People v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 20 April 1998
• Citation: 681 N.Y.S.2d 428,178 Misc.2d 695
• Parties: , 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 98,597 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Enerodilio SANCHEZ, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 428

681 N.Y.S.2d 428

178 Misc.2d 695, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 98,597

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Enerodilio SANCHEZ, Defendant.

Criminal Court of the City of New York New York County.

April 20, 1998.

Goldstein, Weinstein & Fuld, Bronx (Christopher Booth, of counsel), for defendant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York County, New York City (Seth Krasilovsky, of counsel), for plaintiff.

LUCY BILLINGS, Judge.

Defendant is charged with Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree, Resisting Arrest, Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree, and Reckless Driving. N.Y.Penal Law §§ 120.20, 205.30; N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 511(1)(a), 1212. The court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether physical evidence and defendant's post-arrest statement should be suppressed. Mapp v.. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965).

I have read the transcript and the recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law from the hearing held February 26, 1998, in Part AP8A before Judicial Hearing Officer William H. Wallace III. I adopt his findings of fact and conclusions of law to the extent set forth below and modify them for the reasons stated.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The sole witness at the hearing was Police Officer Martin Williams of the New York City Police Department, 34th Precinct. The court finds his testimony credible.

In the early morning of April 10, 1997, Officer Williams and his partner were on motor patrol travelling south on St. Nicholas Avenue in New York County. They observed defendant Enerodilio Sanchez in a blue 1988 Toyota moving in the same direction. Officer Williams noted that defendant's automobile lacked a working license plate lamp and decided to pull defendant over either to issue defendant a summons or to admonish him to repair the light. Officer Williams activated his police lights and siren Officer Williams parked behind defendant's Toyota. As Williams and his partner exited their vehicle defendant leaned forward and lowered his left arm and shoulder. Defendant then drove off at a high speed, made a U-turn, and proceeded north at 40 to 50 miles per hour. Nearing 187th Street, defendant crossed the double yellow lines and travelled in the opposite lane of traffic toward a car stopped at a traffic light, before turning west on 187th Street.

and stopped defendant on the southwest corner of 186th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue.

Officer Williams and his partner set off in pursuit of defendant and reported defendant's actions over police radio. They followed defendant for about two minutes as defendant drove on 187th Street to Audubon Avenue where he made another turn, continued for two more blocks, and turned again at an intersection. At this point the officers received an order by police radio to end the pursuit in the interest of public safety. During the chase the officers observed defendant pass two red lights and a stop sign.

Officer Williams received a police radio message that other officers had followed defendant's automobile until it crashed on the Bronx side of University Bridge. Arriving at the accident scene, Officer Williams found defendant sitting outside his demolished vehicle in handcuffs. Defendant, who appeared "flushed" and "nervous," emitted the odor of an alcoholic beverage. Transcript of Proceedings at 13 (Feb. 26, 1998). Curious as to defendant's motive for his behavior, Williams asked defendant why he had "run." Id. Defendant answered "because my license is not good. I have a revoked license." Id. Recalling that defendant had "reached down" on the left side of the driver's seat before departing 187th Street, Officer Williams was concerned that the object of defendant's interest might have been a weapon. Id. The officer searched under the driver's seat and found a bottle of cognac.

Officer Williams placed defendant under arrest. The officer took defendant's identification from him and checked the status of his driver's license on the police computer. The license had been suspended and revoked.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. The Stop

1. The Standards for Determining the Propriety of a Vehicle Stop

The court rejects defendant's initial claim, strenuously advanced at the hearing, that the police stopped his car as a pretext to investigate an unrelated offense. A police officer may lawfully stop a car where the officer has probable cause to believe the driver violated vehicle and traffic law. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977); People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393, 396, 477 N.Y.S.2d 106, 465 N.E.2d 826 (1984); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 419, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39 (1975). Absent such a violation the police may stop a vehicle only where the circumstances justify a reasonable suspicion of criminality. People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 753, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785 (1995).

