People v. McClure
| Decision Date | 20 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 100321.,100321. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Joseph E. McCLURE, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Stewart J. Umholtz, State's Attorney, Pekin (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Christina M. Schlect and Leah C. Myers, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Joe Mikula, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.
Kevin F. Sullivan, Peoria, for appellee.
The central issue before us is whether the savings provision set forth in section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2002)) serves to toll the limitations period set forth in section 2-118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002)), such that a driver who voluntarily withdraws a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension of a driver's license may refile the petition within one year. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal after the appellate court reversed the circuit court of Tazewell County's judgment and determined that section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure tolled the limitations period of section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code. 355 Ill. App.3d 778, 291 Ill.Dec. 741, 824 N.E.2d 317. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
On April 25, 2003, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) under section 11-501(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2002)). As mandated by statute, defendant's driver's license was summarily suspended due to his failure to submit to chemical testing. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2002). On June 19, 2003, defendant filed a "Request for Hearing," under section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code. See 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002). The matter was set for hearing, and continued twice by agreement of the parties. A hearing did not commence, however, because defendant withdrew his petition to rescind on August 26, 2003.
The charge of DUI was ultimately amended to reckless driving, and defendant pleaded guilty to that offense on February 24, 2004. He was sentenced to two days in the county jail, one year of probation, and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine.
Defendant thereafter filed a second petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension on April 1, 2004, nearly one year after his arrest and more than seven months since withdrawing his first petition. In his second petition, defendant asserted that the withdrawal of his initial petition was tantamount to a voluntary dismissal contemplated by section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, under that statute, he had one year to refile his petition. The State moved to strike defendant's petition as untimely. In its motion to strike, the State relied on the appellate court's decision in People v. Rodriguez, 339 Ill.App.3d 677, 274 Ill.Dec. 615, 791 N.E.2d 707 (2003). The trial court in the instant case noted that it was bound by the Rodriguez holding, as it was the only case that had yet to decide the issue, and accordingly struck defendant's petition as untimely.
Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, declining to follow the Second District's opinion in Rodriguez. The appellate court disagreed with the Rodriguez court's determination that section 2-118.1(b) was ambiguous, and held that the plain language of the statute, when construed as a whole, requires an initial petition to rescind to be filed within the 90-day time limit, and likewise allows refiling of a voluntarily dismissed petition within one year. 355 Ill.App.3d at 781, 291 Ill.Dec. 741, 824 N.E.2d 317. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Section 11-501 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2002)) prohibits motorists in this state from driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. In addition to criminal sanctions, motorists arrested for DUI are subject to suspension of their driving privileges. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2002). Any person driving on a public roadway in Illinois who is arrested for DUI is deemed to have given implied consent to blood, breath or urine testing to determine whether the motorist is under the influence of an intoxicant. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 2002). Section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code authorizes the Secretary of State to summarily suspend the driver's license of any motorist arrested for DUI who refuses to submit to chemical testing, tests above the legal alcohol concentration limit, or tests positive for an intoxicating substance. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(d) (West 2002). The statutory summary suspension takes effect on the forty-sixth day after the motorist receives notice of the suspension. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(g) (West 2002). We have previously stated that the issuance of a statutory summary suspension protects the public from impaired drivers and swiftly removes them from our roadways. People v. Moore, 138 Ill.2d 162, 166, 149 Ill.Dec. 278, 561 N.E.2d 648 (1990); People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill.2d 250, 255, 182 Ill.Dec. 26, 609 N.E.2d 329 (1993).
Although motorists arrested for DUI are immediately subject to the statutory summary suspension of their drivers' licenses, they are not left without recourse. Indeed, section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code allows motorists to contest their suspensions. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002). Section 2-118.1(b) provides:
625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002).
The petition filed by the motorist must state grounds upon which the summary suspension should be lifted. Schaefer, 154 Ill.2d at 257, 182 Ill.Dec. 26, 609 N.E.2d 329. The issues considered in the hearing are limited to: (a) whether the motorist was lawfully arrested under section 11-501 of the Vehicle Code; (b) whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or both; (c) whether the motorist refused to submit to chemical testing after being advised that such refusal would result in a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges; and (d) whether the motorist submitted to chemical testing and failed the test. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002). The motorist bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case for rescission. People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill.2d 308, 313, 294 Ill.Dec. 110, 830 N.E.2d 522 (2005). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the State to present evidence justifying the suspension. Cosenza, 215 Ill.2d at 313, 294 Ill.Dec. 110, 830 N.E.2d 522.
It is within this framework that we now consider whether a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension refiled after the 90-day period set forth in section 2-118.1(b), in reliance on the one-year savings clause set forth in section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is untimely and subject to dismissal. As this issue is purely a question of law, we review it de novo. People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill.2d 176, 179, 291 Ill.Dec. 656, 824 N.E.2d 232 (2005).
The State asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that defendant's rescission petition was improperly dismissed as untimely. The State argues that an ambiguity exists in section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code such that the statute can be construed to preclude the refiling of a rescission petition beyond the 90-day limitations period and can simultaneously be construed to authorize the refiling of a rescission petition after the 90 days have lapsed. The State urges that this ambiguity compels us to look outside the plain language of the statute and consider legislative history. In that regard, the State contends that the legislature did not intend for the Code of Civil Procedure's savings clause to be applied to section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code.
Defendant counters that the plain language of section 2-118.1(b) is clear and unambiguous. Defendant maintains that this court is bound by the statutory language and need not resort to further aids of statutory construction. Relying on this premise, along with the appellate court's holding in the instant case, defendant posits that the plain language of the statute states that rescission hearings are civil in nature and, consequently, are subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, including the one-year savings clause set forth in section 13-217. Thus, defendant contends that his rescission petition was timely filed and improperly dismissed.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill.2d 159, 171, 273 Ill.Dec. 116, 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute. People v. Martinez, 184 Ill.2d 547, 550, 235 Ill.Dec. 452, 705 N.E.2d 65 (1998). When possible, the court should interpret the...
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