People v. Moody

• Decision Date: 11 April 2014
• Docket Number: F066596
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THOMAS JAMES MOODY, Defendant and Respondent.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THOMAS JAMES MOODY, Defendant and Respondent.

F066596

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Filed: April 11, 2014

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 1439135)

OPINION

THE COURT^*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Scott T. Steffen, Judge.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Caely E. Fallini, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Carol Foster, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

After a magistrate sustained a Miranda¹ objection and dismissed the complaint against defendant Thomas James Moody, the People moved to reinstate the complaint pursuant to Penal Code section 871.5.² The Stanislaus County Superior Court denied the motion and the People appeal. We will reverse the superior court's order denying reinstatement of the complaint.

BACKGROUND

On December 6, 2011, the Stanislaus County District Attorney charged defendant with possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and possession of a controlled substance pipe (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)). The complaint included various special allegations. Defendant pled not guilty.

At the preliminary hearing on May 29, 2012, Officer Torres was the only witness. He testified that he and Officer Jones were on patrol on December 2, 2011, at about 1:00 a.m. They were driving in an alley when they saw a BMW with an open driver's door and an illuminated dome light. Defendant was crouched down and his hands were under the dashboard.³ The officers found this behavior suspicious because it was consistent with someone breaking into the vehicle, tampering with it, or stealing it. Based on these suspicions, the officers conducted an investigative stop. Officer Jones pulled the patrol vehicle toward the BMW's driver's side, perpendicular to the BMW, and shone the spotlight on defendant. Defendant immediately "popped out" of the BMW. Both officers exited the patrol vehicle and approached. Officer Jones contacted defendant, who was now about six or seven feet from the BMW's open driver's door, and started talking to him and questioning him. As Officer Jones questioned defendant,Officer Torres stood near the BMW's rear door on the driver's side, about four feet from the open driver's door.

Officer Torres asked defendant for permission to search the car. Defendant said, "Yes." Officer Torres saw a dirty rag tucked into the pocket of the open driver's door. He pulled out the rag, unwrapped it, and found a glass pipe and a white rock-like substance. Officer Torres recognized that the glass pipe was consistent with those used to smoke rock cocaine.

Officer Jones spoke to defendant; they had a conversation about the rock-like substance. Defendant said it was crack. The officers had not read defendant his Miranda rights.

Following this testimony, the magistrate requested briefing and reserved its ruling on defendant's Miranda motion.

On July 9, 2012, the magistrate granted the Miranda motion. The magistrate concluded that the search was consensual and it occurred before defendant was in custody. Once Officer Torres found the glass pipe and rock-like substance, however, he became aware that an offense had been committed, and at that point, defendant was no longer free to leave and the interrogation became custodial. Thus, the officers should have read defendant his rights prior to any further questioning. When the officer asked defendant about the rock-like substance, he should have known that his words were likely to elicit an incriminating response from defendant. The magistrate stated it was granting the motion "from the time of the discovery of the rag forward. Because of that, there's no evidence linking the defendant to the substance found or the pipe found, so the defendant is not held to answer on either. Defendant is discharged."

On July 24, 2012, the People moved to compel reinstatement of the complaint pursuant to section 871.5, arguing that the magistrate erroneously dismissed the complaint.

On January 4, 2013, the superior court denied the People's motion. The court accepted the magistrate's finding that defendant was not free to leave once the officer had found the pipe. Based on this finding, the court believed the "legal issue [was] pretty clear that [defendant] was required to be advised of his Miranda rights." The court considered People v. Sims (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 900, where officers found some marijuana in a car and asked the defendant where the rest of the marijuana was. The defendant pointed out the location of more marijuana. The Sims court said the defendant had become a suspect in the investigation that had focused on him and he was not free to leave the scene. Thus, he was in custody and the officers should have advised him of his rights before questioning him further.

DISCUSSION

The People contend the magistrate's decision was erroneous as a matter of law because the circumstances under which defendant made the statement that the rock-like substance was crack did not constitute custodial interrogation and therefore did not trigger the duty to advise him of his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the People argue the superior court erred in denying their motion to reinstate the complaint.

I. Law

Section 871.5 provides that "[w]hen an action is dismissed by a magistrate ..., the prosecutor may make a motion in the superior court within 15 days to compel the magistrate to reinstate the complaint or a portion thereof and to reinstate the custodial status of the defendant under the same terms and conditions as when the defendant last appeared before the magistrate." (§ 871.5, subd. (a).) "The only ground for the motion shall be that, as a matter of law, the magistrate erroneously dismissed the action or a portion thereof." (§ 871.5, subd. (b).) "The superior court shall hear and determine the motion on the basis of the record of the proceedings before the magistrate. If the motionis litigated to decision by the prosecutor, the prosecution is prohibited from refiling the dismissed action, or portion thereof." (§ 871.5, subd. (c).)

"'In a proceeding under Penal Code section 871.5 to reinstate a complaint, the superior court sits as a reviewing court and is bound by the magistrate's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ... 'In determining whether to compel reinstatement of a complaint dismissed after the granting of a defendant's suppression motion by the magistrate at a preliminary hearing, the superior court reviews the legal soundness of the magistrate's ruling on the suppression motion [citations] based on "the record of the proceedings before the magistrate" [Citation.]' [Citation.] [¶] 'On appeal from an order denying a motion to reinstate a criminal complaint under section 871.5, we disregard the superior court's ruling and directly examine the magistrate's ruling to determine if the dismissal of the complaint was erroneous as a matter of law. To the extent the magistrate's decision rests upon factual findings, "[w]e, like the superior court, must draw every legitimate inference in favor of the magistrate's ruling and cannot substitute our judgment, on the credibility or weight of the evidence, for that of the magistrate." [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'We review the magistrate's legal conclusions de novo, but are bound by any factual findings the magistrate made if they are supported by substantial evidence.' [Citation.] [¶] '[I]t is the duty of the superior court, and ours as well, to measure those facts, as found by the magistrate, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness. The constitutional issue is solely a question of law ....' [Citation.]" (People v. Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 544-545.)

In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court held that prior to any custodial interrogation, police officers must advise a criminal suspect of his right to remain silent, right to have an attorney present, and right to have an appointed attorney if the suspect is indigent. (Id. at p. 444.) A defendant's statements obtained innoncompliance with this rule cannot be introduced into evidence to establish his guilt. (Ibid.) Importantly, officers "are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question." (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495.) "'Absent "custodial interrogation," Miranda simply does not come into play.'" (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.)

The "ultimate inquiry" for custody for Miranda is "simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. [Citation.]" (California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125.) Absent a formal arrest, custody is determined by objectively looking at all the surrounding circumstances and determining whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would believe he was in police custody to the degree associated with a formal arrest. (Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 662-663; Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 (Berkemer); People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830; People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403 ["Would a reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal arrest?"].) A single factor, such as handcuffing, is not determinative. (People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 972-973.)

An officer's undisclosed focus of suspicion is not relevant to the...