People v. Rosas

• Decision Date: 16 March 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 19SA242
• Citation: 459 P.3d 540
• Parties: In re The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. Paul Damon ROSAS, Defendant.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

459 P.3d 540

In re The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff,

v.Paul Damon ROSAS, Defendant.

Supreme Court Case No. 19SA242

Supreme Court of Colorado.

March 16, 2020

Attorneys for Plaintiff: George H. Brauchler, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, Susan J. Trout, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Centennial, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant: The Law Firm of Michael D. Miller, LLC, Michael D. Miller, Lakewood, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Must a defendant charged with specific intent crimes plead not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI") in order to introduce evidence that, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he was incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state on the dates of the offenses charged? The district court said "no." The People then filed a petition pursuant to C.A.R. 21, and we issued a rule to show cause. Because the correct answer to the question is "yes," we make the rule absolute. Evidence that a mental disease or defect prevented a defendant from forming the culpable mental state required by an offense charged is evidence relevant to the issue of insanity. And a defendant—even one charged with specific intent crimes—cannot introduce evidence relevant to the issue of insanity without first pleading NGRI.

I

¶2 Based on an incident that occurred between January 3 and 4 of 2018, the People charged Paul Damon Rosas with two counts of second degree assault on a peace officer (class 4 felonies), two counts of attempted second degree assault on a peace officer (class 5 felonies), and one count of obstructing a peace officer (a class 2 misdemeanor). Rosas filed a notice of the affirmative defense of "impaired mental condition" pursuant to section 16-8-103.5, C.R.S. (2019), asserting that at the time of the offenses he was suffering from a mental disease or defect that made him incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state. But this affirmative defense no longer exists; in fact, it hasn't existed for a quarter of a century. See § 16-8-103.5(8) ("This section shall apply only to offenses committed before July 1, 1995."). Effective July 1, 1995, our General Assembly "modified the test for insanity to fold in the former affirmative defense for ‘impaired mental condition.’ " Renfandt v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. , 2018 CO 49, ¶ 48, 419 P.3d 576, 585. Thus, what used to be the defense of "impaired mental condition" is now subsumed within the defense of insanity.

¶3 Insanity is defined through the following two-part test:

(a) A person who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act is not accountable; except that care should be taken not to confuse such mental disease or defect with moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other motives and kindred evil conditions, for, when the act is induced by any of these causes, the person is accountable to the law; or

(b) A person who suffered from a condition of mind caused by mental disease or defect that prevented the person from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of a crime charged, but care should be taken not to confuse such mental disease or defect with moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other motives and kindred evil conditions because, when the act is induced by any of these causes, the person is accountable to the law.

§ 16-8-101.5(1), C.R.S. (2019).¹ With respect to crimes committed before July 1, 1995, as to which insanity and impaired mental condition are separate defenses, paragraph (a) above defines "insanity" and paragraph (b) above defines "impaired mental condition," though the two defenses do not reside within the same statute. See § 16-8-101(1), (3), C.R.S. (2019); § 16-8-102(2.7), C.R.S. (2019).

¶4 The People objected to Rosas's notice of the defense of impaired mental condition, but only on the ground that it was untimely. After a hearing, the district court overruled the People's objection and "allow[ed] [Rosas] to enter an affirmative defense of impaired mental condition." It then ordered an examination "for impaired mental condition."²

¶5 Then, rather than order an examination of Rosas at the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo ("CMHIP") or at another eligible public facility selected by the court , see § 16-8-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), the court incorrectly ordered an examination by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other expert of Rosas's choosing .³ The court appears to have relied on section 16-8-108(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), but that provision simply permits a defendant to request a second court-ordered examination—one that may be performed "by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other expert of his own choice."⁴ § 16-8-108(1)(a) ; see also § 16-8-106(1)(a) (requiring, in the first instance, a court-ordered examination at a "public institution designated by the court").