Even where the police have probable cause to believe traffic offenses occurred, New York courts have held that the police may not exploit traffic offenses as pretexts to investigate unrelated criminality for which reasonable suspicion is lacking. People v. Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 227, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't 1995); People v. Smith, 181 A.D.2d 802, 803, 581 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2d Dep't 1992); People v. Llopis, 125 A.D.2d 416, 417, 509 N.Y.S.2d 135 (2d Dep't 1986). If the court concludes the arresting officers would have ignored the traffic offenses but for curiosity, bias, or less than reasonable suspicion of unrelated criminality, the court may suppress evidence obtained as the result of the stop. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 246 A.D.2d 456, 667 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1st Dep't 1998); People v. Rijo, 220 A.D.2d 217, 632 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1st Dep't 1995); People v. David, 223 A.D.2d 551, 553, 636 N.Y.S.2d 374 (2d Dep't 1996); People v. Lewis, 195 A.D.2d 523, 524, 600 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1993).

This inquiry into officers' subjective reasons in order to determine the legality of vehicle stops departs from the usual objective standard for proper official action under the Fourth Amendment. Maryland v. Macon In dicta the New York Court of Appeals has implicitly accepted the subjective pretext analysis, but the court has never expressly invalidated an automobile stop as pretextual under the State Constitution. People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 753, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785; People v. Woods, 64 N.Y.2d 736, 737, 485 N.Y.S.2d 975, 475 N.E.2d 442 (1984). The First Department's recent restatement of pretext analysis, moreover, holds that automobile stops for traffic offenses are proper "even though the officer may also have reason to suspect that the vehicle was involved in an unrelated crime." People v. Washington, 238 A.D.2d at 48, 671 N.Y.S.2d 439. See also People v. Ross, 228 A.D.2d 718, 644 N.Y.S.2d 336 (3d Dep't 1996); People v. Coggins, 175 A.D.2d 924, 926, 573 N.Y.S.2d 760 (2d Dep't 1991). This holding blurs the distinction between the federal and state standards and appears to move toward the federal standard in practical application.

472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); People v. Washington, 238 A.D.2d 43, 49, 671 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1st Dep't 1998); People v. McCoy, 239 A.D.2d 437, 657 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (2d Dep't 1997). Federal courts have consistently applied an objective standard in analyzing the propriety of automobile stops for vehicle related offenses. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir.1990). See also People v. McCoy, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 439 (collecting cases from other states).

2. The Standards' Practical Application

If the police have a reasonable suspicion that an unrelated crime was or is about to be committed an automobile stop is justified on that ground alone. People v. Tillie, 239 A.D.2d 670, 657 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 (3d Dep't 1997). If "reason to suspect" is not equivalent to "reasonable suspicion," so long as the officers intend to stop an automobile for a traffic offense, whatever other motivations they simultaneously entertain appear to be irrelevant under Washington. Thus the conclusion that a stop is not pretextual if "based upon the officer's observation" of a violation of the vehicle and traffic law, People v. Jackson, 241 A.D.2d 557, 661 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 (2d Dep't 1997), is simply the outcome of an objective test.

On the other hand, to suggest that an objectively valid traffic stop is pretextual because it was "predicated on something other than the traffic infractions that the officers observed," People v. Owens, 164 Misc.2d 15, 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co.1995), assumes the point to be proved. Police officers, concerned with unrelated criminal activity, are not required to ignore traffic offenses because an inference later might be drawn that they would have ignored those offenses absent the unrelated concern. People v. Coggins, 175 A.D.2d at 926, 573 N.Y.S.2d 760. Nothing in Washington requires proof that the officer would have effected the traffic stop absent suspicions of unrelated criminal activity.

It is even less clear that suppression would be required where police officers in fact had a basis for reasonable suspicion of criminality unrelated to a traffic offense, but mistakenly concluded they lacked that reasonable suspicion and employed a traffic offense to stop an automobile. Arrests for criminal conduct are always proper under the Fourth Amendment, "even if the purpose of a lawful arrest is to question [a defendant] about another offense." People v. Reynolds, 240 A.D.2d 517, 658 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (2d Dep't 1997). It follows that where officers have probable cause to arrest a person for criminality unrelated to a traffic offense, and they...