People v. Melanson

• Decision Date: 08 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93CA1777,93CA1777
• Citation: 937 P.2d 826
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roy A. MELANSON, Defendant-Appellant. . IV
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 826

937 P.2d 826

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roy A. MELANSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 93CA1777.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. IV.

Aug. 8, 1996.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

Oct. 10, 1996.

Certiorari Denied June 2, 1997.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Laurie A. Booras, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Elizabeth Griffin, Thomas K. Carberry, Deputy State Public Defenders, Denver, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge TAUBMAN.

In a prosecution premised on the disappearance of a woman in 1974, defendant, Roy A. Melanson, appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree murder. We affirm.

Testimony at the trial in August 1993 revealed the following facts. On August 30, 1974, defendant and an acquaintance were driving toward Gunnison, Colorado, when they experienced car trouble. They were picked up by the victim, a 25-year-old woman who was preparing for a five-day backpacking and photography trip. The acquaintance was dropped off at a bar, and the victim and defendant proceeded to a different location.

On September 3, 1974, the victim's mother reported to police that her daughter was missing. An extensive search of the Gunnison and Crested Butte areas failed to uncover either the victim or her car. However, defendant's acquaintance informed the police that he had seen the woman with defendant several days earlier. Defendant later arrived at a friend's house in Gunnison driving the victim's car.

Thereafter, defendant left Colorado in the victim's car, pawned a backpack and sleeping bag in Kansas, and pawned various other items in Iowa. Defendant later abandoned the victim's car in Texas and, with another acquaintance, drove back to Pueblo, where he pawned a camera and other photography equipment.

On September 12, 1974, defendant and this acquaintance were stopped by the police in Pueblo based on a tip from an anonymous informant that they appeared to be selling drugs at a local high school. They were allowed to leave after brief questioning. However, after a computer search revealed an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest in Texas, the police located him and his acquaintance at a nearby motel.

The acquaintance consented to a search of his car, and, as a result of the search, the police discovered keys to the victim's car, a gas card belonging to the victim, and an insurance card with the name of the victim's father. The police questioned defendant at the Pueblo police station regarding his relationship with the victim. Defendant denied ever driving with the victim or being a passenger in her car, but stated that he had once met her. Defendant then requested a lawyer.

The next day, while meeting with an FBI agent, defendant admitted that the victim had given him and an acquaintance a ride in her car. However, he stated that he and the victim had gone to a bar and from there he had stolen her car, left the Gunnison area, and eventually abandoned the car in Texas. Defendant was not charged with murder at that time, but was taken to the Gunnison county jail on unrelated charges where he was held until March 1975.

In July 1979, a scalp with hair tied in braids was found near a creek in Gunnison. Although the police suspected that it was the victim's hair, a search of the area where it was discovered revealed no other evidence.

There were no further developments until August 1991, when an investigator in the Gunnison County sheriff's department realized that the police still had a hairbrush that had belonged to the victim. The investigator sent the brush, along with the scalp and hair sample found in 1979, to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for comparison. The CBI determined that the hair samples matched.

In April 1992, defendant was arrested and charged with first degree murder. Four months later, a new search of the area in which the scalp had been found revealed a skull with gold dental work, some thread, buttons, a zipper, and a brassiere. In addition, a hiking boot was discovered with a skeletal foot inside it. A dentist identified the teeth and dental work as the victim's and an odontologist confirmed that the skull was the victim's.

The conviction at issue here followed.

I. Speedy Trial/Delay in Prosecution

Defendant first contends that the charges against him should be dismissed because he was denied his right to speedy trial and due process of law by the prosecution's delay in charging him with murder. We do not agree.

The right to a speedy trial guaranteed by Colo. Const. art. II, § 16 and the Sixth Amendment attaches with the filing of a formal charge, People v. Chavez, 779 P.2d 375 (Colo.1989), or with the arrest and holding of a defendant to answer a criminal charge. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). That right, however, does not include the right to a speedy arrest or indictment. People v. Hall, 729 P.2d 373 (Colo.1986).

First, we reject defendant's contention that his speedy trial rights attached in September 1974 when he was held on unrelated charges. Here, although defendant was questioned by police in 1974, his speedy trial rights did not attach until April 1992 when formal charges were filed. He was tried in August 1993, and therefore, we conclude no speedy trial violation occurred.

Second, we disagree with defendant's contention that his due process rights were violated by the delay in prosecution. A point may be reached at which the delay in prosecution is so great that considerations of due process and fundamental fairness require that the charges be dismissed. People v. Hutchinson, 192 Colo. 204, 557 P.2d 376 (1976).

In determining whether a delayed prosecution has resulted in a denial of due process, a court must examine certain key factors, including: (1) loss of defense witnesses; (2) whether the delay was purposeful and intended to prejudice the defendant; (3) the kind and quantum of evidence available to the prosecution; and (4) general considerations of justice and fair play. People v. Hall, supra.

Based on our review of the record, we find that the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that no violation of due process occurred as a result of the delay.

As to the first element of the test, five potential defense witnesses were either deceased or could not be located. However, the trial court found that two of the deceased witnesses would not have been helpful to the defense. Had they been alive, they could only have testified as to inculpatory statements of the defendant and to his possession of the victim's property.

Although two of the missing witnesses had previously stated they had seen the victim after the date on which she was purportedly killed, the trial court concluded that their statements were suspect because the witnesses could not speak English and the officer who prepared their statements spoke very little Spanish. Indeed, that officer testified that the dates noted in the statements could have been inaccurate by as much as two weeks.

The trial court also found that the third deceased witness had offered statements which amounted to nothing more than speculation on a case that had received substantial media coverage. He was not an eyewitness and did not claim to know either the victim or the defendant. Therefore, this witness would not have been helpful to the defense.

As the trial court noted, the greatest impairment to defendant would have been the faded memories of those witnesses available to testify. However, there existed numerous documents and statements from those witnesses that could assist them in refreshing their memories. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that the loss of defense witnesses, overall, helped rather than hurt the defendant.

In regard to the second element of the Hall test, while the trial court found some negligence on the part of the sheriff's department in collecting and comparing evidence, it also found that the delay in prosecuting was not purposeful or intended to prejudice the defendant. Further, even if the sheriff had matched scalp hairs with hairs from the victim's hairbrush in 1979, that match would not have positively identified the scalp as the victim's or further implicated defendant.

As the trial court noted, charges were not brought sooner because police and prosecutors wanted to find the victim's body and believed that no conviction would result without it. Thus, we agree that the investigative delay was not purposeful or intended to prejudice defendant. See People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981) (when the government takes time before seeking an indictment for purposes of conducting further criminal investigation, fundamental fairness is not violated unless this procedure shocks the community's sense of fair play and decency).

As to the third Hall element, the trial court found that the evidence available to the prosecution was the same in 1979 as it was when defendant was charged in 1992. While this fact alone might suggest an unreasonable delay, the prosecution also was legitimately concerned about proceeding to trial without the victim's body. This concern was justified because the prosecution would have had a significantly weaker case without the identification of the victim's remains. See People v. Small, supra.

Also, the trial court found that the interests of justice and fair play did not warrant the dismissal of the charges against defendant. We agree. As the trial court noted, although statutes of limitations exist to guard against the prejudice of stale prosecutions, there is no statute of limitations for first degree murder because of its grave and heinous nature. See § 16-5-401,...