People v. McFarlin

• Decision Date: 28 June 1973
• Docket Number: 8,9,Nos. 7,s. 7
• Citation: 208 N.W.2d 504,389 Mich. 557
• Parties: , 64 A.L.R.3d 1274 PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary Maurice McFARLIN, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Laverne RABB, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David K. LOOMIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 504

208 N.W.2d 504

389 Mich. 557, 64 A.L.R.3d 1274

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary Maurice McFARLIN, Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Laverne RABB, Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David K. LOOMIS, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 7, 8, 9.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 28, 1973.

Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Appellate Div., Joel B. Saxe, Asst. Pros. Atty., Robert F. Leonard, Prosecuting Atty., Genesee County, Mich., Flint, William F. Delhey, Washtenaw County Pros. Atty., by Leonhard J. Kowalski, Asst. Pros. Atty., Ann Arbor, for the People.

Richard S. McMillin, Asst. Defender, Detroit, John C. Maginnis, Rolf Berg, Research Assts., for McFarlin, Rabb and Loomis.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH.

LEVIN, Justice.

In these cases, consolidated on appeal, the defendants were convicted of felonies and sentenced to serve terms in prison. In the leading McFarlin case (People v. McFarlin, 41 Mich.App. 116, 199 N.W.2d 684 (1972)) a panel of the Court of Appeals, differing with an earlier panel's decision in People v. Coleman, 19 Mich.App. 250, 172 N.W.2d 512 (1969), held that a judge may not consider an adult offender's juvenile offense record as a factor in imposing sentence upon him, and remanded McFarlin for resentencing. The other consolidated cases concern the same issue.

We are of the opinion that the Coleman decision was correct and, therefore, reverse McFarlin and dispose of the other consolidated cases accordingly.

At issue is the restriction on the use of an offender's juvenile record found in the chapter of the Probate Code concerning juveniles and the juvenile division of the Probate Court:

'A disposition of any child under this chapter, or any evidence given in such case, shall not in any civil, criminal or any other cause or proceeding whatever in any court, be lawful or proper evidence against such child for any purpose whatever, except in subsequent cases against the same child under this chapter.' M.C.L.A. § 712A.23; M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.23).

The defendants stress the words prohibiting use of a juvenile record 'for any purpose whatever,' while the people contend that a judge who takes a juvenile record into consideration at sentencing is not using it as 'evidence.'

This language, enacted in 1905 as part of Michigan's first juvenile court act, ¹ has been carried forward to the present without substantive change. ²

Separate courts for juveniles were established in a number of states at the turn of the century. Illinois, in 1899, was the first to act. ³ Other states followed before Michigan acted, but only two, California and Colorado, ⁴ restricted the use of juvenile records in other proceedings. Michigan adopted the language of the Colorado act. ⁵

Although provisions restricting the use of a juvenile record were soon adopted in well over half the states, we have neither been directed to, nor have we been able to find, any contemporaneous discussion or interpretation of these provisions. Thus, now over 65 years after these provisions were first enacted, after everyone conversant with the 'legislative intent' is gone, we seek to determine the proper construction of this restriction.

I

This Court has said that where 'language is of doubtful meaning, a reasonable construction must be given, looking to the purpose subserved thereby. Its occasion and necessity are matters of judicial concern, and its purpose should be effected if possible. Its spirit and purpose should prevail over its strict letter. Injustice in its application should be prevented, and absurd consequences avoided.' (Citations omitted.) Webster v. Rotary Electric Steel Co., 321 Mich. 526, 531, 33 N.W.2d 69, 71 (1948).

Few words have a 'content so intrinsic' that their meaning does not become doubtful in the context of a particular question. Wyandotte Savings Bank v. State Banking Commissioner, 347 Mich. 33, 40, 78 N.W.2d 612 (1956). G. A. Endlich, in his treatise on statutory construction, said:

'Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense; and to adhere rigidly to its literal and primary meaning in all cases would be to miss its real meaning in many. If a literal meaning had been given to the laws which forbade a layman to lay hands on a priest, and punished all who drew blood in the street, the layman who wounded a priest with a weapon would not have falled within the prohibition, and the surgeon who bled a person in the street to save his life, would have been liable to punishment. On the literal construction of his promise, Mahomed II.'s sawing the Venetian governor's body in two, was no breach of his engagement to spare his head; nor Tamerlane's burying alive a garrison, a violation of his pledge to shed no blood. On a literal construction, Paches, after inducing the defendant of Notium to a parley under a promise to replace him safely in the citadel, claimed to be within his engagement when he detained his foe until the place was captured, and put him to death after having conducted him back to it; and the Earl of Argyll fulfilled in the same spirit his promise to the laird of Glenstane, that if he would surrender he would see him safe to England; for he hanged him only after having taken him across the Tweed to the English bank.' Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes (Linn & Company ed. 1888), § 25, pp. 33--34.

The sharp division in the Court of Appeals on this issue in the literally dozens of cases decided since these consolidated cases were decided may impart that the language expressing the restriction on the use of juvenile record is subject to more than one construction.

We seek to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182, 189 N.W.2d 221 (1922). But, as Karl Llewellyn observed, only infrequently 'a legislative intent with some concrete reality can be uncovered in circumstance or legislative history. For the rest, the Court's work is not to Find, any more than it is with case law. It is to Do, responsibly, fittingly, intelligently, with and within the given frame.' (Emphasis by author.) Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals, p. 382. Much the same point was made in language quoted approvingly in Wyandotte Savings Bank v. State Banking Commissioner, Supra, 347 Mich. pp. 40--41, 78 N.W.2d p. 617: the intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion.' 1 Kent's Commentaries (14th ed), § 462.

The teleological approach has great appeal to judges who recognize that law should make sense to the people who must live with it. In Magnuson v. Kent County Board of Canvassers, 370 Mich. 649, 657, 122 N.W.2d 808, 812 (1963), this Court said: 'We may in the construction of an ambiguous statute look to the result of the construction to aid us in determining legislative intent.'

II

In many states the restriction, worded like ours, states that an offender's juvenile record shall not be admissible or usable against him in subsequent proceedings in other courts 'as evidence.' Michigan, along with a few other states, adds emphatically, 'for any purpose whatever.' In other states the limiting words 'as evidence' are not used. In still others, the legislatures have added that juvenile court adjudication shall not be deemed to be a conviction. There are still other variations. ⁶

Although these comparable provisions are almost as venerable as Michigan's, only recently have appellate courts considered whether these provisions preclude a judge from considering an adult offender's juvenile record as a factor in imposing sentence. We have not been cited to, nor have we been able to uncover, any case where the issue was raised before 1958.

In that year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania statute ('The disposition of a child or any evidence given in a juvenile court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other court') does not bar a sentencing judge from considering an adult defendant's juvenile record. Commonwealth v. Myers, 393 P. 224, 144 A.2d 367 (1958). In subsequent cases, the Delaware, Wisconsin, Alaska, Arizona and Oregon Supreme Courts and the New Jersey Superior Court agreed with this construction. ⁷

The Alaska court reasoned:

'A judge, of all persons, should be most cognizant of the existence and meaning of AS 47.10.080(g), and of the fact that under that statute a juvenile offender may not be considered a criminal even though he has suffered a criminal conviction. But the judge cannot simply ignore that phase of appellant's life--before he reached 18 years of age--as though it did not exist-- particularly when appellant was only 21 years old when sentenced. The judge is not required to operate in a vacuum. In sentencing a 21 year old person, the life, characteristics, and background behavior of that person prior to reaching the age of 18 years might be highly relevant. It should be noted that the judge cannot consider a juvenile offense as a criminal conviction for the purpose of prescribing a mandatory sentence. But that was not done in this case. The judge's consideration of factors relating to appellant's life, characteristics, background and behavior prior to reaching the age of 18 years does not mean that he considered appellant a criminal or that he was using the juvenile offenses as criminal convictions in determining the sentence to impose.' Berfield v. State, 458 P.2d 1008, 1011--1012 (Alaska, 1969).

An Illinois intermediate appellate court, ⁸ on the other hand, agreed with the construction adopted by our Court of Appeals in McFarlin.

These decisions from other states are certainly not controlling; indeed, only the Delaware and Illinois statutes contain the same language found in the Michigan statute. Nevertheless, they reveal that the clear weight...