People v. Moselle

Citation439 N.E.2d 1235,454 N.Y.S.2d 292,57 N.Y.2d 97
Parties, 439 N.E.2d 1235 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Obardo MOSELLE, Jr., Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Paul DANIEL, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Steven A. WOLTER, Respondent.
Decision Date01 July 1982
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, Judge.

Absent a manifestation of a defendant's consent thereto, blood samples taken without a court order other than in conformity with the provisions of subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law are inadmissible in prosecutions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol under section 1192 of that law. Beyond that, blood samples taken without a defendant's consent are inadmissible in prosecutions under the Penal Law unless taken pursuant to an authorizing court order.

In People v. Moselle, defendant was involved in an automobile accident on March 17, 1979 in which his vehicle collided with another vehicle operated by Paul Barrett. Within minutes Sergeant Caffery of the Erie County Sheriff's Department arrived at the scene. Barrett was then being placed in an ambulance. Defendant, who was still seated behind the wheel of his vehicle when Caffery arrived, was shortly transferred to the ambulance, and both men were then transported to the hospital. 1

Sergeant Caffery conducted an on-the-scene investigation, after completion of which he proceeded to the hospital. Detecting a strong odor of alcohol emanating from defendant, Caffery directed a physician to take a sample of his blood. The People offered no proof that defendant consented to this procedure, that he had been arrested, 2 or that the procedural requirements of section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law were observed. Analysis of the blood sample so taken about an hour after the accident revealed the presence of .17 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in defendant's bloodstream.

On recommendation of the Grand Jury, a prosecutor's information was filed charging defendant with operating a motor vehicle while he had .10 of one per centum or more of alcohol in his blood (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 1192, subd. 2). No Penal Law charge was ever placed against him.

On October 2, 1980 after a jury trial at which testimony was received over defendant's objection as to the results of his blood analysis and the jury was charged in effect that if they found that the police had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was operating a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired they could consider evidence of the results of such analysis, defendant was convicted in Town Court, Town of Elma, of violation of subdivision 2 of section 1192. On appeal Erie County Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the accusatory instrument.

In People v. Daniel, on October 20, 1979 a van operated by defendant collided with two other motor vehicles as a result of which a passenger in one of the other vehicles was killed. Investigating police officers observed defendant lying semiconscious on the ground and on looking into the van found a cold, half-full bottle of beer on the console and two empty bottles on the dashboard and on the floor. Defendant was taken by ambulance to the hospital where Officer Willis requested a registered nurse to take a blood sample from him. Defendant was not under arrest at the time, was not asked for his consent, and neither consented nor refused to give the blood sample. While the blood was being drawn defendant regained consciousness. Subsequent analysis revealed the presence of .22 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in defendant's bloodstream.

Defendant was indicted for criminally negligent homicide and for violations of subdivisions 2 and 3 of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (operating a motor vehicle while he had .10 of one per centum or more of alcohol in his blood and driving while intoxicated). His pretrial motion to suppress the results of the blood test was granted by Erie County Court and a motion to reargue was denied. On appeal the Appellate Division, 84 A.D.2d 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658 unanimously affirmed.

In People v. Wolter, on January 7, 1980 the motor vehicle being driven by defendant collided head-on with another motor vehicle as a consequence of which the operator of the other vehicle was instantly killed. The investigating Sheriff's deputy found defendant in a semiconscious condition behind the steering wheel of his vehicle and detected the odor of alcohol. Defendant was removed to the hospital in an ambulance. The deputy there placed defendant under arrest for driving while intoxicated and for failure to keep right. The deputy gave defendant, then fully conscious, his constitutional preinterrogation warnings and advised him in accordance with the prescriptions of section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Defendant refused to submit to a blood test. Following a telephone conversation with the District Attorney, the deputy then directed a physician to draw a sample of defendant's blood, less than two hours after the accident. Subsequent analysis disclosed a blood alcohol content of .23 of one per centum by weight.

Defendant was indicted for manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law, § 125.15, subd. 1), for assault in the second degree (Penal Law, § 120.05, subd. 4), for driving while intoxicated in violation of subdivision 3 of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and for violations of other sections of that law. After a pretrial suppression hearing, Livingston County Court ruled that, while the results of the blood test could not be used in connection with the prosecution for driving while intoxicated, they could be used on the manslaughter trial, and accordingly severed the driving while intoxicated charge for separate trial. After selection of a jury for trial on the remaining charges defendant's plea of guilty to criminally negligent homicide was accepted in full satisfaction of all counts in the indictment, and the severed driving while intoxicated charge was dismissed with prejudice to resubmittal.

On appeal the Appellate Division, 83 A.D.2d 187, 444 N.Y.S.2d 331, reversed defendant's conviction, holding that the explicit provision of subdivision 2 of section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (that upon refusal to consent thereto, "the test shall not be given") foreclosed use of the results of the test on the prosecution of the charges under the Penal Law.

In each of these cases permission to appeal has been granted the People by a Judge of our court.

These three cases present varying aspects of the right of the People to introduce the results of chemical analysis of blood samples taken from a defendant without his consent following an automobile accident, for the purpose of proving the presence of a significant amount of alcohol in the defendant's bloodstream. In each case there should be an affirmance of the order denying the People the right to introduce such evidence.

At the outset we observe that our disposition in none of these cases is predicated on constitutional grounds. Because our disposition of these appeals is premised on statutory and nonconstitutional legal principles, we have no occasion to reach or consider any underlying constitutional arguments.

Our decision is grounded on two enactments of our State Legislature and the absence of any other. Subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law in effect at the time the blood samples in these cases were taken provided:

"1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content of his blood provided that such test is administered at the direction of a police officer:

"(1) having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been driving in violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two and within two hours after such person has been placed under arrest for any such violation, or

"(2) within two hours after a breath test, as provided in section eleven hundred ninety-three-a of this chapter, indicates that alcohol has been consumed by such person and in accordance with the rules and regulations established by the police force of which he is a member.

"2. If such person having been placed under arrest or after a breath test indicates the presence of alcohol in his system and having thereafter been requested to submit to such chemical test, refuses to submit to such chemical test, the test shall not be given and a report of such refusal shall be forwarded by the police officer under whose direction the test was requested to the commissioner within seventy-two hours and the commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any non-resident operating privilege; provided, however, the commissioner shall grant such person an opportunity to be heard, unless such opportunity is waived by such person, and provided further, however, that no license, permit or non-resident operating privilege shall be revoked because of a refusal to submit to such chemical test unless the hearing officer is satisfied that the person was given sufficient warning, in clear and unequivocal language, prior to such refusal that such refusal to submit to such chemical test may result in the revocation of his license or...

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