People v. McClurkin

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO
• Citation: 945 N.Y.S.2d 718,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04366,96 A.D.3d 784
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Bryan McCLURKIN, appellant.
• Decision Date: 06 June 2012

96 A.D.3d 784
945 N.Y.S.2d 718
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04366

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,
v.
Bryan McCLURKIN, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

June 6, 2012.

Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, N.Y., for appellant.

Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Ronnie Jane Lamm of counsel), for respondent.

DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, J.P., ANITA R. FLORIO, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and PLUMMER E. LOTT, JJ.

[96 A.D.3d 785]Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Suffolk County (Gazzillo, J.), both rendered October 27, 2008, convicting him of attempted

[945 N.Y.S.2d 719]

assault in the first degree under Indictment No. 361/07, and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree under Indictment No. 1323/07, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.

The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court and generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion ( see People v. Seeber, 4 N.Y.3d 780, 793 N.Y.S.2d 826, 826 N.E.2d 797;People v. Jackson, 87 A.D.3d 552, 928 N.Y.S.2d 58;People v. Douglas, 83 A.D.3d 1092, 921 N.Y.S.2d 324;People v. Duncan, 78 A.D.3d 1193, 912 N.Y.S.2d 283). Here, the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his negotiated pleas of guilty with the assistance of competent counsel in exchange for the promise of favorable sentences ( see People v. Pooler, 58 A.D.3d 757, 871 N.Y.S.2d 707;People v. Ford, 44 A.D.3d 1070, 844 N.Y.S.2d 400;People v. Mann, 32 A.D.3d 865, 821 N.Y.S.2d 616). The sentencing court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, without a hearing, the defendant's pro se motion to vacate his plea of guilty to attempted assault in the first degree on the ground that he did not receive the sentence promised to him by his attorney ( see People v. Anderson, 230 A.D.2d 916, 917, 647 N.Y.S.2d 91). The terms of the defendant's promised sentence were clearly set forth by the court during the plea proceeding, and the defendant acknowledged that he understood those terms and that, other than the promises placed on the record, no other promises had been made to induce his plea of guilty ( see People v. Laurent, 58 A.D.3d 754, 872 N.Y.S.2d 161;People v. Anderson, 230 A.D.2d at 917, 647 N.Y.S.2d 91;People v. Kai Ming Hou, 193 A.D.2d 759, 598 N.Y.S.2d 984;People v. Davis, 161 A.D.2d 787, 556 N.Y.S.2d 664;People v. Davis, 144 A.D.2d 576, 534 N.Y.S.2d 429). Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, his attorney was not obligated to participate in a baseless pro se motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, which was...