¶6 Rosas retained Dr. Patricia Westmoreland to complete the court-ordered examination. In her report, Dr. Westmoreland diagnosed Rosas as suffering from multiple conditions on the dates of the offenses: bipolar I disorder, current episode manic, with psychotic feature; alcohol use disorder; cannabis use disorder; and a concussion. She concluded that Rosas's actions were the result of "delusions" caused by "his acutely manic state, which rendered him so acutely mentally ill that he required not only restraints and high doses of major tranquilizers in the immediate period, but [also] acute psychiatric hospitalization with a need for medication adjustment several weeks later" before he could finally be psychiatrically stabilized. Defense counsel subsequently informed the court that Dr. Westmoreland intends to opine at trial that, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, Rosas was not capable of forming the culpable mental state required by all four of the felony charges—i.e., the culpable mental state of intentionally.⁵

¶7 The People moved for a second examination, this one by CMHIP, and the court held a hearing on their motion. At the hearing, the court sought confirmation from Rosas that he had not pled NGRI, "which would include impaired mental condition," and had instead simply given notice of his intent to introduce expert evidence of his mental condition pursuant to section 16-8-107(3)(b), C.R.S. (2019). Rosas confirmed that the court's recollection was accurate. However, the record reflects that Rosas had clearly indicated that he plans to introduce evidence related to insanity (evidence of impaired mental condition), not expert mental condition evidence pursuant to section 16-8-107(3)(b). The court apparently misremembered what had transpired in earlier proceedings, including that it had ordered an impaired mental condition examination, not an examination pursuant to section 16-8-107(3)(b).

¶8 Under section 16-8-107(3)(b), a defendant may introduce expert evidence of his "mental condition" when his "mental condition is not so severe" as to fall within "the statutory definition of ‘insanity’ " and such evidence is offered "to show that [he] had a mistaken belief of fact that negates the existence of a culpable mental state."⁶ People v. Wilburn , 2012 CO 21, ¶ 20, 272 P.3d 1078, 1082 (quoting § 16-8-107(3)(b) ). Section 16-8-107(3) reflects that our legislature has "distinguished between expert testimony offered to support a plea of [NGRI] and expert testimony of a mental condition in support of a defendant's theory that, on the occasion in question, he did not form the mens rea required for conviction." Id. at ¶ 21, 272 P.3d at 1082 ; see also § 16-8-103.6(2)(a), C.R.S. (2019) (distinguishing, for purposes of waiver of confidentiality or privilege, between pleading NGRI and seeking to introduce expert evidence of mental condition under section 16-8-107(3)(b) ).

¶9 Whereas a defendant who raises the defense of insanity must plead NGRI, see § 16-8-103(1.5)(a), C.R.S. (2019), a defendant who wishes to introduce expert evidence of mental condition pursuant to section 16-8-107(3)(b) need only provide timely notice of his intent to present such evidence. However, like a defendant who asserts the insanity defense, a defendant relying on section 16-8-107(3)(b) must submit to a court-ordered examination pursuant to section 16-8-106.

¶10 The court granted the People's motion for a second examination. But, in accordance with its erroneous belief that Rosas was proceeding pursuant to section 16-8-107(3)(b), it ordered CMHIP to conduct an examination related to his "mental condition," not his sanity. In so doing, the court seemed to assume that evidence that on the dates of the offenses Rosas suffered from a mental disease or defect that deprived him of "the capacity to form the culpable mental state" of intentionally is evidence governed by section 16-8-107(3)(b), not evidence relevant to the issue of insanity. (Emphasis added.)

¶11 Dr. Brittany Remmert performed CMHIP's mental condition examination of Rosas. After diagnosing him as suffering from, among other things, bipolar disorder

with psychotic features, she concluded that he experienced symptoms of this serious mood disorder prior to and after the charged assaults. She added that at the time of the offenses Rosas exhibited "a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impaired [his] understanding or perception of reality." In other words, Dr. Remmert opined that Rosas suffered from a mental disease or defect that affected his mental condition on the dates of the offenses. See § 16-8-101.5(2)(b) (defining "[m]ental disease or defect" as including "only those severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception or understanding of reality").

¶12 In a follow-up telephone interview with the People, Dr. Remmert informed them that she had not formulated or...