People v. Miranda

• Decision Date: 04 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. H009669,H009669
• Citation: 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785,17 Cal.App.4th 917
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ignacio MIRANDA, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 785

21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785

17 Cal.App.4th 917

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ignacio MIRANDA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. H009669.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

Aug. 4, 1993.

Review Denied Oct. 28, 1993.

Paul McCarthy, Pacifica, By Appointment of the Sixth District Appellate Program, for defendant/appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Mark S. Howell, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Joan Killeen, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff/respondent.

WUNDERLICH, Associate Justice.

Statement of the Case

Defendant Ignacio Miranda appeals from a judgment entered after his motion to suppress evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5) was denied and he pleaded guilty to possession for sale and sale of phencyclidine (PCP). (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11378.5, 11379.5.) He claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence against him. He argues that the evidence was the product of an unlawful pretextual traffic stop. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Facts

At approximately 9:20 p.m. on February 8, 1991, Officer Steve Becerra of the Gilroy Police Department was driving a marked police car on patrol near the Gilroy Apartments, when a car containing three people passed him going the other way. Becerra recognized Yvonne Lucero, the driver, and defendant, the front-seat passenger, from previous arrests involving PCP. He recognized the other passenger Leticia Cuellar but did not know her name. Their car entered a parking lot, and Becerra decided to follow them. He made a U-turn and entered the lot. He passed Lucero's car and noticed that Cuellar had a blank stare.

Lucero parked her car, and Becerra moved on to an adjacent lot. From there, he watched Lucero and Cuellar get out of the car and walk away. Cuellar still had a blank look and walked slowly and deliberately and at times needed Lucero's help. Becerra thought Cuellar might be under the influence of something, perhaps PCP. Defendant also got out of the car but stayed near it.

After about two minutes, Lucero and Cuellar returned, and Cuellar reentered the back seat. Lucero went to the trunk, opened it, put her hands inside, and moved them around. One of her hands had been closed, and Becerra thought she had put something inside. During this time, defendant stood slightly behind her and kept looking around and out toward the driveway. After Lucero closed the trunk, she and defendant reentered the car and drove out of the parking lot.

Becerra followed Lucero out of the lot and down Murray Street. He had no idea how far or where he was going to follow them and had no plan at that time to stop them. However, about one block from the Gilroy Apartments, Lucero made a left turn without signalling, in violation of Vehicle Code section 22107. ¹ Becerra activated his lights and made a stop.

Becerra asked Lucero for her driver's license. She told him it was suspended. Becerra brought her to his patrol car to get more information and begin writing a citation. He then returned to Lucero's car to check on Cuellar's condition and see whether there was a validly licensed driver who could drive Lucero's car.

Becerra again saw that Cuellar's movements were slow and deliberate. When asked her name, date of birth, and address, she was not able to complete a sentence. Becerra, whom the parties later agreed had expertise concerning the symptoms of PCP use, concluded that Cuellar was under the influence of PCP. He also spoke to defendant, who appeared to be coherent.

Becerra returned to Lucero, talked with her about her license, and asked for her address and car registration information. When he told her he thought Cuellar was under the influence of PCP, Lucero became very concerned. She said she did not believe or know anything about that and told Becerra that she was already on probation for a PCP related offense and would not have anything to do with PCP. Becerra asked who her probation officer was, and Lucero told him. He asked if she had a probation search clause, and she said she did. He then asked if he could search her car, and she consented.

Becerra had defendant and Cuellar get out of the car so he could search inside without having to lean over them and expose the items on his gun belt. At that point, a backup officer arrived. Becerra then searched the car, and in the trunk he found a blue binder. Inside it, he found a baggie containing several hand-rolled cigarettes which were later found to contain PCP. Defendant, Lucero, and Cuellar were then arrested. ²

Standard of Review

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.)

