People v. Mercado

• Citation: 68 N.Y.2d 874,501 N.E.2d 27,508 N.Y.S.2d 419
• Parties: , 501 N.E.2d 27 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William MERCADO, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 16 October 1986
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 419

508 N.Y.S.2d 419

68 N.Y.2d 874, 501 N.E.2d 27

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William MERCADO, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 16, 1986.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 23, 1987. See 107 S.Ct. 1313.

Bertrand J. Kahn and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty. (Marc Resnick, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, 119 A.D.2d 1014, 501 N.Y.S.2d 548.

On March 4, 1981, Port Authority Police Officer William Gray was on duty at a passenger screening station inside the Pan American building at Kennedy Airport. An unidentified man came out of the men's rest room near the screening station and informed the officer that there were two men in a toilet stall in the rest room. Officer Gray entered the rest room to investigate. He saw only one stall with a closed door; from a distance he looked beneath the stalls and observed only one pair of feet. Coming closer to the occupied stall, Officer Gray could hear two low male voices in conversation, but could not tell what was being said. He then attempted to peer through the space between the door and the frame. On the first side the door was blocked, as if someone were leaning against it; on the other side he could see defendant sitting on the top of the flushing unit with his feet resting on the toilet bowl. The officer then entered the adjoining stall, stood on the commode and looked down into the occupied stall. Kevin Jackson was standing inside, his back to the door, with an open glassine envelope containing white powder in his hand, and defendant was in the same position as before. Upon seeing Officer Gray, defendant dropped the envelope into the toilet. Both men were ordered out of the stall and to the rear of the rest room. A pat-down search of defendant revealed 19 "nickel bags" of heroin. Defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 220.09). After denial of his suppression motion, he pleaded guilty to that crime and was sentenced to five years' probation. The Appellate Division affirmed, without opinion.

The question presented is whether defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer looked into the stall.

The Fourth Amendment protects all citizens "from unreasonable government intrusions into * * * legitimate expectations of privacy" (United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2481, 53 L.Ed.2d 538). It does not protect every subjective expectation of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as reasonable (Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1740, 80 L.Ed.2d 214; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 ). Once it is resolved that the particular locale is one in which there is a cognizable expectation of privacy, the invasion of that privacy interest--including a visual one--will be a search subject to constitutional strictures (see, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220). Of course, since the Fourth Amendment protects against only unreasonable intrusions, a search may be justified by the existence of probable cause to believe that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to take place.

Persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy, for example, in their homes. The Supreme Court has also recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in places that are nominally public, such as the interior of a public telephone booth; although available for general use, the Supreme Court recognized the booth as a place where an occupant's expectation of privacy regarding auditory transmission is reasonable (see, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at p. 361, 88 S.Ct., at 516 supra). By the same token, an expectation of privacy in a public rest room toilet stall is reasonable. The enclosure exists precisely to insure privacy and to shield its occupant from public view (see, 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.4). Once the door is closed, an individual is entitled to assume that while inside he or she will not be viewed by others. (See also, Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F.Supp. 1114 (D.Pa.); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal.3d 884, 106 Cal.Rptr. 408, 506 P.2d 232; Buchanan v....