People v. Murata
| Decision Date | 07 April 1960 |
| Citation | 4 Cal.Rptr. 45 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of State of California, Acting by and through DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Plaintiff and Appellant. v. Kenji MURATA et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 24357. |
George C. Hadley, Joseph A. Montoya, Hugh R. Williams, Charles E. Spencer, Jr., Los Angeles, for appellant.
Hodge L. Dolle and J. Marion Wright, Los Angeles, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment in a condemnation action.
The State Highway Commission, by a resolution, a copy of which was attached to the complaint in the action, declared the proposed highway a freeway on December 15, 1954. The complaint was filed in the Superior Court in Los Angeles County and summons was issued on January 4, 1956. Lis Pendens was recorded on January 4, 1956.
The proceedings were taken and the properties condemned pursuant to what is referred to as a 'Chapter 20 Provision.' Chapter 20, Statute of 1952--Second Extrza-Ordinary Session, p. 463. In the first instance a trial date was contemplated before January 2, 1957, just two days before the expiration of one year from the issuance of summons. Counsel for the defendants was then engaged in other trial work and an agreement between counsel as to a trial date was made and entered into. Trial was set for May 21, 1957, and it was stipulated that the date of value should remain as the date of issuance of summons (for that trial only). The first trial started on May 21, 1957 and continued through June 18, 1957. A jury returned a verdict for $610,763. The plaintiff made a motion for a new trial, and the same was denied on September 12, 1957. An appeal was taken by the plaintiff on September 18, 1957 and the judgment was reversed. See, People v. Murata, 161 Cal.App.2d 369, 326 P.2d 947. The remittitur was filed with the Superior Court on August 18, 1958 and a request for a setting was made on October 20, 1958.
On December 30, 1958 the defendants filed a 'Notice of Motion for Appointment of a Judge to Determine Prior to the Trial of Factual Issues, the Date Valuation.' The hearing on that motion was held on February 26, 1959 and on March 2, 1959 the Court ordered as follows:
'* * * It is further ordered--The judgment in this case having been reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial, the date of valuation of the property in question for the purpose of assessing compensation and damages shall be the date of the second trial.'
Pre-trial was set for April 17, 1959 and trial was set for April 27, 1959. The pretrial was continued to April 27, 1959. A petition by the plaintiff for a Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus to prevent the trial court from changing the date of value was denied by this court on March 13, 1959. Defendants filed amendments to their answer on April 27, 1959 alleging in effect an increased valuation of the parcels involved.
The jury returned a verdict for $650,103.12 based on the value as of May 4, 1959. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied and notice of appeal was filed August 14, 1959.
The case involves about 53.113 acres of property on the southeast corner of Santa Ana Freeway and the San Gabriel River which will be the site of the future interchange between the San Gabriel Freeway and the Santa Ana Freeway. The property consisted of nine parcels used as a single farm, although divided into three separate units.
The only question presented is whether, in an eminent domain proceeding where judgment has been reversed on appeal for errors of law and remanded for a new trial, compensation and damages shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the issuance of summons (date used at the first trial) or at the date of the second trial.
Section 1249 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
It was in 1911 that the Legislature added that part of the code section which declares that in cases wherein the issue is not tried within one year after commencement of the action the compensation and damages shall be deemed to have accured at the date of trial.
Appellants contend that:
'(1) Once the case is 'tried within one year,' as in the instant, case, the date of value may not shift; (2) A retrial following a reversal must be a re-examination of an issue of fact theretofore tried and the only issue of fact to be retried is the valuation which must be of the same date; (3) The law of the case requires a retrial with the same valuation date in that otherwise the case is entirely different from the one reversed on appeal; (4) The delay in causing the retrial to be held beyond one year from commencement of the action must be laid at the door of the defendants which means that the exception in Section 1249 Code of Civil Procedure which provides for the valuation date being the date of trial cannot of effective.'
Appellant further asserts that this case was tried within one year and that in any event any delay was caused by the defendant. As might be suspected property gencrally and the parcels in question in particular have continually increased in value for the past several years and such was reflected in the second verdict.
For the purposes of this opinion it will be considered that the first trial was held within one year from the date of issuance of summons. The plaintiff makes no contention that the stipulation entered into between the attorneys should be binding as to the second trial.
The late Clarence B. Runkle, Judge of the Superior Court, trial judge in the case of People v. Loop, No. 574,769, wrote an opinion with reference to the matter therein closely allied to the question here. We quote with approval some parts of that opinion:
"Trial' is a proceeding where issues of law or fact are examined and determined so as finally to dispose of the controversy. (Goldtree vs. Spreckles [Spreckels], 135 Cal. 666 ; City of Pasadena vs. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309, 313 ; Broder vs. Conklin, 98 Cal. 360, 362 ; Hastings vs. Hastings, 31 Cal. 95, 98; San Joaquin etc. Irrigation Co. vs. Stevinson, 30 Cal.App. 405, 414 .)
'The word 'trial' as used in Sec. 1249, C.C.P. must therefore be construed to mean the trial that disposes of the case. The reversal on appeal completely set aside the prior trial and its results, with the same effect as though it had never occurred, and put the case back in its status before that trial (Sharp vs. Miller, 66 Cal. 98 ; Central Savings Bank of Oakland vs. Lake, 201 Cal. 438, 443 ; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Superior Court, 12 Cal.2d 549 ; Benjamin vs. Ver Nooy , 61 N.E. 971).
'It follows that the valuation date in the case at bar is now the date of the trial which is about to commence, sometimes referred to as the second trial, but in reality the only trial in this case unless the judgment resulting therefrom is also reversed and this trial is therefore completely set aside as though it had never occurred.
'The case of City of Los Angeles vs. Morris, 74 Cal.App. 473 , relied on heavily by the plaintiff, is not applicable. It construes the Street Opening Act of 1903 which provides two alternative native, definite and fixed valuation dates, the first alternative being applicable when the case is not contested in which event valuation is fixed by referees as of the date of order of their appointment, and the second alternative being applicable when it is contested, in which event the valuation date is the date of the order setting the cause for trial. Both of these dates, as above stated, are definite and fixed and, in that respect correspond to the date provided in the first part of Sec. 1249, C.C.P., namely, the 'date of issuance of summons.' The 1903 Act does not have any counterpart of the fluctuating valuation date, 'the date of the trial,' which is specified in the latter part of Sec. 1249.
'The court says at page 478 of [74 Cal.App., at page 411 of 241 P.] the Morris case: ...
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People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Mascotti
...came on for a second trial on April 13, 1960. A division of this court had decided on April 7, 1960, People By and Through Department of Public Works v. Murata, Cal.App., 4 Cal.Rptr. 45, holding that, after reversal of the judgment rendered on the first trial the valuation date would be tha......
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People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Murata
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