People v. McGrath
| Decision Date | 01 February 1988 |
| Citation | 524 N.Y.S.2d 214,135 A.D.2d 60 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Appellant, v. Richard McGRATH, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Francis D. Phillips II, Dist. Atty., Goshen (Charles A. Esposito, Barbara Strauss, of counsel), for appellant.
Stuart I. Greenberg, Monroe, for respondent.
Before BRACKEN, J.P., and KUNZEMAN, SPATT and HARWOOD, JJ.
The question of law presented on this appeal--whether a court-ordered chemical test to determine the alcohol or drug content of a person's blood must be administered within a specific time after a subject's arrest--has not previously been determined by an appellate court in this State. We hold that chemical tests performed pursuant to a court order issued in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194-a are not subject to the two-hour limitation for tests performed pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 or any other specific time limitation. The time for administering court-ordered chemical tests is limited only by considerations of due process.
The defendant was indicted for numerous crimes, including a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2), charging that he operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The charges arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on Saturday evening, March 8, 1986, at approximately 7:00 P.M. The defendant allegedly caused the accident which resulted in serious injuries to four people in another car. The police officer who responded to the scene of the accident was of the opinion that the defendant was intoxicated based on his observations of the defendant and statements made by the defendant. Accordingly, in the hospital at 8:15 P.M., he placed the defendant under arrest and asked him to consent to a blood test to determine the level of alcohol in his blood. The defendant repeatedly refused. Consequently, the officer began telephoning various judges for the purpose of obtaining an order, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194-a, directing that a blood test be performed. After almost an hour of telephoning, the officer finally located a Judge at home who heard his application. At 10:20 P.M., the application for a court-ordered blood test was granted. At 10:35 P.M., two hours and 20 minutes after the arrest, the test was performed by a doctor. The test results allegedly indicated a blood alcohol content of .23 of 1%.
Following the filing of the indictment, the defendant moved, inter alia, to suppress the results of the blood test and to dismiss count 9 of the indictment which was based on those results on the ground that the blood test had been performed more than two hours after the arrest. Although the defendant acknowledged that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194-a, which governs compulsory chemical tests for intoxication, does not contain a two-hour requirement, he argued, and the County Court agreed, that the two-hour limitation contained in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 should be imposed on court-ordered tests.
We reverse the order of the County Court insofar as appealed from and hold that neither the two-hour limitation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 nor any other specific time limitation is applicable to chemical tests performed pursuant to a court order issued in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194-a ( see generally, People v. Mills, 124 A.D.2d 600, 601, 507 N.Y.S.2d 743, lv. denied 69 N.Y.2d 953, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1037, 509 N.E.2d 372; People v. Morse, 127 Misc.2d 468, 486 N.Y.S.2d 621; see also, People v. White, 133 Misc.2d 386, 391, n. 4, 506 N.Y.S.2d 815). The contrary holding in People v. D'Angelo, 124 Misc.2d 1050, 478 N.Y.S.2d 538, is rejected.
Nothing in the unambiguous language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194-a indicates that the Legislature intended to impose a specific time limitation on the performance of court-ordered chemical tests. The omission of such a restriction reflects a rational legislative determination that it was unnecessary. It is reasonable to assume that the intervention of an impartial magistrate in the issuance of an order for a chemical test insures that the test will not be administered at a time so remote that the results are irrelevant to the central question of the driver's blood-alcohol count at the time of the automobile accident.
Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194-a, a court may only issue an order directing a chemical test of a person's breath, blood, urine or saliva upon a finding of reasonable cause to believe that (1) the person was operating a motor vehicle which was involved in an accident in which another person was killed or seriously injured; (2) the operation of the vehicle violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 which prohibits driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or a breath test administered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193-a indicates that the driver had consumed alcohol; (3) the driver has been lawfully arrested; and (4) the driver has refused to submit to a chemical test after being advised of the consequences of such a refusal, or is unable to consent to such a test. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194-a(2) defines reasonable cause as "the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident which, when taken together, indicate that the operator was driving in violation of The elapsed time between the incident and the request for a court order is one of the circumstances which a court must consider before issuing an order. The determination of reasonable cause is reviewable before trial by way of a motion to suppress the results of the chemical test pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195(3) and CPL § 710.20(5). A claim that delay in the administering of the test following the issuance of the court order negates the finding of reasonable cause is similarly reviewable.
The omission of a specific time limitation for performance of court-ordered chemical tests also reflects a reasonable legislative concern with the practicality of applying the statute. The absence of an absolute time limit permits the flexibility which is sometimes necessary to obtain a court order during hours when court is not in session.
We reject the defendant's contention that the incorporation by reference of certain ...
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