People v. Morton

• Decision Date: 08 September 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 176888
• Citation: 213 Mich.App. 331,539 N.W.2d 771
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Karl S. MORTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 771

539 N.W.2d 771

213 Mich.App. 331

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Karl S. MORTON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 176888.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 16, 1995, at Lansing.

Decided Sept. 8, 1995, at 9:25 a.m.

Released for Publication Nov. 17, 1995.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Richard Thompson, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Anica Letica, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the People.

Daniel J. Blank, Birmingham, for defendant.

Before FITZGERALD, P.J., and MARKMAN and M.F. SAPALA, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following an accident involving another motorist, defendant was convicted by a jury of driving while impaired, M.C.L. § 257.625(3); M.S.A. § 9.2325(3), and felonious driving, M.C.L. § 752.191; M.S.A. § 28.661. Defendant claims that the evidence failed to establish the elements of the latter offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

M.C.L. § 752.191; M.S.A. § 28.661 provides:

Every person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property and thereby injuring so as to cripple any person, but not causing death, shall be guilty of the offense of felonious driving....

Defendant contends that the injuries suffered by the driver of the other vehicle could not be characterized as "crippling" injuries pursuant to this statute. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to any of the other elements of the felonious driving offense.

In People v. Lockwood, 308 Mich. 618, 621, 14 N.W.2d 517 (1944), the Supreme Court defined the term "to cripple" as follows:

"(1) to deprive of the use of a limb, particularly of a leg or foot; to lame.

"(2) to deprive of strength, activity or capability for service." [quoting Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed) ]

"[The] word 'crippling' is the equivalent of words, 'physical disability' and is defined as to deprive of use of limbs, particularly of leg or foot, to deprive of strength, activity or capability for service or use, and to disable. 10 Words & Phrases (Perm Ed), p 544."

In Lockwood, the victim had fractured his collar bone and did not recover his ability to work until four months after the accident. The Court concluded that the injury was encompassed by the definition of "crippling," notwithstanding the victim's eventual full recovery. See, also, CJI2d 15.10(5); OAG, 1939-1940, p. 322 (November 17, 1939) ("crippling injury" need not be a permanent injury).

In the immediate case, the victim suffered a broken collar bone, severe bruises and cuts on her body, and whiplash. She wore a neck brace for two weeks and a figure-eight shoulder brace for a month, and was unable to use or move one of her arms for a month. She was on pain medication for two months and had limited mobility at work for approximately four months after the accident. The victim was unable to drive for six weeks.

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court must view it in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Jolly, 442 Mich. 458, 466, 502 N.W.2d 177 (1993). Viewed in such light, the prosecutor "must offer enough evidence for a court to conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime have been established." Id. Although the injuries suffered by the victim in this case were neither permanently disabling nor the most severely incapacitating injuries that one might imagine, we believe that a rational factfinder could have concluded that her injuries were "crippling" within the Lockwood definition.

Defendant also contends that the court erred in denying him the opportunity to ask the victim about any civil lawsuits that she might be contemplating. We agree. While the proper scope of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 347, 365 N.W.2d 120 (1984), the bias or interest of a witness is always a relevant subject of inquiry upon cross-examination. In particular, whether a witness has filed or is contemplating filing a civil lawsuit, the prospects for which may be affected by the outcome of a criminal action, is always relevant to a witness' credibility. People v. Grisham, 125 Mich.App. 280, 285, 335 N.W.2d 680 (1983); People v. Johnston, 76 Mich.App. 332, 336, 256 N.W.2d 782 (1977). The failure to allow such cross-examination may constitute error requiring reversal. Crippen v. People, 8 Mich. 117, 127 (1860); People v. Field, 290 Mich. 173, 287 N.W. 422 (1939); People v. Adamski, 198 Mich.App. 133, 141-142, 497 N.W.2d 546 (1993); People v. Richmond, 35 Mich.App. 115, 120, 192 N.W.2d 372 (1971); Grisham, supra; Johnston, supra. The prosecutor has failed to set forth any reason why the jury should have been denied access to information concerning a possible civil lawsuit by the victim-witness in this case.

We do not agree with the prosecutor that defense counsel's statement to "strike the question" (concerning the civil lawsuit) coming after the court stated that the question was "irrelevant" constituted a withdrawal of the question. While counsel may have been better disposed to employ different language in acquiescing to the court's evidentiary determination, we think that it is clear that there was no intention on his part to withdraw the inquiry. Therefore, we believe that defendant properly preserved this issue for appeal. We also do not agree with the prosecutor that defense counsel was under any obligation to make an offer of proof to the court concerning the purpose of the inquiry where such purpose "was apparent from the context within which" the question was asked. MRE 103(a)(2).

Further, we are unable to conclude that the trial court's error in limiting cross-examination in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when it has had no effect on the verdict. People v. Bigge, 297 Mich. 58, 72, 297 N.W. 70 (1941); People v. Thinel (On Remand), 164 Mich.App. 717, 721, 417 N.W.2d 585 (1987). Claims that a denial of cross-examination has prevented the exploration of a witness' bias is subject to harmless error analysis. People v. Bushard, 444 Mich. 384, 391, n. 7, 508 N.W.2d 745 (1993), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). See, also, Crane v. Kentucky, ...