reach defendant's lawyer at that time; he made no attempt to speak with his supervisor, but instead left a message for the attorney. According to Dingle, defendant's attorney knew that his client was suspected of certain felony sex crimes in California, presumably the rape of Kiz L., but did not know he was also suspected of murder.

The next day Officer Dingle brought defendant to an interview room to be questioned by Officer Reed. Reed readvised defendant of his rights, and he agreed to talk. He admitted to the kidnaping, rape, and murder of Cheryl G. and further confessed to the kidnaping, rape, and murder of a young girl later identified as Adele C. As to each victim two conversations took place, one unrecorded and a second tape recorded.

In July 1979 the Los Angeles District Attorney's office filed an information charging defendant with the multiple counts of kidnaping, rape, other sexual offenses, and murder enumerated above.

I. Admissibility of Defendant's Confessions Under Pettingill

Defendant contends that because he asserted his constitutional rights to remain silent and to be represented by counsel when he was initially advised of his Miranda rights by Officer Dingle in Nevada, his subsequent confessions are inadmissible under People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108. Although defendant's case is factually somewhat different from the situation confronting us in Pettingill, it is nonetheless governed by the principles of that decision, recently reaffirmed in People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 263-269, 193 Cal.Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149.

In Pettingill the defendant and three companions were arrested in Eureka at the scene of a burglary. When advised of his Miranda rights the defendant refused to talk to the police and was taken to the Eureka police station and booked. While arresting the codefendants the police saw and seized items they believed linked the suspects with Santa Barbara burglaries. The Eureka police contacted the Santa Barbara police and, three days after the defendant's arrest on the Eureka burglary, a Santa Barbara officer arrived and questioned him about burglaries in that jurisdiction. He first told the defendant that his companions had confessed, and recited other facts implicating the defendant in the crimes. He then advised the defendant of his rights and secured a confession to the burglaries. The Santa Barbara officer had been informed that the defendant had invoked his privilege against self-incrimination when first advised of his Miranda rights at the scene of the Eureka burglary.

We held the confessions inadmissible under the California privilege against self-incrimination (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15), rejecting the more permissive federal standard set out in Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313. We reaffirmed our holding in People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625, that once a defendant has invoked his privilege against self-incrimination the police cannot question him again, even if they repeat the Miranda warnings: "By his refusal to waive his constitutional rights initially, defendant indicated that he intended to assert his rights--the privilege had been once invoked--and all further attempts at police interrogation should have ceased." (Id. at p. 719, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625.)

In Pettingill the People sought to distinguish Miranda-Fioritto on factual grounds, stressing that (1) the interrogation that produced the confession did not immediately follow defendant's assertion of his right to remain silent, but came three days later; and (2) the interrogation was conducted by an officer of a different law enforcement agency and dealt with crimes different from those for which the defendant had been arrested and first questioned. (21 Cal.3d at p. 242, 145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108.) We rejected both distinctions. First, we observed that the three-day delay between the defendant's arrest on the Eureka burglary and his confession to the Santa Barbara crimes did not cure the failure of the police to cease all questioning, but in fact aggravated the error. (Id. at p. 244, 145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108.) Further, we found the limitation on Fioritto contemplated by the second proffered distinction fundamentally objectionable. "It might catch the occasional sophisticated criminal who wishes to make selective statements about certain charges to specified agencies; but it would do so at the cost of sweeping into its net the larger majority of suspects who see the uniform only as a symbol of police authority, who neither know nor care about the precise jurisdictional competence of their interrogators, and who do not want to talk to any of them. Little would remain of the Fioritto rule if it could be evaded simply by sending in an officer from a different police or sheriff's department every time a suspect asserts his right to remain silent, or by changing the subject of the questioning from one of the crimes under investigation to another." (Id. at p. 245, 145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108.)

Here defendant's October 3 confession to the crimes against Kiz L. should have been excluded under the Fioritto-Pettingill rule. Responding to an inquiry from the Huntington Beach police (see fn. 2, post), Officer Dingle initiated an interrogation of defendant one week after his arrest and elicited his confession to the California crime. As we stated in Pettingill, neither the delay between the initial assertion of the privilege nor the fact that the renewed questioning concerned a different crime cures the Fioritto error of resuming interrogations once a suspect has asserted his Miranda rights.

Officer Reed's interrogations of defendant on November 8 were also conducted in violation of the...