People v. Maust
| Decision Date | 27 June 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-88-2109,1-88-2109 |
| Citation | 216 Ill.App.3d 173,576 N.E.2d 965,160 Ill.Dec. 11 |
| Parties | , 160 Ill.Dec. 11 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David MAUST, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jack O'Malley, State's Atty. of Cook County (Renee Goldfarb and David R. Butzen, Asst. State's Attys.), Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.
Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender of Cook County (Z. Peter Tokatlian, Asst. Public Defender), Chicago, for defendant-appellee.
Defendant David Maust (defendant) made incriminating statements, regarding his involvement in a 1981 Chicago homicide for which he had not yet been charged, during custodial interrogation initiated by officers of the Cook County sheriff's police. At the time he gave these statements, defendant was in custody in a Texas prison for an unrelated criminal charge that had been filed against him in that State, and local counsel had been appointed to represent him regarding that offense.
After defendant made the incriminating remarks to Cook County authorities regarding the Chicago murder, he was indicted in Illinois for that offense and waived formal proceedings for his extradition from Texas to Illinois. In his written waiver of extradition proceedings, defendant requested that "counsel be appointed to represent [him]." Later, when defendant was being returned to Illinois in the custody of Cook County sheriff's police, defendant made additional incriminating statements regarding the Chicago homicide.
Upon his return to Illinois, defendant was arraigned for the Chicago murder and appointed counsel to represent him. He filed motions to suppress his incriminating statements regarding the Chicago homicide, arguing that the statements had been taken in violation of his fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel under the United States Constitution. ( Following a hearing, the trial court suppressed both sets of statements made by defendant. The State appeals from this ruling.
We conclude that defendant's acceptance of counsel for the Texas criminal charge, where there is nothing in the record to show that defendant invoked his right to an attorney during any previous custodial interrogation, did not prohibit the Cook County sheriff's police from questioning defendant with respect to the unrelated Chicago homicide. However, we also determine that defendant effectively invoked his sixth amendment right to counsel when he waived formal extradition proceedings following his indictment for the Chicago murder. We find no basis to disturb the trial court's evidentiary finding that defendant's second set of statements, during his return journey to Illinois, were prompted by remarks from the Cook County sheriff's police who accompanied him. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's suppression of defendant's first set of statements to authorities, affirm the court's suppression of defendant's second set of statements, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent herewith.
The following facts derive from the hearing on defendant's motions to suppress his statements. In 1982, the Cook County sheriff's police learned that defendant was being held in a Texas prison. Officers William Behrens and Philip Bettiker of the Cook County sheriff's police travelled to the Galveston County, Texas sheriff's office in May 1982 to question defendant regarding a 1981 Chicago murder. Before questioning defendant, the officers informed him of his Miranda rights and defendant acknowledged and waived these rights. Thereafter, defendant made statements incriminating himself in the 1981 Chicago murder.
At the time he made these statements to Cook County Officers Behrens and Bettiker, defendant was represented by local counsel on an unrelated Texas criminal offense for which defendant had been charged prior to the Cook County officers' conversation with defendant. The officers were aware that defendant was being held for the Texas offense, but did not know that defendant had been appointed counsel with respect to the Texas charge.
Thereafter, an indictment was returned against defendant in Illinois charging him with the 1981 Chicago homicide and his concealment thereof. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, pars. 9-1, 9-3.1.) Defendant then waived formal extradition proceedings and agreed to return to Illinois to face the criminal indictments that had been filed against him in connection with the 1981 Chicago murder. In his written waiver of extradition proceedings, defendant requested that "counsel be appointed to represent [him]."
In December 1983, defendant was returned to Illinois in the custody of Officers Edward O'Donnell and Joseph Curtin of the Cook County sheriff's police. During this return trip, defendant made additional incriminating statements to the officers regarding the 1981 Chicago homicide. At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, defendant testified that his statements were prompted by remarks from the officers who accompanied him to Chicago. The officers testified that defendant's statements were volunteered, and that they had said nothing to defendant to elicit his incriminating remarks.
Following his return to Illinois, defendant was arraigned and appointed counsel to represent him for the Chicago homicide. His attorney filed motions to suppress his statements to the Cook County sheriff's police that defendant made in May 1982 and December 1983. In these motions, defendant argued the May 1982 statements were taken in violation of the right to counsel defendant invoked when he was appointed local counsel for the unrelated Texas criminal charge. Defendant claimed that the December 1983 statements should be suppressed because they violated the right to counsel he invoked when he waived formal extradition proceedings, and because his remarks had occurred during interrogation prompted by the officers in violation of defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel under the United States Constitution.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's motions to suppress both sets of statements he made to the Cook County sheriff's police. The trial court specifically credited defendant's testimony that his December 1983 statements, during his return from Texas to Illinois, were prompted by comments from the officers who accompanied defendant during this trip. The State appeals from the trial court's suppression order.
The defendant contends that his acceptance of legal representation at arraignment on the Texas offense served to trigger his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, during his subsequent custodial interrogation concerning the 1981 Chicago homicide with which he had not then been charged, and which was unrelated to the Texas offense. The State argues that the appointment of Texas counsel to represent defendant on the unrelated Texas criminal charge did not preclude the officers' questioning of defendant regarding the 1981 Chicago murder.
The defendant's argument in the instant appeal relies upon jurisprudence under the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution. Under the fifth amendment, no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." (U.S. Const., amend. V.) To safeguard this right against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation, authorities must inform the suspect before questioning begins that the accused has a right to remain silent, that the statements he makes to authorities may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either appointed or retained. (Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) If the accused indicates during custodial interrogation that he desires the assistance of counsel, additional questioning may resume only if the suspect initiates further dialogue with authorities. (Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, see also Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (per curiam).) The Edwards prohibition against subsequent police questioning following a suspect's request for counsel is not "investigation specific," but serves to bar subsequent interrogation of the accused regarding separate, unrelated offenses. Arizona v. Roberson (1988), 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704.
Upon the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings against an accused, the suspect is accorded the sixth amendment "right to * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) This guarantee applies to all critical stages of the prosecution including post-indictment interrogation. (United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146.) The Miranda warnings are deemed sufficient to apprise an accused of his right to counsel if police undertake questioning of the suspect regarding the charged offense before the suspect has been arraigned. (Patterson v. Illinois (1988), 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261.) Once the accused requests or is appointed counsel at arraignment or similar proceeding, authorities are prohibited from initiating further questioning of the defendant regarding the criminal activity for which the defendant has been indicted and counsel provided. (Michigan v. Jackson (1986), 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631.) In addition, once the sixth amendment right to counsel has attached, authorities may not use surreptitious means to gain information from the accused regarding the charged offense. Maine v. Moulton (1985), 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481; United States v. Henry (1980), 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115.
To support his position that the acceptance of sixth amendment counsel serves to trigger the fifth amendment right to counsel, the...
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...even though it is a separate proceeding from the criminal action for which extradition is sought. See People v. Maust, 216 Ill.App.3d 173, 160 Ill.Dec. 11, 576 N.E.2d 965, 971 (1991) (concluding that Maust invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for pending charges when he requested co......
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