People v. Morillo

• Decision Date: 13 March 2013
• Citation: 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 01572,960 N.Y.S.2d 224,104 A.D.3d 792
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Luis MORILLO, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

104 A.D.3d 792

960 N.Y.S.2d 224

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 01572

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Luis MORILLO, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 13, 2013.

Maureen Galvin Dwyer, Northport, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Anne E. Oh of counsel), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SHERI S. ROMAN, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Braslow, J.), rendered October 25, 2010, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, criminal contempt in the second degree, attempted assault in the third degree, and menacing in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the convictions of burglary in the first degree and menacing in the second degree under counts one and five of the indictment, vacating the sentences imposed thereon, and dismissing those counts of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The evidence at trial established that the defendant broke through the door of the complainant's home and punched, “smacked,” and pushed her. During the altercation, he also threatened her with a taser or stun gun. As the People correctly concede, the evidence that the defendant displayed a taser or stun gun was legally insufficient to establish the “dangerous instrument” element of burglary in the first degree and menacing in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 140.30[3]; 120.14[1]; see People v. Hall, 18 N.Y.3d 122, 936 N.Y.S.2d 630, 960 N.E.2d 399;People v. Maio Ni, 293 A.D.2d 552, 742 N.Y.S.2d 61). Accordingly, those convictions must be reversed, the sentences imposed thereon vacated, and those counts of the indictment dismissed.

The defendant's contention that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support his convictions of burglary in the second degree, criminal contempt in the second degree, and attempted assault in the third degree is not preserved for appellate review ( seeCPL 470.05[2]; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 491–492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish his guilt of those offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15(5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt on those counts was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

The federal constitution “forbids the use of visible shackles ..., unless that use is justified by an essential state interest ... specific to the defendant on trial” ( Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, the defendant was shackled throughout the trial and black bunting was draped around his table in the courtroom. However, because it appears from the record that similar bunting was not draped around the prosecution's table, “we cannot conclude ... that the jury, seeing the bunting around the defense table and not the prosecutor's, would not have inferred that it was there to hide shackles” ( People v. Cruz, 17 N.Y.3d 941, 944, 936 N.Y.S.2d 661, 960 N.E.2d 430). Since the County Court failed to articulate on the record an adequate justification individualized to the defendant for the shackling, we must determine whether the error in permitting the shackling was harmless ( see People v. Clyde, 18 N.Y.3d 145, 148, 938 N.Y.S.2d 243, 961 N.E.2d 634,cert. denied––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1921, 182 L.Ed.2d 784;People v. Cruz, 17 N.Y.3d 941, 936 N.Y.S.2d 661, 960 N.E.2d 430). Applying that analysis, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial since the evidence of the defendant's guilt of burglary in the second degree, criminal contempt in the second degree, and attempted assault in the third degree, without reference to the alleged error, was overwhelming, and there is no reasonable possibility that the alleged error might have contributed to the defendant's conviction ( see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787;People v. Glover, 96 A.D.3d 777, 777–778, 945 N.Y.S.2d 733).

Evidence of two prior incidents of domestic violence between the defendant and the complainant was properly admitted as “relevant background material to enable the jury to understand the defendant's relationship with the complainant and explain the issuance of an order of protection, and as evidence of the defendant's motive and intent in the commission of the charged crimes” ( People v. Laverpool, 52 A.D.3d 622, 622, 860 N.Y.S.2d 565;see People v. Mendez, 70 A.D.3d 861, 892...