Discussion

Defendant concedes that Lucero's failure to signal her left turn provided a "nominal" basis for a traffic stop. He contends, however, that Becerra used the stop as a pretext to investigate his suspicion of criminal activity unrelated to the traffic violation. He argues that such a stop is unreasonable under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and that here the illegal stop vitiated Lucero's consent to search the car. Thus, he claims that the warrantless search of the trunk was illegal and the evidence found therein should have been suppressed. ³

According to one court, "a pretextual arrest occurs when the police employ an arrest based on probable cause as a device to investigate or search for evidence of an unrelated offense for which probable cause is lacking. [Citations.] As such, the arrest serves as a means to circumvent the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment." (U.S. v. Trigg (7th Cir.1989) 878 F.2d 1037, 1039.)

Although federal courts long ago decried this practice (see, e.g., Henderson v. United States (4th Cir.1926) 12 F.2d 528, 531; United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 L.Ed. 877), recent pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court have made analyzing a claim of pretextual arrest more complicated. ⁴

On the one hand, the definition of a "pretextual arrest" noted above suggests that a police officer's subjective ulterior investigative motive can render an ostensibly valid search incident to an arrest unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (See United States v. Smith (9th Cir.1986) 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 [claim of pretext is question of the "motivation or primary purpose" of the arresting officer].) On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Macon (1985) 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 stated, "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." (Id. at pp. 470-471, 105 S.Ct. at p. 2783; see also Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 136-140, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-2309, 110 L.Ed.2d 112; United States v. Villamonte-Marquez (1983) 462 U.S. 579, 584, fn. 3, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2577, fn. 3, 77 L.Ed.2d 22; Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168; see also People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1 [overruled on other grounds in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 5, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872].) ⁵

The effort to harmonize the concept of pretextual arrests with the Supreme Court's pronouncements has precipitated a conflict in case law and robust academic debate concerning how to analyze a claim of pretextual arrest, especially when based on a traffic stop. (See Cummins v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 962, ----, 112 S.Ct. 428, 429, 116 L.Ed.2d 448, 449 (dis. opn. of White, J. [certiorari should be granted to resolve conflict among circuits]; see, e.g., U.S. v. Causey, supra, 834 F.2d 1179 [majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions]; compare U.S. v. Trigg, supra, 878 F.2d 1037; U.S. v. Guzman (10th Cir.1988) 864 F.2d 1512; United States v. Smith, supra, 802 F.2d 1119; see also discussion and cases and authorities cited in 1 LaFave, Search & Seizure (2d ed. 1987) [LaFave] § 1.4(e), pp. 90-97, and Supp. (1993) p. 17, fn. 3 and pp. 19-21; 3 LaFave, supra, § 7.5(e), pp. 141-145, and Supp. (1993) pp. 35-36.)

Some courts have not considered the impact of the Supreme Court's statements and hold that the officer's subjective motivation or primary purpose in making the arrest is dispositive on the reasonableness of a subsequent search. (See, e.g., United States v. Smith, supra, 802 F.2d at p. 1124 [following Williams v. United States (9th Cir.1969) 418 F.2d 159, 161]; U.S. v. Reeves (E.D.Wash.1992) 798 F.Supp. 1459, 1463; U.S. v. Hill (D.N.D.1987) 666 F.Supp. 174, 176; United States v. Keller (N.D.Ill.E.D.1980) 499 F.Supp. 415, 416; United States v. D'Alo (D.R.I.1979) 486 F.Supp. 945, 949; see also U.S. v. Lillard (9th Cir.1991) 929 F.2d 500, 502; United States v. Prim (9th Cir.1983) 698 F.2d 972, 975.)

Most federal courts, however, have rejected this view and conclude that the Supreme Court's statements require that the reasonableness of an arrest and search be solely determined by the objective circumstances. Two conflicting objective tests have emerged.

Under the majority test, the inquiry focuses on whether the officer was legally authorized to make an arrest and conduct a search. If, in the abstract, the officer does no more than he or she is legally permitted to do, regardless of the subjective intent with which it was done, the...