People v. Serrano
| Decision Date | 18 March 1965 |
| Citation | 206 N.E.2d 330,15 N.Y.2d 304,258 N.Y.S.2d 386 |
| Parties | , 206 N.E.2d 330 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Fernando SERRANO, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Gerald Zuckerman, New York City, for appellant.
Isidore Dollinger, Dist. Atty. (Walter E. Dillon, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
The principal question presented is whether a judgment of conviction, entered upon a plea of guilty to a particular crime, may stand where the record discloses that, before accepting the plea, the court elicited information from the defendant which cast doubt upon his guilt of the crime to which he pleaded.
The defendant, accused of shooting and killing one Gilberto Bonilla, was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree and, upon his arraignment and in the presence of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Subsequently, after the selection of a jury and the opening statement by the prosecution, the defendant at his request and with the knowledge of his three assigned attorneys and the consent of the district attorney was permitted to withdraw his plea and to plead guilty to the crime of murder in the second degree. Sentence to serve a prison term of 30 years to life, the defendant now appeals from a judgment of the Appellate Division affirming his conviction upon which appeal he raises the issue stated above and from an order of that court affirming a denial of coram nobis relief.
The record reveals that, before accepting the plea of guilty, the trial judge first heard the People's version of the crime and then proceeded to interrogate the defendant not only as to the circumstances surrounding the change in plea but also as to the facts concerning the homicide itself. Without detailing the accounts of the crime as related by the prosecutor and the defendant, it is sufficient to say that there evolved from this colloquy between court and parties two distinct versions of the events surrounding the homicide. Of particular importance is the fact that, although the defendant admitted shooting and killing Bonilla, an essential element of the crime of murder in the second degree, namely, the intent to kill (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 1046), could not readily be inferred from the defendant's recitation of the circumstances of the killing. Rather, if anything, his version of the shooting simply put, that it occurred during the course of an argument with, and after a threat of bodily harm by, the deceased with whom he had long had a strained relationship is more consonant with the lesser charge of manslaughter in the first degree, that is, a killing in the heat of passion (Penal Law, § 1050, subd. 2).
Judging from his statements at the time of sentencing, the trial judge himself was aware of the considerable variance between the defendant's story and that of the district attorney. However, instead of rejecting the change of plea or advising the defendant that his admissions might very well not amount to the crime to which he pleaded guilty and inquiring further whether he, nevertheless, wished to plead guilty for instance, to avoid the risk of a jury verdict of first degree murder the trial judge took it upon himself to resolve these differences by deciding that the defendant was not subject to belief. It is our view, as it was that of Valente, J., dissenting in the Appellate Division, that the resolution of the inconsistencies in the versions of the occurrence was not within the province of the court. In the words of Judge Valente, 'Those were questions for a jury to decide in determining defendant's guilt or innocence unless there was the interposition of a valid plea of guilt' (20 A.D.2d 777, 778, 247 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750, 751).
Under the circumstances here presented, we do not see how it may properly be said that such a 'valid plea of guilt' was interposed. It is true, as this court declared in People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d 511, 516, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677, 166 N.E.2d 684, 686, that, '(a)fter a plea to a lesser crime has been accepted, the factual basis of the crime confessed can ordinarily be found only in the language of the plea.' But, where, as is the usual case today, the trial court, before accepting the plea of guilty, properly inquires of the defendant as to the circumstances and details of the crime to which he is admitting his guilt, the mere mouthing of the word 'guilty' may not be relied upon to establish all the elements of that crime. In such case, the requisite elements shoudl appear from the defendant's own recital and, if the circumstances of the commission of the crime as related by the defendant do not clearly spell out the crime to which the plea is offered, then, the court should not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Thomas
...347; People v. Jackson, 54 A.D.2d 1132, 389 N.Y.S.2d 77) and thus whether it constituted a valid plea of guilt (People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330). The fact that the question raised on appeal is of constitutional proportion does not necessarily determine its......
-
North Carolina v. Alford, 14
...to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence. See, e.g., People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308—309, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388—389, 206 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1965); State v. Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 563, 63 S.E. 169, 171 (1908). See also Kreuter v. United States, 201 F......
-
United States v. Mancusi
...have proceeded sua sponte to set aside the plea of guilt or to question the defendant further. People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308-310, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388-390, 206 N.E.2d 330 (1965); People v. Longe, 269 App.Div. 474, 57 N.Y.S.2d 337 (3d Dep't 1945) (after sentencing while defendant wa......
-
Dixon v. Miller
...count and three and one-half to seven years for the weapon possession count. Dixon was eventually apprehended in April 1983 and entered a Serrano plea on July 6, 1983, in which he pleaded guilty to certain crimes without admitting to the underlying facts. See People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 30......
-
40-d-2 Factors Making a Plea Not Voluntary, Knowing, or Intelligent
...crime with which defendant was charged, defendant's guilty plea would be invalid under due process clause). 121. See People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308, 206 N.E.2d 330, 332, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388-89 122. See People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 664-65, 525 N.E.2d 5, 5-6, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466......
-
9.32 - D. Guilty Pleas By Defendants Who Deny Guilt
...while denying his guilt regarding a bargained-for plea. Face it: Serrano-Alford pleas are counterintuitive.[1712] . People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1965); see also People v. Friedman, 39 N.Y.2d 463, 384 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1976), following N.C. v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); s......
-
C. Alford Plea/Mental Disease Or Defect/Acd
...the victim does not have to consent to the ACD. --------Notes:[130] North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1965). [131] See CPL § 220.15. [132] People v. Carter, 33 Misc.3d 14, 930 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Term 2d Dep't 2011). ...