People v. Meyer

• Decision Date: 05 April 1962
• Citation: 227 N.Y.S.2d 427,182 N.E.2d 103,11 N.Y.2d 162
• Parties: , 182 N.E.2d 103 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Robert MEYER, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 427

227 N.Y.S.2d 427

11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Robert MEYER, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 5, 1962.

Isidore Dollinger, Dist. Atty. (Irving Anolik, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Otto F. Fusco, New York City, for respondent.

DYE, Judge.

The question on this appeal is whether a voluntary, unsolicited statement made by an accused to a police officer after arraignment following his arrest and before indictment is admissible in evidence against him. It is undisputed that upon the arraignment this accused was informed of his rights, including his rights to counsel, and that he requested none (Code Criminal Procedure, § 188) and had no counsel at the time the challenged statement was made. It is now the rule that statements obtained from an accused after indictment are inadmissible where as in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265, revg. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793, 15o N.E.2d 226, a statement was obtained from an accused after indictment and after he had surrendered himself upon advice of counsel who had instructed him not to answer and to whom the officers had refused access.

Shortly after Spano we ruled that the admission into evidence over objection of a statement obtained from an accused in the absence of counsel, although not amounting to a confession, was nonetheless testimonial compulsion, People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 166 N.E.2d 825, which principle we soon applied in People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 567, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 76, 175 N.E.2d 445, wherein we noted that in People v. Downs, 8 N.Y.2d 860, 203 N.Y.S.2d 908, 168 N.E.2d 710, cert. den. 364 U.S. 867, 81 S.Ct. 111, 5 L.Ed.2d 89, the admission of a post-indictment statement turned on the special circumstances there present.

An arraignment after an arrest must be deemed the first stage of a criminal proceeding (Code Crim.Proc. §§ 165, 188) especially when, as here, the accused has been held for the Grand Jury, with fixation of bail (Code Crim.Proc. § 208). In reason and logic the admissibility into evidence of a post-arraignment statement should not be treated any differently than a post- indictment statement. A statement so taken necessarily impinges on the fundamentals of protection against testimonial compulsion, since the jury might well accord it weight beyond its worth to reach a verdict of guilty. While an accused may waive a fundamental right, he did not do so here, nor is he estopped because he had made no request when informed of his rights. We thus conclude that any statement made by an accused after arraignment not in the presence of counsel as in Spano, Di Biasi and Waterman (supra) is inadmissible.

The order appealed from should be affirmed.

FROESSEL, Judge (dissenting).

The majority would now extend the rule laid down in People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 166 N.E.2d 825, to the voluntary, unsolicited statements made by defendant immediately after he had been arraigned, advised as to the charge against him and as to his right to the aid of counsel (Code Crim.Proc., § 188), which he did not request, and weeks before an indictment had been found against him. Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor this court has ever gone so far and I see no warrant for our doing so in this case.

In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265, a capital case, petitioner's confession was held involuntary as the result of coercion, after his repeated requests for an opportunity to consult counsel were denied. The majority found it 'unnecessary to reach' the contention that a confession following an indictment, in the absence of counsel, was obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Di Biasi (supra) an indictment on a capital charge was handed up in 1952. Six years later, defendant surrendered himself by arrangement with his attorney, and we held, by a closely divided court, that his post-inictment statements made in the absence of counsel were not admissible in evidence. In People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 175 N.E.2d 445, we again held by a closely divided court that the defendant's statements made to a police officer some months after his indictment were inadmissible. On the other hand, in People v. Downs, 8 N.Y.2d 860, 203 N.Y.S.2d 908, 168 N.E.2d 710, another capital case, statements made by a defendant several months after his indictment were received in evidence. There said statements did not differ materially from defendant's testimony at the trial, and we affirmed his conviction.

In this case, the unsolicited statements challenged were made to a police detective immediately after the arraignment, and were in the nature of an inquiry as to what punishment he might receive if he were to admit his guilt. He had made virtually the same inquiry of the same police officer before the arraignment; that evidence showed that while defendant was being taken downtown for photographs he said to Detective Wynne: "Assuming that I am the fellow', he said, 'What do you...