People v. Montoya

• Decision Date: 09 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2-05-0458.,2-05-0458.
• Citation: 868 N.E.2d 389
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maria D. MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

868 N.E.2d 389

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maria D. MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-05-0458.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

May 9, 2007.

G. Joseph Weller, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defenders, Vicki P. Kouros (all Court-appointed), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Maria D. Montoya.

Paul A. Logli, Winnebago County State's Attorney, Rockford, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, Stephanie Hoit Lee, Algonquin, for the People.

Justice BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant, Maria D. Montoya, was convicted of two counts of identity theft (720 ILCS 5/16G-15(a)(1) (West Supp.2003)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 months' probation and 100 hours of public service work and imposed a $500 fine. On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions of identity theft, and (2) she is entitled to a $5 credit against her fine. We affirm defendant's convictions but modify the sentencing order to reflect the $5 credit.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 18, 2004, defendant was indicted on two counts of identity theft. Count I alleged that "between February of 2000 and December of 2003 * * * defendant knowingly used personal identifying information of Mona L. Cantu, by using the social security number of Mona Cantu, to fraudulently obtain money exceeding $10,000 and not exceeding $100,000." Count II alleged that "between December of 2002 and August of 2003 * * * defendant knowingly used personal identifying information of Mona L. Cantu, by using the social security number of Mona Cantu, to fraudulently obtain services exceeding $10,000 and not exceeding $100,000." The charges arose after defendant, an undocumented immigrant, purchased a social security card bearing Cantu's social security number and used it to obtain a job. A stipulated bench trial commenced on March 1, 2005, at which the following evidence was adduced.

Defendant applied to work for Terra Harvest Foods using Cantu's name and social security number. From February 2000 to December 2003, defendant received $53,702.57 in wages at Terra Harvest under the name and social security number of Cantu. As part of her employment package, defendant was issued health insurance from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois (Blue Cross), also under Cantu's name and social security number. Between December 2002 and August 2003, defendant received medical services at Swedish American Hospital that involved the delivery of her baby. The medical services totaled approximately $31,000.

Defendant arranged for the Blue Cross statements to be mailed to her own address, and she paid the medical and insurance bills. However, when Cantu changed her mailing address, defendant's bills began arriving at Cantu's home. After receiving several bills that involved a hospital stay and medical testing, Cantu questioned Blue Cross about these charges. From this inquiry, Cantu learned that someone was using her name and social security number to obtain insurance through Terra Harvest Foods.

Cantu reported these findings to the Loves Park police department. The police conducted a follow-up investigation and learned that defendant was earning wages and receiving benefits at Terra Harvest Foods under Cantu's name. When the police brought a photograph of Cantu to Terra Harvest Foods, defendant's supervisor stated that the woman in the photograph was not the person he knew as "Mona Cantu."

The Loves Park police interviewed defendant on December 22, 2003. Initially, defendant identified herself as Mona Cantu. The police asked for her mother's maiden name, and defendant did not answer this question. Defendant told the police she was using someone else's "card." Defendant was then transported to the police station, where she gave a statement explaining the circumstances by which she obtained Cantu's social security number. According to defendant, she drove to Chicago with a person named Sylvia, who loaned her $100 and obtained the social security card for defendant. In her statement, defendant admitted using Cantu's name and social security number to obtain a job. Defendant also stated that she did not use the social security number anywhere else. There was no evidence that defendant knew that Cantu was a real person.

On April 8, 2005, defendant was convicted of two counts of identity theft. On May 9, 2005, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.

At defendant's sentencing hearing on May 9, 2005, the State presented evidence of the financial difficulty that defendant's actions had caused Cantu. First, the Illinois Department of Employment Services attempted to recollect unemployment benefits that had been provided to Cantu based on defendant's employment at Terra Harvest Foods. Second, the State of Illinois withheld Cantu's state tax refund because it believed that Cantu was working at defendant's job and not paying taxes. Third, the federal government withheld a portion of Cantu's federal tax refund based on defendant's employment. Last, Cantu was forced to dispute various medical charges that defendant had incurred. Defendant was sentenced to 30 months' probation and 100 hours of public service work and was fined $500. Defendant timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Identity Theft

Defendant first argues that her actions did not constitute identity theft. Specifically, she argues that she did not "fraudulently obtain" money and services when she used Cantu's name and social security number to obtain a job, because she earned her wages and the insurance benefits were part of her employment package. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 214 Ill.2d 206, 217, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005). In this case, because the facts are not in dispute, defendant's guilt is a question of law, which we review de novo. See People v. Smith, 191 Ill.2d 408, 411, 247 Ill.Dec. 458, 732 N.E.2d 513 (2000).

We begin by setting forth the relevant provisions of the Identity Theft Law (720 ILCS 5/16G-1 et seq. (West Supp.2003)), which was enacted in 1999. The legislative declaration for the Identity Theft Law provides as follows:

"(a) It is the public policy of this State that the substantial burden placed upon the economy of this State as a result of the rising incidence of identity theft and the negative effect of this crime on the People of this State and its victims is a matter of grave concern to the People of this State who have the right to be protected in their health, safety, and welfare from the effects of this crime, and therefore identity theft shall be identified and dealt with swiftly and appropriately considering the onerous nature of the crime." 720 ILCS 5/16G-5(a) (West Supp.2003).

Under section 16G-15(a)(1), "[a] person commits the offense of identity theft when he or she knowingly: (1) uses any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another person to fraudulently obtain credit, money, goods, services, or other property." 720 ILCS 5/16G-15(a)(1) (West Supp.2003). Section 16G-25 then states that "[i]t is no defense to a charge of * * * identity theft that the offender has an interest in the credit, money, goods, services, or other property." 720 ILCS 5/16G-25 (West Supp.2003).

We are asked to construe the phrase "fraudulently obtain" as used in the statute. "Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, the standard of review is de novo." Collins, 214 Ill.2d at 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262. The principal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Grever, 222 Ill.2d 321, 328, 305 Ill.Dec. 573, 856 N.E.2d 378 (2006). The language of the statute is the best indication of the legislative intent. Grever, 222 Ill.2d at 328, 305 Ill.Dec. 573, 856 N.E.2d 378. To ascertain the legislature's intent, we may also consider the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals to be achieved. Collins, 214 Ill.2d at 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262. Furthermore, we should evaluate a statutory provision as a whole rather than read phrases in isolation. People v. Glisson, 202 Ill.2d 499, 505, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (2002). When the language is plain and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resorting to further aids of statutory construction. Collins, 214 Ill.2d at 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262.

The statute does not define fraud, and this is a case of first impression. "In the absence of a statutory definition indicating legislative intent, an undefined term must be given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning." In re Ryan B., 212 Ill.2d 226, 232, 288 Ill.Dec. 137, 817 N.E.2d 495 (2004). Also, "[a] term of well-known legal significance can be presumed to have that meaning in a statute." Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill.2d 1, 17, 223 Ill.Dec. 1, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996). "Fraud" is defined as a "knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment." Black's Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed.1999); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 904 (1986) (defining "fraud" as "an instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp[ecially] when involving misrepresentation: an act of deluding"). "Fraudulent" means "belonging to or characterized by fraud [or] * * * obtained or performed by fraud." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 904 (1986).

In this case, defendant does not contest that she obtained money in the form of wages and services in the form of insurance benefits. Rather, defendant...