People v. Montoya
| Decision Date | 23 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 03CA0696.,03CA0696. |
| Citation | 141 P.3d 916 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrea R. Manning, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant, Nathan Montoya, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree burglary, second degree kidnapping, and sexual assault. He also appeals the sentence imposed. We affirm.
Defendant, along with two other men, entered the house where the victim was living with her boyfriend and his father and, after arguing with her boyfriend, destroyed various items in the house. The victim, a seventeen-year-old girl, testified that defendant kidnapped her and her friend, drove them to a warehouse, and sexually assaulted the victim.
Defendant was charged with a total of fourteen counts, including one burglary count, two kidnapping counts, one sexual assault count, three sexual assault aggravator counts, and seven conspiracy counts. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree burglary in violation of § 18-4-202(1), C.R.S. 2005; second degree kidnapping (sexual assault) in violation of § 18-3-302(1) and (3)(a), C.R.S.2005; sexual assault in violation of § 18-3-402(1)(a), C.R.S.2005; sexual assault aggravator, force or violence, in violation of § 18-3-402(4)(a), C.R.S.2005; and sexual assault aggravator, present threat, in violation of § 18-3-402(4)(b), C.R.S.2005.
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of fifty-one years to life in the Department of Corrections (DOC), including fifteen years on the burglary count, eighteen years on the kidnapping count, and eighteen years to life on the sexual assault count, to run consecutively. In sentencing defendant on his burglary and kidnapping convictions, the court applied Colorado's aggravated sentencing statute after it found that defendant was on parole, on probation, or under supervision when he committed the offenses. See § 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(II)-(III), C.R.S.2005. The trial court further sentenced defendant to terms of mandatory parole as required by statute.
This appeal followed.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred when it denied his challenge for cause of a juror, because the juror could not be fair and impartial. Defendant further argues that his use of a peremptory challenge on this juror, who should have been struck for cause, violated his due process right to a fair trial. We disagree.
A trial court's denial of a defendant's challenge for cause is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478 (Colo.1999); see also People v. Strean, 74 P.3d 387 (Colo.App.2002). The trial court's determination is given deference, because it is in a superior position to assess the credibility of a prospective juror's responses, demeanor, and body language. Carrillo v. People, supra; see also People v. Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295 (Colo.2000) (); People v. Strean, supra, 74 P.3d at 391 ().
The trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Strean, supra. In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must review the entire voir dire of the prospective juror. Carrillo v. People, supra.
The right to challenge a juror for cause is an integral part of a fair trial. Carrillo v. People, supra. Upon such a challenge, the trial court is required to dismiss potential jurors who hold any of the biases listed in § 16-10-103(1), C.R.S.2005, as a matter of law. "A biased juror may not serve because . . . she could poison the defendant's right to a fair trial." People v. Lefebre, supra, 5 P.3d at 300.
Under § 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S.2005, a court must sustain a challenge for cause if there is
[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state; however, no person summoned as a juror shall be disqualified by reason of a previously formed or expressed opinion with reference to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if the court is satisfied, from the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that he will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial[.]
But "the court is not required to dismiss a prospective juror simply because . . . she has indicated a possible source of bias." People v. Strean, supra, 74 P.3d at 390. "If the court is satisfied that the prospective juror will base the decision on the evidence and will follow the court's instructions," it should not disqualify the juror. People v. Strean, supra, 74 P.3d at 390-91; see also People v. Lefebre, supra, 5 P.3d at 301 ().
Here, the trial court thoroughly questioned the challenged juror in chambers. The court inquired as to whether her "rational powers might be interfered with" due to her emotions about her friend's experience of being raped. The juror responded, "I would like to say no, but I think they might be." When the court asked her whether she had "some hesitation about that," she responded,
However, in response to questioning by the prosecution, the juror, without reservation, indicated that she would require the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor asked the prospective juror, "[W]ould you hold the prosecution to proving this case beyond a reasonable doubt?" The juror responded, "Absolutely." The prosecutor further probed,
And if I missed an element—you know, the judge said that there will be a list of elements. If I miss one, do you think your emotions would make it so that you would find [defendant] guilty even though you did not believe that [the prosecution] had proven all of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt?
The juror responded, "No. I think I can be impartial enough that I could step aside and be sure that all of the criteria had been fulfilled."
The trial court determined that, although the juror had concerns about her friend's experience, she had responded "unequivocally" that she would hold the prosecution to the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt even if she was "feeling very emotional and sympathetic for the victim." The court further found:
[The] evidence in this case might remind her about what happened to her friend, it might make it difficult for her to serve, but I don't think there was anything she said in answer to counsel's questions that indicated she couldn't be fair and impartial, despite that emotional overlay, or the potential for that emotional overlay.
Having reviewed the entire record of the voir dire of the prospective juror, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the challenged juror could be fair and impartial. See People v. Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. 1987) (). Her responses, taken as a whole, reflect that while serving as a juror may have been difficult for her, she would base her decision on the evidence and the law and would follow the court's instructions. Accordingly, we will not disturb the court's determination upon appeal. See People v. Strean, supra.
Defendant next contends that his due process right to a fair trial was violated because Instruction No. 22 inappropriately included language which permitted the jury to find him guilty as a complicitor without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime had been proved. We disagree.
Because defendant objected to the instructional language, we review under a constitutional harmless error analysis. See Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo.2001) (). A constitutional error is harmless if we are confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in the jury instruction did not contribute to the verdict. Griego v. People, supra ().
A trial court must properly instruct the jury on every element of a crime in order to preserve a defendant's constitutional rights to a jury trial and to the requirement that the prosecution prove each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Griego v. People, supra; see also People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo.1981) (). "In determining the propriety of any one instruction, the instructions must be considered as a whole, and if they properly instruct the jury as a whole, there is no error." People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921, 926 (Colo.App.2003).
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...to his prior conviction and thus falls within the prior conviction exception" to the rule of Apprendi and Blakely. People v. Montoya, 141 P.3d 916, 922 (Colo.App.2006); accord People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628, 633 (Colo.2006) ("Because a defendant's sentence to probation or supervision can be ......
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...arise from and are essentially analogous to a prior conviction. See, e.g., People v. Montoya, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 03CA0696, 141 P.3d 916, 922, 2006 Colo. App. Lexis 220, *6 (Colo.App. February 23, 2006) (concluding that "fact that [the] defendant was on parole or probation is inext......
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