People v. Moore
| Decision Date | 03 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 20SA293 |
| Citation | 485 P.3d 1088 |
| Parties | In Re The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff v. Aundre D. MOORE, Defendant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Plaintiff: Beth McCann, District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Jeff M. Van der Veer, Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Sarah Varty, Deputy Public Defender, Robert Halpern, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
¶1 The Denver District Attorney has charged Aundre Moore with first degree murder for the shooting death of Jamaica McClain. Moore has pleaded not guilty and is awaiting trial. He claims that he acted in self-defense, and he intends to introduce evidence of his pre-existing mental illness to help show why he subjectively believed he was in imminent danger and needed to use deadly force to repel McClain.
¶2 The prosecution moved to exclude evidence of Moore's mental condition, arguing that it is inadmissible unless he pleads not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI") — an affirmative defense that Moore has said he doesn't plan to invoke. The district court denied the prosecution's motion, reasoning that Moore's stated purpose in offering the mental condition evidence is to prove the subjective belief component of his self-defense claim, not to prove insanity. Therefore, the court ruled that it would allow, without an insanity plea, expert testimony by a psychologist and a forensic psychiatrist who examined Moore, so long as their testimony otherwise conforms to the rules of evidence. The prosecution then filed a petition pursuant to C.A.R. 21, and we issued an order to show cause.
¶3 We conclude that, absent an insanity plea, the trial court must exclude any evidence that is probative of insanity, as that term has been defined by the legislature, irrespective of the ostensible purpose for which it is offered. The court must therefore ask: Does some or all of the proposed testimony tend to prove that the defendant (a) was so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, or (b) suffered from a condition of mind caused by mental disease or defect that prevented the defendant from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of a crime charged?
¶4 Critically, however, this question involves an often-neglected threshold issue: the existence of "a mental disease or defect." For a defendant's mental condition to implicate the statutory definition of mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, it must have been so severely abnormal that it grossly and demonstrably impaired the defendant's perception or understanding of reality (without being attributable to the voluntary ingestion of drugs or alcohol).
¶5 This means that evidence of less-severe mental illness remains admissible, absent an insanity plea, if it otherwise conforms to the statutory requirements and the rules of evidence. The court must parse any proffered mental condition evidence, line by line if necessary, to distinguish what is probative of insanity under this exacting definition from what is not.
¶6 We therefore make the rule absolute and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶7 The charges against Moore stem from an incident that occurred on March 21, 2019. That evening, Moore met D.E. in a motel lobby. The two spent some time together before deciding to grab a drink at a bar in the Park Hill neighborhood. Moore drove D.E. to the bar and backed his car into a spot in the bar's parking lot. As Moore and D.E. were sitting in Moore's car, another car pulled into the parking lot and stopped in front of them, blocking their exit. McClain, with whom Moore was acquainted, exited the driver's side of the other car and approached the driver's side of Moore's car. Moore got out of his car. The two appeared to argue before Moore shot McClain in the head. Subsequent investigation revealed that McClain was unarmed. That much appears to be undisputed.
¶8 The prosecution charged Moore with first degree murder, among other crimes. Moore contends that he acted in self-defense. He plans to present evidence that he knew McClain was an active gang member with a reputation for carrying a gun; that McClain got out of his car and started yelling at Moore, posturing to fight; that he saw McClain reach into his car before approaching him; and that McClain continued to approach him in an aggressive manner despite Moore's repeated warnings to "back up."
¶9 To further support his self-defense claim, Moore seeks to present expert testimony about his mental condition at the time of the offense. He filed a notice with the district court of his intent to do so pursuant to section 16-8-107(3)(b), C.R.S. (2020), and he retained a psychologist, Dr. Jane Wells, who evaluated him. Dr. Leah Brar, a forensic psychiatrist, also conducted a mandatory examination on behalf of the state pursuant to section 16-8-106, C.R.S. (2020).
