People v. Montes

• Decision Date: 31 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. S105781.,S105781.
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Victor Rodriguez MONTES, Defendant and Appellant.

2 Cal.Rptr.3d 621

73 P.3d 489

31 Cal.4th 350

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Victor Rodriguez MONTES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S105781.

Supreme Court of California.

July 31, 2003.

As Modified September 10, 2003.

Richard A. Levy, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Mathew Chan and Charles V. Fennessey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MORENO, J.

Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) (section 186.22(b)(5)) provides that a defendant who commits "a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life" for the benefit of a criminal street gang "shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served." We granted review to determine whether this provision applies (a) if the defendant commits a felony which, together with the Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) (section 12022.53(d)) enhancement results in a life term, or (b) only if the defendant commits a felony that, by its own terms, provides for a life sentence.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that section 186.22(b)(5) applies only where the felony by its own terms provides for a life sentence.

Proceedings Below

On March 8, 2000, defendant shot a rival gang member several times, inflicting serious injuries requiring surgery. Following a court trial, defendant was convicted of attempted murder. (Pen.Code §§ 664, 187.)¹ The court also found true that defendant intentionally discharged a firearm while committing the offense (§§ 12022.5, 12022.53, subds.(b), (c)), inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, 12022.53, subd. (d)), participated in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)), and acted for the benefit of that gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant as follows: the midterm of seven years for attempted murder (§§ 664, 187),² plus a consecutive term of 10 years for the criminal street gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).

The Court of Appeal, however, held that the trial court erred in imposing the 10-year enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (hereafter section 186.22(b)(1)) and modified the judgment. It struck the section 186.22(b)(1) enhancement and instead imposed the 15 year minimum parole eligibility date mandated by section 186.22(b)(5),³ which applies when a defendant is convicted of "a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life," and provides that the defendant "shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served." The Court of Appeal reasoned that attempted murder was "a felony punishable by imprisonment ... for life," within the meaning of section 186.22(b)(5) because the underlying felony of attempted murder and the section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement together resulted in a life term. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified and directed the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that reflected the modifications.

The Attorney General disagrees. He argues that section 186.22(b)(5) applies only where the underlying felony itself provides for a life sentence, ruling out any enhancement not included in the definition of the underlying felony. Under this view, the trial court correctly computed defendant's sentence. For the reasons stated below, we agree and reverse the Court of Appeal's modification of judgment.

Discussion

A. The STEP Act

Penal Code section 186.22(b)(5) is a provision that was added to the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act). (§ 186.20 et seq.) The impetus behind the STEP Act, which was enacted in 1988, was the Legislature's recognition that "California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively, present a clear and present danger to the public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected." (§ 186.21.) The Act's express purpose is "to seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs...." (Ibid.)

On March 7, 2000, the California electorate passed Proposition 21, which amended the STEP Act. As is relevant here, section 186.22(b)(1) now provides that, "Except as provided by paragraphs (4) and (5), any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of ... any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony ..., be punished as follows: [¶] (A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the person shall be punished by an additional term of two, three, or four years at the court's discretion. [!] (B) If the felony is a serious felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, the person shall be punished by an additional term of five years. [U] (C) If the felony is a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, the person shall be punished by an additional term of 10 years."

Additionally, Proposition 21 renumbered section 186.22, former subdivision (b)(4) as section 186.22(b)(5). Its substantive language was unchanged. Section 186.22(b)(5) provides: "Except as provided in paragraph (4), any person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served."

B. Court of Appeal Opinion

The Court of Appeal first noted that a defendant is subject to the section 186.22(b)(5) alternate penalty provision when a court "imposes a life term on a felony committed for the gang's benefit." "This raises the question," stated the Court of Appeal, "whether the phrase `felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life' in section 186.22(b)(5) means the underlying felony in the abstract or the felony actually committed, including conduct that results in enhanced punishment."

The Court of Appeal believed that because the "Legislature did not specify that the felony be punishable by a `base term' of imprisonment in the state prison for life, nor did it expressly include felonies punishable by life imprisonment as the result of an enhancement," the phrase "felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life" was ambiguous. As such, "courts must construe the ambiguity in favor of the defendant, giving him the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of the statute. [Citations.] This `rule of lenity' is an appropriate `tiebreaker' where there are equally plausible interpretations of law. [Citation.]"<sup>4</sup> The Court of Appeal, because it found "no logical reason why a felony punishable by life imprisonment as a result of an enhancement should be treated differently [than a felony punishable by a `base term' of imprisonment for life]," struck the section 186.22(b)(1) enhancement and instead imposed the 15 year minimum eligible parole date of section 186.22(b)(5). We disagree.

C. Analysis

As stated earlier, the STEP Act was enacted in 1988. At that time, the language that now appears in section 186.22(b)(5) was contained in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(3).⁵ While current section 186.22(b)(5) has been renumbered several times since 1988, the section's substantive language has remained the same since 1988, through the voters' passage of Proposition 21.⁶ Where a voter initiative contains a provision that is identical to a provision previously enacted by the Legislature, in the absence of an indication of a contrary intent, we infer that the voters intended the provision to have the same meaning as the provision drafted by the Legislature. (See People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283 ["Section 190.2 was enacted by voter initiative in 1978, but the language of its subdivision (a)(2) is identical to a provision that the Legislature enacted as part of the 1977 death penalty law. [Citation.] In the absence of anything suggesting the contrary, we infer that the voters who enacted section 190.2 intended subdivision (a)(2) to have the same meaning as the identically worded provision drafted by the Legislature."].)⁷ Because there is no evidence of a contrary intent here, we infer that the voters intended section 186.22(b)(5) to have the same meaning as the identically worded provision drafted by the Legislature in 1988.

In People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 746-747, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278, we stated: "`In construing the relevant provisions of the STEP Act, as with any statute, we strive to ascertain and effectuate the Legislatures intent.' [Citations.]" "We begin by examining the words of the [statute]; if the statutory language is not ambiguous, then we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citations.] If, however, the statutory language lacks clarity, we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such situations, we strive to select the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature's apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statute['s] general purposes. [Citation.] We will avoid any interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences. [Citation.]" (People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 581, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 75, 59 P.3d 150 (Walker).)

1. Ambiguity

It is unclear, focusing solely on the statutory language, whether the ...