People v. Mox

• Decision Date: 11 December 2012
• Citation: 20 N.Y.3d 936,982 N.E.2d 590,958 N.Y.S.2d 670,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 08441
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Michael MOX, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

20 N.Y.3d 936
982 N.E.2d 590
958 N.Y.S.2d 670
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 08441

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant,
v.
Michael MOX, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 11, 2012.

[958 N.Y.S.2d 671]

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Geoffrey Kaeuper of counsel), for appellant.

Easton Thompson Kasperek Shiffrin LLP, Rochester (William T. Easton of counsel), for respondent.

[20 N.Y.3d 937]OPINION OF THE COURT
MEMORANDUM.

[982 N.E.2d 591]The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

A Monroe County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with the crime of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1] ) for the killing of his elderly father. The indictment alleged that defendant caused his father's death by stabbing him and striking him in the head with a blunt instrument. Defendant had a documented history of mental illness and had been hospitalized in psychiatric treatment for much of the year preceding his father's death.

After approximately six months of psychiatric hospitalization, defendant was declared competent to stand trial pursuant to CPL article 730. Defendant had filed a notice of intent to present psychiatric evidence, pursuant to CPL 250.10, to demonstrate that, at the time of the alleged crime, he suffered from a mental disease or defect. While both defendant's and the People's psychiatrists concluded that defendant suffered from schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, the experts disagreed as to whether the condition rendered defendant unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct. The People's psychiatrist, however, did find support for the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The People subsequently offered a plea to the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree under a theory of extreme emotional disturbance (Penal Law § 125.20 [2] ) with a determinate sentence of 25 years plus five years' postrelease supervision and a waiver of the right to appeal. Defendant accepted the offer and pleaded guilty.

During the plea colloquy before County Court, defendant stated that on the day of the crime, he was “hearing voices” [20 N.Y.3d 938]and feeling painful bodily sensations, was “in a psychotic state” and had not taken his prescribed medication for several days. County Court accepted defendant's plea. Immediately following, defense counsel informed County Court that she had discussed “the potential defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect with [defendant] at length and that he was willing to forgo that defense in order to accept this plea.” County Court asked defendant if that was correct, and defendant replied, “Yes.” The court did not inquire further. Represented by new counsel, defendant moved before sentencing to withdraw his plea pursuant to CPL 220.60. County Court denied the motion and sentenced defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.

With one Justice dissenting, the Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction, holding that defendant's plea allocution raised doubts as to his guilt of first-degree manslaughter as it tended to negate the intent element of that crime. The [982 N.E.2d 592]

[958 N.Y.S.2d 672]

majority further held that County Court failed to fulfill its duty to make further inquiry to ensure the plea was knowing and voluntary ( see People v. Mox, 84 A.D.3d 1723, 1724, 922 N.Y.S.2d 686 [4th Dept.2011] ).

“[W]hen a criminal defendant waives the fundamental right to trial by jury and pleads guilty, due process requires that the waiver be knowing, voluntary and intelligent” ( People v. Hill, 9 N.Y.3d 189, 191, 849 N.Y.S.2d 13, 879 N.E.2d 152 [2007], citing N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6). “[N]o catechism is required in connection with the acceptance of a plea” ( People v. Goldstein, 12 N.Y.3d 295, 301, 879 N.Y.S.2d 814, 907 N.E.2d 692 [2009] ). However, “where the defendant's recitation of the facts underlying the crime pleaded to clearly casts significant doubt upon the defendant's guilt or otherwise calls into question the voluntariness of the plea, ... the trial court has a duty to inquire further to ensure [the] guilty plea is knowing and voluntary” ( People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 [1988];see People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330 [1965] [...