People v. Miller, No. 03SA107.
| Decision Date | 08 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 03SA107. |
| Citation | 75 P.3d 1108 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wade Paul MILLER, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Edward J. Rogers, District Attorney, Kathleen G. Eberling, Assistant District Attorney, Canon City, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Josh T. Liles, Salida, Colorado, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee. Justice HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In this interlocutory appeal, filed pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2), 6 C.R.S. (2002), the prosecution appeals the district court's order suppressing evidence of methamphetamine manufacture seized from defendant Wade Miller's home. Nearly a month expired between the event the informant related and application by the police for the warrant. The trial court set aside the warrant for lack of probable cause and suppressed the evidence seized—for lack of good faith police reliance on the sufficiency of the warrant—because the only information linking the illegal activity to the place to be searched, Miller's home, was stale. We agree with the trial court and affirm its suppression order.
On January 6, 2003, the police obtained and executed a search warrant for Miller's home. During the search, the police discovered a methamphetamine laboratory, arrested Miller, and charged him with possessing and operating the lab.1
The warrant was based on a police affidavit reciting information from an anonymous informant. The informant said that, on December 9, 2002, at Miller's home, he smoked some methamphetamine Miller had just finished manufacturing there. The informant also stated that Miller kept methamphetamine manufacturing supplies in his kitchen cabinets. The affidavit also recited another informant's information—current at the time of application for this warrant on January 6, 2003—that Miller was manufacturing methamphetamine at a location other than his home. But the affidavit (attached as Exhibit A) contained no information more current than December 9, 2002,2 regarding manufacture or the presence of contraband at Miller's home.
The record made at the suppression hearing discloses that the police obtained and executed warrants for the other location and Miller's home on January 6, but the affidavit for search of the other location inexplicably contains more current information regarding manufacture of the drug by Miller at his home than was contained in the affidavit for search of his home.
As to the affidavit for search of Miller's home, the trial court found that: (1) the police had recited sufficient reliable information to implicate Miller in the manufacture of methamphetamine; (2) but the information regarding drug manufacturing by Miller at his home was stale; and (3) the police could not have reasonably relied on it in applying for the warrant. The trial court concluded that the warrant lacked probable cause, and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because no reasonably objective police officer would have relied on the warrant's sufficiency. It therefore granted Miller's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from search of his home.
We agree with the trial court that the warrant in this case was not based on probable cause, and the police could not have reasonably relied on it, because the information regarding drug manufacturing at Miller's home was stale when the police applied for the warrant, and no reasonable police officer would have relied on it. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule operates in this case, not the good faith exception to it.
When reviewing a suppression order, we defer to the trial court's findings of facts, if supported by the record; and we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. People v. Schall, 59 P.3d 848, 851 (Colo.2002); People v. D.F., 933 P.2d 9, 13-14 (Colo.1997).
We address this case using the framework set forth by People v. Randolph, 4 P.3d 477, 482 (Colo.2000), and People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Colo.1998). Randolph upheld a trial court's suppression order because the warrant there lacked probable cause and the police, under the circumstances in that case, could not have reasonably relied on it. In contrast, Altman applied the good faith exception and allowed the evidence to be admitted at trial, even though it was derived from execution of a warrant that may have lacked probable cause.
The application for the warrant in Randolph failed to particularize the building where the evidence of illegal activity might be found; pertinent here, the anonymous tip received in that warrant was stale (two months old). We concluded that the police could not have reasonably believed that the "bare bones" affidavit they presented to the magistrate in that case established probable cause.
In contrast, the affidavit in Altman contained recent information the police had personally observed, suggesting a reasonable inference that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home.
Officer Landolt's experience and training led him to believe that the purchase of equipment commonly associated with indoor marijuana cultivation at the height of the outdoor growing season, the high electrical usage, the potentially suspicious use of a rental car, and the defendant's previous brushes with the law all created a reasonable inference of marijuana cultivation.
Altman, 960 P.2d at 1172. Though the warrant may have lacked probable cause, an issue we did not reach because of the applicability of the good faith exception, we concluded that police reliance on the warrant in Altman was objectively reasonable.
The test for good faith reliance on the warrant imposes upon the officer involved in obtaining and executing the search warrant a continuing duty to exercise reasonable professional judgment. Randolph, 4 P.3d at 483. The officer must read the affidavit and warrant carefully and must be objectively persuaded that the warrant is sufficient. Id. In determining whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization, a reviewing court should take all the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant into account. Id.
As we did in Randolph, we now address the law of probable cause and the good faith exception for police reliance on a warrant. Then, we apply that law to the warrant and the seizure of evidence in this case.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution prohibit the issuance of a search warrant except upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. 2, § 7; see also § 16-3-303, 6 C.R.S. (2002) (). Because there is no mechanical formula for determining probable cause, reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause. Altman, 960 P.2d at 1167. A reviewing court should uphold the validity of a warrant if the affidavit accompanying the warrant creates a substantial basis for the conclusion that probable cause existed. People v. Reed, 56 P.3d 96, 101 (Colo.2002).
The warrant must establish probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located in the place to be searched at the time of the warrant application, not merely some time in the past. People v. Erthal, 194 Colo. 147, 570 P.2d 534 (1977). Probable cause exists when an affidavit for a search warrant alleges sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located at the place to be searched. Altman, 960 P.2d at 1167. To determine whether probable cause exists, we examine the totality of the circumstances. Id. This analysis does not lend itself to mathematical certainties or bright line rules; rather, it involves a practical, common-sense determination whether a fair probability exists that a search of a particular place will reveal contraband or other evidence of criminal activity. Id.
Whether information is current or stale plays an important role in the totality of the circumstances analysis. See Randolph, 4 P.3d at 482
; People v. Meraz, 961 P.2d 481, 484 (Colo.1998); People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302, 311 (Colo.1982); see also People v. Green, 70 P.3d 1213, 1215 (Colo.2003) (). Whether the information is stale and cannot support probable cause depends on the factual circumstances and the type of crime.3
Typically, when the police conduct a search without a valid warrant, the exclusionary rule operates to suppress the fruits of the search, unless the search falls under an exception to the warrant requirement. People v. Winpigler, 8 P.3d 439, 443-44 (Colo.1999). The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved; whether to invoke the exclusionary rule is an issue separate from the question of whether Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Application of the exclusionary rule is restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. Id. at 908, 104 S.Ct. 3405.
As a result, the exclusionary rule does not apply to situations where the police act in objectively reasonable, good faith reliance on a...
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