People v. Mondello
| Decision Date | 01 March 1993 |
| Citation | 594 N.Y.S.2d 287,191 A.D.2d 462 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Keith MONDELLO, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Joseph V. DiBlasi, Forest Hills, for appellant.
Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Jay M. Cohen and Monique Ferrell, of counsel), for respondent.
Before MANGANO, P.J., and ROSENBLATT, RITTER and SANTUCCI, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Owens, J.), rendered June 11, 1990, convicting him of riot in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (three counts), discrimination (four counts), menacing (three counts), and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to four consecutive terms of 1 1/3 to 4 years imprisonment for the riot in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree convictions, concurrent terms of 90 days imprisonment for each of the three counts of menacing, and one year imprisonment for each of the four counts of discrimination and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to the police.
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by providing that the term of imprisonment imposed for riot in the first degree shall be served concurrently with each of the consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed for the convictions of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (three counts); as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
We disagree with the defendant's contention that the court committed a reversible error in denying his peremptory challenge to a black juror (Juror No. 2). It was not error for the court to determine that the defendant excused the juror on racially-discriminatory grounds, notwithstanding the defendant's attempt to provide a race-neutral explanation.
It is well established that purposeful racial discrimination by criminal defendants and their counsel in the exercise of peremptory challenges is prohibited under the New York State and Federal Constitutions (see, People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235, cert. denied 498 U.S. 824, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33; see generally, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69). Before peremptorily challenging the juror in issue, the defendant had peremptorily challenged all but one of the available black prospective jurors, while peremptorily challenging no individuals of any other race. There was, thus, a prima facie showing of discrimination (cf., People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709 [1993]. When the court asked the defense counsel for a race-neutral reason for peremptorily challenging Juror No. 2, the defense counsel responded that he did not like that prospective juror, and gave entirely subjective impressions. He resisted the obligation to give race-neutral reasons and asserted that his peremptory challenge was merely a response or quid pro quo to what he characterized as the prosecutor's racially-motivated peremptory challenges. When the court continued to press the defense counsel for a race-neutral reason to support this peremptory challenge of Juror No. 2, the defense counsel eventually responded that he did not want that juror because he thought that the juror would be influenced by the publicity of the case. The record does not support any valid claim that the juror would be influenced by media accounts. The juror did acknowledge that he was aware of media accounts, but his comments cannot be fairly interpreted to justify any belief that he could not render a fair and proper verdict.
It is for the trial court to determine if a race-neutral explanation for challenging a juror is a mere pretext, and the resolution of this issue by the trial court is entitled to great deference (see, People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 552 N.E.2d 621, aff'd 500 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395; People v. Green, 181 A.D.2d 693, 581 N.Y.S.2d 357). We find no basis to interfere with the trial court's finding that counsel's proffered excuse was a pretext offered in an attempt to cover a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Dixon
...638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235; see also, People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 591 N.E.2d 1136; People v. Mondello, 191 A.D.2d 462, 594 N.Y.S.2d 287). If Batson does not apply, a defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges remains as unlimited as it was under ......
-
People v. Rambersed
...75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235 cert. denied 498 U.S. 824, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 [1990]; People v. Mondello, 191 A.D.2d 462, 594 N.Y.S.2d 287 [1993] ). This extrapolation of the Batson rule is based on the equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution......
-
People v. Richie
...620 N.Y.S.2d 87; People v. Dixon, 202 A.D.2d 12, 615 N.Y.S.2d 904; People v. Bailey, 200 A.D.2d 677, 606 N.Y.S.2d 757; People v. Mondello, 191 A.D.2d 462, 594 N.Y.S.2d 287). Obviously, in a case where counsel advances, as a reason for his or her challenge, anything relating to the potential......
-
People v. Stiff
...v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235, cert. denied 498 U.S. 824, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50; People v. Mondello, 191 A.D.2d 462, 594 N.Y.S.2d 287). This extrapolation of the Batson rule is based on the Equal Protection guarantees of the United States Constitution (see......