People v. Moirzadeh

• Decision Date: 20 May 2011
• Docket Number: 2009-2468 N CR.
• Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Hooman Moirzadeh, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

2011 NY Slip Op 50939

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v. Hooman Moirzadeh, Appellant.

2009-2468 N CR.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decision Date: May 20, 2011

PRESENT: : NICOLAI, P.J., MOLIA and IANNACCI, JJ

Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Great Neck Estates, Nassau County (Harold M. Hoffman, J.), rendered November 10, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of speeding.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

By simplified traffic information, defendant was charged with speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [d]). At the nonjury trial, the police officer testified that he had visually estimated that defendant was traveling at a rate of speed of 45 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone. He further testified that his accuracy in visually estimating speed was plus or minus two miles per hour. The Justice Court found defendant guilty as charged.

It is well settled that even the uncorroborated testimony of a qualified police officer as to a vehicle's rate of speed is legally sufficient to support a conviction of speeding (see People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, 232 [1968]; see also People v Poltorak, 28 Misc 3d 129[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51222[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]; People v Gravagna, 26 Misc 3d 138[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50225[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]; People v Ramaker, 9 Misc 3d 131[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51592[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]). In this case, the 15 mile per hour variance between defendant's speed and the speed limit did not exceed the 20 mile per hour variance deemed "clearly sufficient" to support a conviction (People v Olsen, 22 NY2d at 232). However, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that the evidence, in its totality, was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of speeding beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the trier of fact's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon a review of the record, we find that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the credible evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]; see also People v Kaye, 2002 NY Slip Op 40093[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud...