People v. Meraz, 98SA124

• Decision Date: 29 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98SA124,98SA124
• Citation: 961 P.2d 481
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 3471 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Efrain Reyes MERAZ, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 481

961 P.2d 481

98 CJ C.A.R. 3471

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Efrain Reyes MERAZ, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98SA124.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

June 29, 1998.

Robert S. Grant, District Attorney, Seventeenth Judicial District, Michael J. Milne, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Brighton, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ronald M. Aal, Denver, for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the People seek review of an order entered by the Adams County District Court suppressing evidence of controlled substances found in the defendant's residence during the execution of a search warrant for the defendant's (Meraz's) home. The affidavit supporting the search warrant contained, in part, information supplied by a confidential informant. The district court determined that the affidavit lacked probable cause since the affidavit failed to state how the informant obtained his information. We hold that the source of the confidential informant's information is only one factor in determining whether a warrant is supported by probable cause, and that under the totality of the circumstances test, which requires us to examine all relevant factors, the affidavit in this case establishes probable cause and passes constitutional muster. Thus, we reverse the district court's ruling granting Meraz's motion to suppress.

I.

On July 7, 1997, Wilbert Duane Neuenkirk contacted Investigator Michael Thomas of the Aurora Police Department's vice and narcotics sections and reported that his brother-in-law, Patrick Stoffel, was selling marijuana. According to Neuenkirk, Stoffel was selling ten to twenty pounds of marijuana a week from Stoffel's home located at 3081 Zion Street in Aurora. Neuenkirk indicated that Stoffel sold marijuana a pound at a time and that he acquired marijuana from his neighbor who lives just south of him. Neuenkirk thought that the neighbor's name was "Efrain." Neuenkirk stated that he heard Stoffel talk about his neighbor "Efrain" obtaining marijuana from Mexico, and that when Stoffel needs more marijuana, he jumps the back fence between the two homes to procure the marijuana.

On August 14, 1997, Vince Barrera, a narcotics officer with the West Metro Drug Task Force, contacted Aurora Police Investigator Gary Sullivan and informed him of a tip that he received from a confidential informant. The confidential informant stated that on approximately August 10, 1997, he learned that a Hispanic male named Efrain Reyes who lived on Zion Street near 30th Avenue had approximately one hundred pounds of marijuana in his home. The confidential informant indicated that the marijuana was located in the rafters of the garage and in the crawl space of the room addition to the home. Although the confidential informant did not know the exact address of the home, he stated that it was located on Zion Street near 30th Avenue and he described the location of the residence with sufficient detail to allow Investigator Thomas to believe that the address was 3073 Zion Street. Officer Barrera stated that the confidential informant "appear[ed] to be very reliable," and that the informant assisted Officer Barrera on two prior occasions resulting in the recovery of eighty-five pounds of marijuana and a felony arrest.

Investigator Thomas contacted the Department of Motor Vehicles and learned that Patrick Stoffel lived at 3081 Zion Street in Aurora, and that Efrain Reyes lived at 3073 Zion Street, next door and directly south of Stoffel's residence.

Investigator Thomas prepared an application for a warrant to search the residence at 3073 Zion Street that included an affidavit stating the facts set forth above. ¹ A county court judge signed the warrant on August 14, 1997. That day, law enforcement officials executed the warrant and discovered a large quantity of marijuana; drug paraphernalia; and approximately nine hundred dollars. The defendant, Efrain Reyes Meraz, was arrested at the residence and charged with unlawful possession with intent to distribute marijuana. See § 18-18-406, 6 C.R.S. (1997).

Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion in Adams County District Court to suppress all evidence seized in the search of Meraz's residence. At a hearing on March 20, 1998, the district court granted the motion, holding that information contained in the affidavit supporting the warrant did not establish probable cause. The district court observed that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant relied in part on information supplied by a confidential informant, and that it was not clear from the affidavit how the confidential informant obtained his information. The district court stated that the confidential informant's reliability standing alone could not justify a warrant, and that no warrant could issue unless the affiant explained how the informant obtained the information set forth in the warrant. ² The People then filed this interlocutory appeal.

II.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit the issuance of a search warrant except upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place to be searched and the objects to be seized. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7; Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 391 (Colo.1994). Probable cause for a search warrant exists when the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant alleges sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that contraband or other evidence of criminal activity is located at the place to be searched. See Henderson, 879 P.2d at 391. A probable cause determination is limited to the four corners of the affidavit. See People v. Titus, 880 P.2d 148, 150 (Colo.1994).

In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine the adequacy of an affidavit that relies on information obtained from a confidential or anonymous informant. The first step of this test required the affiant to reveal the informant's "basis of knowledge," which is the means by which the informant obtained the information. The second step required the affiant to establish either the informant's veracity or the informant's reliability. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416, 89 S.Ct. 584.

Later, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli rule in favor of a test that examines the totality of the circumstances and asks the "commonsense, practical question whether there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place." Id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317. The Gates court stated that the informant's basis of knowledge, veracity, and reliability are highly relevant, but not conclusive factors. See id. In determining the overall reliability of a tip, a strong showing in one of these areas--or the existence of some other indicia of reliability--may compensate for the absence of one of the factors. See id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317. The Gates court stated:

If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based on his tip. Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity--which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability--we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.

Id. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citations omitted).

We adopted the Gates totality of the circumstances test in People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo.1986). Since that decision, we have reaffirmed the principle that an informant's basis of knowledge is a factor for consideration and is not a prerequisite to a finding of probable cause. See People v. Pate, 878 P.2d 685, 689-90 (Colo.1994); People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1266-68 (Colo.1994); People v. Paquin, 811 P.2d 394, 397 (Colo.1991).

Under the totality of the circumstances test, the court must examine all of the relevant factors. A highly detailed statement from an informant may allow a judge to conclude that the informant had access to reliable information about the activities. See People v. Abeyta, 795 P.2d 1324, 1327-28 (Colo.1990). Police corroboration of some of the information provided by the informant may support a finding of probable cause, even when all of the corroborated details relate to innocent, non-criminal activities. See Titus, 880 P.2d at 150; People v. Diaz, 793 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Colo.1990). The statements of other witnesses may also corroborate an informant's account and elevate the degree of suspicion to probable cause. See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3, at 170 (3d ed.1996). Another relevant factor is whether the information is current and not stale. See People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302, 311 (Colo.1982).

The issuing magistrate's probable cause determination receives deference and is not reviewed de novo. See Henderson, 879 P.2d at 391. The duty of a court reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit for probable cause is to ensure that the issuing judge had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed. Pate, 878 P.2d at 690.

III.

Turning to the...