People v. McFall

• Decision Date: 20 February 1968
• Docket Number: Cr. 6164
• Citation: 66 Cal.Rptr. 277,259 Cal.App.2d 172
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Arthur McFALL, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 277

66 Cal.Rptr. 277

259 Cal.App.2d 172

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Arthur McFALL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 6164.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 20, 1968.

Hearing Denied April 17, 1968.

Morris Schachter, San Jose, for appellant (under appointment of the Court of Appeal).

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., of the State of California, Jerome C. Utz, Michael J. Kelly, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

AGEE, Associate Justice.

Defendant appeals following jury conviction of auto theft (Veh.Code § 10851). The prosecution's case in chief is based upon the testimony of three witnesses.

Michael Burns testified that on July 30, 1965, about 7:00 p.m., he drove his 1954 Chevrolet out to a sawmill near Fortuna, where his brother Gene was at work; that he parked it in the mill's parking lot and put the car keys on the sun visor; that he had traded the Chevrolet for Gene's Nova and he went into the mill and got the Nova's keys from Gene; that he drove away in the Nova and never saw the Chevrolet again; that he had not given anyone except Gene permission to drive the Chevrolet.

Richard Mendoza testified that on the same evening, about 9 o'clock, defendant drove the Chevrolet into a drive-in, which the witness owned, and told him that he (defendant) had bought the car.

Chief of Police Lindsay, of the City of Louisiana, State of Missouri, testified that on October 9, 1965 he arrested defendant in said city pursuant to a warrant of arrest on charges of fraudulent checks and forgery. Defendant was driving the Chevrolet at the time. (The statements made by defendant to Chief Lindsay following the arrest will be discussed below.)

The prosecution rested at this point and defendant took the witness stand. He testified that Gene had agreed to sell him the Chevrolet for $50 and that it would be at the sawmill on Friday (July 30); that he went to the mill on that day, about 8:30 p.m., paid Gene $30 in cash on account, got the car keys from him, and drove away in the Chevrolet; that Gene told him the 'papers to the car' had not come back from Sacramento and that he would send them to him when they came; that he believed Gene was the owner of the Chevrolet and entitled to sell it.

Defendant rested after completing his testimony and the prosecution called Gene in rebuttal. He testified that he had never offered to sell the Chevrolet to defendant; that when he finished his shift and found the Chevrolet missing from the car lot, he got a ride into Fortuna and reported this fact to the State Highway Patrol.

On cross-examination, Gene testified that he had known defendant for about five years; that he and his brother Michael had made a deal which involved the exchange of their cars; that he (Gene) may have told defendant about this deal; that he did not tell defendant's sister (Ruby Sharp) that his reason for filing the stolen vehicle report was that defendant took the car out of the state.

The defense called Ruby Sharp, defendant's stepsister, in surrebuttal. She testified to a conversation with Gene in which he admitted selling the car to defendant but that he reported it as missing because defendant had taken the car out of the state without paying for it.

Statements Made to Police By Defendant

Chief Lindsay testified that he stopped defendant, who was driving the Chevrolet, and placed him under arrest pursuant to the warrant referred to above.

Lindsay gave the following answers to the following questions by the prosecutor: 'Q. * * * Now, after you arrested him did you advise him of any legal rights? A. Yes, sir. Q. And what did you advise him? A. I advised him that he didn't have to make a statement, he was entitled to an attorney if he wanted one, and the boy voluntarily gave us a statement.'

Timely objection was made by defendant's counsel to the admission of any statement by defendant on the ground that the warnings required by Miranda v. State of Arizona (June 13, 1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, had not been given. This decision is applicable since the trial herein did not commence until October 17, 1966. (See People v. Rollins (1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 691, 56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221.)

Miranda holds that, absent an explicit waiver, statements of one subjected to custodial police interrogation are admissible as evidence only if the person in custody is warned, prior to questioning, that: (1) he has a right to remain silent, (2) anything he says may be used as evidence against him, (3) he has the right to the presence of a lawyer during the interrogation, and (4) if indigent, he has a right to a court-appointed lawyer (384 U.S., at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612).

It is clear from the record that the warnings given did not include those numbered (2) and (4) above and there is no evidence which indicates any waiver of these rights. Nevertheless, the trial court overruled the defendant's objections based upon Miranda and admitted the following testimony of Chief Lindsay:

'We asked him for ownership to the car or a slip of the title. The boy told us that the car belonged to his mother who lived in the State of Washington. Upon questioning further we asked him how come the car had California plates on it if his mother lived in Washington. He then said that he had bought the car from his buddy in Eureka, California, who worked at a service station, the day prior to him leaving California, and he didn't have time to get the papers and that they would be mailed to him.'

The People contend that the Miranda warnings were not required because, at the time of questioning, suspicion had not focused on the defendant with respect to auto theft and he was not in custody on any charge relating to the vehicle. ¹

Granting that the charges upon which defendant was arrested are totally unrelated to the subsequent charge of auto theft and that the questioning as to the car ownership was only investigatory, the rationale and explicit language of the Miranda decision rule out any such limitation on present admissibility requirements. We therefore need not discuss the Escobedo-Dorado rule as it was applied prior to Miranda. (Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361.)

Miranda states: ...