People v. Medina
Decision Date | 03 July 2003 |
Docket Number | No. B159372.,B159372. |
Citation | 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 546,110 Cal.App.4th 171 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Roman MEDINA, Defendant and Appellant. |
Geri Lynn Green, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Suzann E. Papagoda, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
May officers, as a matter of standard procedure and in the name of "officer safety," detain and frisk a driver stopped for an equipment infraction solely on the basis that the stop occurs in a high crime area at night? Here we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not permit such an intrusion and that any incriminating evidence flowing from the illegal contact, which may include statements made by the driver, is inadmissible.
Roman Medina appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found on his person and in his vehicle, as well as statements he made to the police at the time of his detention and search (Pen.Code, § 1538.5.) After the court denied his motion, Medina pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Entry of judgment was deferred, and Medina was placed on probation. He contends that the cocaine and the statements attributed to him were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 We agree and, accordingly, reverse.
At approximately midnight on January 19, 2002, Los Angeles Police Officers Lopez and Arroyo stopped Medina's car near Olympic Boulevard and Alvarado Street in Los Angeles for driving with a broken taillight. Both officers testified at the suppression hearing that they could not recall the precise nature of the break, although Officer Lopez testified that some unspecified portion of the plastic cover was missing.
The officers activated their overhead lights and Medina promptly pulled over. He remained in his car until the officers approached and ordered him to step out. After Medina promptly exited the car, he was ordered to place his hands behind his head, walk backwards toward the officers, and then face an adjacent wall. He complied without incident.
Officer Lopez testified that there "wasn't anything specific" about the 49year-old Medina that led him to believe Medina was armed. Nevertheless, Officer Lopez decided to search him because he was in a "high-gang location." Lopez "grabbed" Medina's hands and asked if he had any weapons, sharp objects, "or anything he should know of prior to the search." Medina responded that he had a "rock" in his pants, which Lopez understood to mean rock cocaine. Lopez subsequently found rock cocaine in Medina's pocket. After Medina was arrested, another small amount of cocaine was found in his car.
Medina moved to suppress the cocaine taken from his pocket and his car, as well as the statements attributed to him by the police. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning as follows: "I think given the factors outlined by the officers ..., including time of night, location, and the fact that it is a known gang and drug area, that additional steps short of arrest are permissible for officer safety and I think those were reasonably articulated here. [¶] I think I would be hard pressed to find that the officers acted unreasonably]. Once the question was made ... whether or not the defendant had anything sharp, or any weapons, or any needles and the defendant's spontaneous statement, I think at that point there was probable cause to arrest him."
"` ` (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.)
Medina contends that the incriminating evidence against him should have been suppressed because it was the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The People respond that Medina's detention was reasonable, that he was not searched until after he revealed he had cocaine in his pocket, and that in any event the officers' actions were supported by reasonable suspicion.
First, we reject the People's claim that the search was prompted by Medina's admission. Officer Lopez testified that he set out to conduct a patdown pursuant to his "standard procedure," and his act of securing Medina's hands behind his head was part and parcel of that search. We also agree with Medina that his detention was rendered unlawful when Officer Lopez grabbed his hands, and that the ensuing search was also illegal because the officer failed to offer articulable facts demonstrating a reasonable suspicion that Medina was armed and dangerous. Indeed, the officer admitted there were no such facts. The only reason for restraining Medina's hands and searching him was the time and location of the stop. Apparently, anyone observed to be driving in that area at night with a citable equipment defect would be stopped and subjected to a patdown search. The Fourth Amendment plainly prohibits the police from employing such a procedure.
Medina was lawfully stopped for having a broken taillight. Such a violation requires the offender to fix the defect. (Veh.Code, §§ 24250, 24600, subd. (b), 40303.5, subd. (d).) But a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception may "`exceed constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances which made its initiation permissible.'" (People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 586, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207.) If a traffic offender provides proper identification, "the officer must simply prepare a written notice to appear (i.e., a citation or `ticket') reciting the particulars of the violation (Veh.Code, § 40500, subd. (a)), and must release the offender when he signs a written promise to appear (id., § 40504, subd. (a))." (McGaughran, p. 583, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, a driver stopped for a minor traffic infraction cannot be physically restrained absent (Id., at p. 591, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207.)
If the officer reasonably believes the driver is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, the officer is entitled to conduct a "Terry frisk" for weapons. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.) A Terry frisk "is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly." (Id., at p. 17, 88 S.Ct. 1868, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, a frisk for weapons is not justified unless the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, considered in conjunction with rational inferences to be drawn therefrom, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. (Id., at p. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 927, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 785 [].)
Officer Lopez conceded that there "wasn't anything specific" about Medina that would have led him to believe he was armed. Instead, he testified that it is "standard procedure" to conduct weapons searches in a high gang area late at night. Our Supreme Court has indicated, however, that the time and location of an encounter are insufficient by themselves to cast reasonable suspicion on an individual. The logic underlying this conclusion is manifest: "Strictly speaking, the `nighttime factor' is not `activity' by a citizen, and this court has warned that this factor `should be appraised with caution' [citation] and that it has, at most, `minimal importance' in evaluating the propriety of an intrusion [citation]." (People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 645, 156 Cal.Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115, fn. omitted.) Similarly, (Bower, p. 645, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115; see also In re...
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