¶10 Because the reports from the two evaluations are relevant to our decision, we summarize their content in some detail.1
¶11 Dr. Wells's report explains that Moore experienced numerous traumatic events related to gun violence. She notes that Moore's grandfather was shot and killed around the corner from where he lived; two of Moore's friends were shot in Park Hill; Moore himself was previously shot at on two separate occasions, one of which was in Park Hill; a friend of Moore's was kidnapped and killed; and Moore lost two other friends to gun violence.
¶12 Dr. Wells also recounts that Moore was hospitalized about twenty years ago with delusional psychosis. He was later diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was briefly medicated, although he wasn't taking any psychotropic medications on the date of the alleged offense.
¶13 Dr. Wells opines that Moore has a cyclical mood disorder, a paranoid thought process, and displays symptoms of trauma. She diagnosed him with bipolar disorder I (most recent episode mixed with paranoid ideation ). She notes that, although Moore exhibits some symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), he doesn't meet the criteria for that diagnosis. Instead, she diagnosed him with other specified trauma- and stressor-related disorder. Dr. Wells described this disorder as a condition where symptoms of PTSD are present but don't meet the threshold for a PTSD diagnosis.
¶14 Dr. Wells finds that Moore's thinking "tends to be distorted with psychotic qualities" and that "[t]rauma symptoms also contributed to his paranoid ideation, hyper-vigilance, agitation[,] and his feelings of vulnerability." She further notes that, at the time of the offense, Moore had an elevated mood, which "may have led him to feel grandiose, energetic[,] and overly[ ]confident in his conclusions." Dr. Wells concludes that, although "Moore shot an unarmed person for no clear reason," it is "likely that his mental state contributed to how he perceived the situation and his decision-making."
¶15 Dr. Brar, for her part, acknowledges the traumatic events that Moore experienced, and she too diagnosed him with other specified trauma- and stressor-related disorder. Additionally, she found that Moore met the criteria for the following diagnoses at the time of the alleged offense: unknown substance intoxication, other specified bipolar and related disorder, severe alcohol use disorder, severe cannabis use disorder, and moderate other hallucinogen (ecstasy) use disorder.
¶16 Still, Dr. Brar concludes that, at the time of the incident, Moore "did not suffer from a severe, abnormal mental condition [that] grossly and demonstrably impaired his perception or understanding of reality," and "was not so diseased or defective in mind ... as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to the alleged acts or to be prevented from forming the culpable mental states." She notes that, although Moore "experience[d] potential impairments in perception and reality testing," in her opinion, those impairments "were likely secondary to the voluntary ingestion of substances" and were unrelated to mania or psychosis. Additionally, she opines that "Moore's trauma-related disorder and intoxication likely ... influence[d] his decision-making during the alleged events, even if they did not rise to [the] level of ... a mental disease or defect."
¶17 The prosecution moved to exclude evidence of Moore's mental condition, arguing that it is inadmissible pursuant to section 16-8-107(3)(a) because it constitutes evidence "relevant to the issue of insanity" and Moore hasn't pleaded insanity.
¶18 The district court denied the prosecution's motion and held that evidence of Moore's mental condition may be admissible at trial even if he doesn't plead NGRI. The court reasoned that the evidence was admissible pursuant to section 16-8-107(3)(b) to prove Moore's subjective belief in the need for self-defense.
¶19 The prosecution then filed this original proceeding, and we issued an order to show cause.2
¶20 We begin by addressing our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We then identify the applicable standards of review and revisit familiar principles of statutory interpretation before turning our attention to the core substantive question before us; namely, what evidence is "relevant to the issue of insanity" under section 16-8-107(3)(a).
¶21 Relief under C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability. People v. Rowell, 2019 CO 104, ¶ 9, 453 P.3d 1156, 1159. Whether to exercise our original jurisdiction rests solely within our discretion. See C.A.R. 21(a)(1) ; People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22, ¶ 19, 459 P.3d 540, 545.
¶22 We have exercised our original jurisdiction when the petition raised an issue of first impression that was of significant public...
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