People v. Medellin

• Decision Date: 20 February 2020
• Docket Number: F076022
• Citation: 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867,45 Cal.App.5th 519
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Samuel Trinidad MEDELLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

45 Cal.App.5th 519

258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Samuel Trinidad MEDELLIN, Defendant and Appellant.

F076022

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Filed February 20, 2020

SNAUFFER, J.

Samuel Medellin challenges his convictions for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, and their accompanying enhancements for inflicting great bodily injury. We agree with Medellin that the prosecutor prejudicially misstated the law during closing arguments. Our conclusion necessarily finds fault in the CALCRIM instructions defining great bodily injury. The convictions are reversed.

BACKGROUND

Trial Evidence

While Medellin and his friends were at a brewery restaurant one evening, an argument regarding alcohol service ensued between his party and the restaurant staff. The argument became a melee during which Medellin hit two different staff members, one time each.

The first victim suffered a quarter-to half-inch-long cut along his jaw requiring three stitches to close. This injury resulted from a punch.¹ While the victim testified he previously had experienced "worse injuries," he described this injury as "hurt[ing] for a few days," resulting in "a little scar," and his "false tooth ... [feeling] a little bit loose after" the impact.

The second victim endured a quarter-inch-long cut on his lip requiring seven stitches to close. This injury also resulted from a punch. The victim described the injury as leaving his lip "swollen for about a week and a half," "hurt[ing] a lot," and scarring. A witness described the injury as "fairly deep" and "bleeding pretty severely."

Verdict and Sentence

The jury found Medellin guilty as charged: two counts of felony assault ( Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) ),² each with a great bodily injury enhancement found true (§ 12022.7). The trial court placed Medellin on probation and ordered him to serve one year in county jail, suspended on the condition he successfully completes probation.

DISCUSSION

This appeal presents three issues. One, did the trial court err by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault? Two, are the convictions and enhancements supported by sufficient evidence? And three, did the prosecutor prejudicially misstate the law?

We first find that if the trial erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense, Medellin waived the error. Second, sufficient evidence supports each verdict. Third, we find the prosecutor's closing argument, relying on and quoting CALCRIM's great bodily injury definition, prejudicially misstated the law and reverse the convictions.

I. Medellin Waived Any Error Related To Lesser Included Offense Instructions

During a preliminary discussion regarding potential jury instructions, the following colloquy occurred:

"The Court: [W]hat is your position as to any lesser-included offenses?

[Medellin's Attorney]: We're not asking for any lesser included.

The Court: And you're satisfied that there are legitimate strategic purposes for not making that request at this time?

[Medellin's Attorney]: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Okay. Do the People have any input on that?

[The People]: No, Your Honor."

Consequently, the court did not instruct the jury on any lesser included offenses.

Medellin now faults the court for not instructing the jury on the lesser included offenses of simple assault. (§ 240.) The People argue the evidence did not warrant instructions on lesser included offenses and, alternatively, that Medellin waived the issue by inviting the court to err. Medellin counters that the invited error doctrine cannot apply to this issue.

We need not decide whether the evidence warranted lesser included offense instructions because we find that Medellin waived the issue by inviting any error.

" ‘ " ‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence [Citations.] ....’ [Citation.] That obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.] The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given." ’ [Citations.]

Nevertheless, the claim may be waived under the doctrine of invited error if trial counsel both ‘ "intentionally caused the trial court to err" ’ and clearly did so for tactical reasons. [Citation.] Invited error will be found, however, only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in resisting or acceding to the complained-of instruction." ( People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 114, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, 277 P.3d 118 ( Souza ).)

It is clear that the instructional error claim at issue here "may be waived" if counsel causes the error and "clearly [does] so for tactical reasons."³ ( Souza, supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 114, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, 277 P.3d 118.) Those circumstances are present and accordingly we find Medellin waived any error.⁴

Medellin asks us to ignore Souza, supra , 54 Cal.4th 90, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, 277 P.3d 118, and find the invited error doctrine does not apply to this issue. He argues the claim cannot be forfeited and cites the following language: " ‘ "The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given." ’ " ( Souza, supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 114, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, 277 P.3d 118, quoting Breverman, supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) We decline the invitation for two reasons.

First, Medellin asks us to infer the Supreme Court in Souza, supra , 54 Cal.4th 90, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, 277 P.3d 118, did not "spend a great deal of time" discussing the issue because it was a "death penalty case[ ]." Our courts conscientiously consider each issue in every case. We believe Souza, supra , is correct and are bound to follow its logic. ( Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937 ( Auto Equity ); Bell, supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 109, 246 Cal.Rptr.3d 527, 439 P.3d 1102 ["The invited error doctrine bars an appellate challenge to the absence of a lesser included offense instruction if the defendant, for tactical reasons, persuaded the trial court to forgo giving the instruction."].)

Second, our conclusion is consistent with the rule requiring trial courts to "instruct on lesser included offenses ... even when" the defense "expressly objects to" the instruction ( Souza, supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 114, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, 277 P.3d 118 ) because "the rule seeks the most accurate possible judgment by ‘ensur[ing] that the jury will consider the full range of possible verdicts ’ included in the charge, regardless of the parties' wishes or tactics." ( Breverman, supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 155, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) "Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an acquittal when that evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense." ( Ibid. ) Allowing the defense to cause the error, lose at trial, and automatically obtain a reversal on appeal would reward the defense's failed gambit and eliminate the rule's purpose.⁵

II. The Evidence Sufficiently Proved Each Charge And Enhancement

Medellin next contends the evidence for both convictions and each enhancement was insufficient. The reviewing standard is well settled.

"When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ... We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility." ( People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664.)

Applying these standards, we find sufficient evidence supports each conviction and enhancement. Medellin's contrary contention is rejected.

A. Additional Background

Medellin punched the first victim's jaw, creating a laceration requiring three stitches at a hospital to close. The stitches were removed at the hospital three weeks later. The only evidence in the record reasonably, credibly, and directly describing the force with which Medellin hit the victim was the victim's testimony that the impact was "a little bit harder" than preceding attacks from other people. The force behind Medellin's strike lacerated the victim's jaw, while other preceding, less forceful impacts, left no visible injury.

Medellin punched the second victim near the mouth. The victim's lip immediately "split open," requiring seven stitches at a hospital to close. The stitches were in place for "almost two weeks." Multiple witnesses described watching Medellin wind his arm back, run or hop towards the victim, and release a punch downwards connecting with the victim's mouth. The victim did not have time to react to the punch. The resulting injury impaired the victim's ability to drink and eat.

The doctor who treated the second victim at the hospital also...