People v. Meller, 25988

Decision Date29 July 1974
Docket NumberNo. 25988,25988
Citation524 P.2d 1366,185 Colo. 389
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado. Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Richard MELLER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., James S. Russell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

Walta, Cannon & Gaddis, J. Gregory Walta, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellant.

KELLEY, Justice.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of issuing a short check contrary to C.R.S. 1963, 40--14--20. On appeal he argues five grounds for reversal of his conviction of which we consider but one. We agree that the trial court should have instructed the jury on defendant's theory of the case. The failure to give such an instruction under the circumstances of this case is plain error and requires reversal of the judgment of the trial court.

The facts presented at trial are as follows: Defendant rented a house in Arapahoe County in August, 1971. The rent was payable in monthly installments of $350, due the first of each month. The defendant had been having financial problems as the result of receiving 'insufficient funds' paychecks from his employer. It is uncontroverted that he did not pay the October rent on time.

Mr. Spenst, the landlord's agent, testified that he went to defendant's home on October 30, 1971, to try to collect the rent. He stated that the defendant gave him a check on that day (which was Saturday) for $700 and asked that he not deposit the check until the following Monday. Spenst testified, however, that the defendant did not notify him that he had no funds on deposit to cover the check.

Defendant's wife testified that Spenst came to their house on October 23, 1971, and was given a check, postdated to October 30, 1971, for $700. She also testified that her husband told Spenst to hold the check until he was advised to cash it.

During cross-examination of Spenst, defendant's attorney read into the record portions of testimony by Spenst in a related civil matter in which Spenst stated that the defendant had advised him at the time the check was delivered that he did not have sufficient funds on deposit to cover the check, but that he expected such funds to be available in the near future. The record also discloses that Spenst waited until November 10, 1971, to deposit the check. The bank did not honor the check due to insufficient funds. This prosecution followed.

Defendant admitted writing the check in question. His defense was predicated solely on the theory that he did not have the specific intent to defraud the payee, which is a necessary element of proof in the commission of the offense charged. See Moore v. People, 124 Colo. 197, 235 P.2d 798 (1951); Nora v. People, 176 Colo. 454, 491 P.2d 62 (1971). An examination of the record makes it abundantly clear that defendant was trying to establish through the testimony of his wife and the testimony of Spenst on cross-examination that the alleged postdating of the check and the request to Spenst to hold the check negated an intent to deceive and defraud Spenst.

The intent to defraud the payee would be conclusively negated if a defendant disclosed, at the time of the issuance of a check, that he did not have sufficient funds on deposit to cover the check. The transaction then becomes one where the payee extends credit to the maker of the check. Likewise, a postdated check, in the absence of a present representation that the check is good, carries on its face implied notice that the maker does not presently have sufficient funds on deposit to pay the check. However, before this notice will be implied, the payee must be made aware that the check is, in fact, postdated. See People v. Poyet, 6 Cal.3d 530, 99 Cal.Rptr. 758, 492 P.2d 1150 (1972); State v. Eikelberger, 72 Idaho 245, 239 P.2d 1069 (1952); Shepherd v. People, 109 Colo. 582, 129 P.2d 104 (1942); See generally 32 Am.Jur.2d, False Pretenses § 81.

When the court conferred with counsel regarding its instructions to the jury, the defendant's attorney approved all the instructions to be given. He also tendered one on behalf of the defendant dealing with the specific intent to defraud. This was in the nature of a theory of the case instruction. Defendant's evidence entitled him to a proper theory of the case instruction and the court should have given one. It was plain error, under the circumstances of this case, not to give one.

Another instruction which must be discussed in connection with the fairness of defendant's trial was one tendered by the People and given by the court. It reads:

'In a prosecution of this nature the People are not bound to prove the exact date as alleged in the information. It is sufficient if it shall appear from the evidence to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime charged in the information at any period of time within three years before the second of May, 1972, the date of filing the complaint and information.'

Defense counsel did not object to the giving of this instruction.

The law is well settled in Colorado that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when there is evidence in the record to support such an instruction. People v. Travis, Colo., 516 P.2d 121 (1973); People v. Moya, Colo., 512 P.2d 1155 (1973); People v. Montague, Colo., 508 P.2d 388 (1973); Nora v. People, Supra; Zarate v. People, 163 Colo. 205, 429 P.2d 309 (1967); Payne v. People, 110 Colo. 236, 132 P.2d 441 (1942). It was stated in People v. Montague, Supra, 508 P.2d at 389:

'A properly worded instruction setting forth such a defendant's theory in a case of this nature when supported by the evidence should always be given by a trial court unless the defendant's theory is encompassed in other instructions to the jury.'

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13 cases
  • People v. Auman
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • September 26, 2002
    ...she could not be held accountable for Jaehnig's actions and that she was under arrest when he shot the officer. Cf. People v. Meller, 185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366 (1974). Hence, we conclude defendant's closing argument fairly presented her theory of defense to the jury. See People v. Dore, ......
  • People v. Bookman
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1982
    ...he was entitled to this theory of the case instruction because there was support for it in the evidence. See, e.g., People v. Meller, 185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366 (1974); People v. Moya, 182 Colo. 290, 512 P.2d 1155 (1973). The coroner, who testified as to the cause of death, indicated that......
  • People v. Gerber
    • United States
    • New York City Court
    • August 10, 1982
    ...However, before this notice will be implied, the payee must be made aware that the check is in fact, postdated. People v. Meller, 185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366, at 1367; Ex Parte Griffin, 83 Cal.App. 779, 257 P. 458; Turner v. Brenner, 138 Va. 232, 121 S.E. 510; Highsmith v. State, 38 Ga.App......
  • People v. Cornelison
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • January 10, 1977
    ...intoxication as allowed by section 18--1--804, C.R.S.1973. United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1975); People v. Meller, 185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new KELLEY, GROVES and ERICKSON, JJ., concur. 1 Now section 18--3--103(1)......
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