People v. McGriff
| Decision Date | 29 September 1995 |
| Citation | 219 A.D.2d 829,631 N.Y.S.2d 969 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Floyd McGRIFF, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Anthony Miranda, Buffalo, for Appellant.
Matthew J. Murphy, III by Thomas Brandt, Lockport, for Respondent.
Before DENMAN, P.J., and LAWTON, FALLON, BALIO and BOEHM, JJ.
County Court should have granted the motion of defendant to sever his trial from that of his codefendant. Defendant and the codefendant were charged with possession of a controlled substance in the third degree based upon the seizure of two bags containing crack cocaine from a vehicle they occupied when it was stopped by police. When the cocaine was seized at the scene of the stop, the codefendant immediately stated that the drugs were not his. The court was informed that defendant and the codefendant would assert antagonistic factual positions at trial, and they did. Defendant testified that the codefendant possessed the drugs and that, when the police started to pull the vehicle over, the codefendant took the bags from his pocket and threw them toward defendant. The codefendant, on the other hand, testified that defendant removed the drugs from his pocket and threw them at the codefendant. Thus, the core of each defense was in irreconcilable conflict (see, People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 184, 544 N.Y.S.2d 769, 543 N.E.2d 34). Moreover, as the proof was presented at trial, the conflict prejudiced defendant. Prosecution witnesses testified that the codefendant immediately protested that the drugs seized from the car were not his and a prosecution witness testified that he had observed defendant throwing white bags in the direction of the passenger. That evidence supported the codefendant's version and led to an inference of defendant's guilt (see, People v. Mahboubian, supra, at 184, 544 N.Y.S.2d 769, 543 N.E.2d 34). Defendant was further prejudiced by the conduct of codefendant's counsel in aggressively cross-examining defendant, which effectively made codefendant's counsel a second prosecutor (see, People v. Cardwell, 78 N.Y.2d 996, 575 N.Y.S.2d 267, 580 N.E.2d 753).
We reject defendant's contention that the stop of the vehicle was pretextual. The police may stop a vehicle for the traffic infraction of excessively tinted windows (People v. Osborne, 158 A.D.2d 740, 551 N.Y.S.2d 336, lv. denied 75 N.Y.2d 968, 556 N.Y.S.2d 253, 555 N.E.2d 625; People v. Daguilar, 158 A.D.2d 857...
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