People v. Myers

• Decision Date: 12 July 2018
• Docket Number: 107200
• Citation: 80 N.Y.S.3d 727,163 A.D.3d 1152
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ariel MYERS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

163 A.D.3d 1152

80 N.Y.S.3d 727

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Ariel MYERS, Appellant.

107200

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: May 30, 2018

Decided and Entered: July 12, 2018

Dennis J. Lamb, Troy, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Joel E. Abelove, District Attorney, Troy (Jacob B. Sher of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Mulvey, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Aarons, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Ceresia, J.), rendered April 25, 2014, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

In 2009, the victim was shot in the head after witnessing and taking pictures of a fight outside his home. The victim underwent multiple surgeries but eventually went into a vegetative coma. In connection with this shooting, defendant was charged by indictment with attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of assault in the first degree and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of assault in the first degree and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. This Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that County Court's Molineux ruling was an abuse of discretion and did not constitute harmless error ( 22 N.Y.3d 1010, 1011, 981 N.Y.S.2d 346, 4 N.E.3d 356 [2013], revg 105 A.D.3d 1250, 963 N.Y.S.2d 464 [2013] ). Upon defendant's retrial, defendant was convicted of one count of assault in the first degree and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 25 years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.

In view of his general motion to dismiss made at the close of the People's case-in-chief and his failure to renew such motion at the close of all proof, defendant failed to preserve his contention that verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence (see People v. Place, 152 A.D.3d 976, 977, 59 N.Y.S.3d 187 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1063, 71 N.Y.S.3d 13, 94 N.E.3d 495 [2017] ; People v. McRobbie, 97 A.D.3d 970, 971, 949 N.Y.S.2d 249 [2012], lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 934, 957 N.Y.S.2d 693, 981 N.E.2d 290 [2012] ). We nevertheless review the proof adduced as to each element of the challenged crimes in light of defendant's assertion that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ; People v. Stacconi, 151 A.D.3d 1395, 1396, 58 N.Y.S.3d 201 [2017] ). Where, as here, a contrary result would not be unreasonable, we "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ).

As pertinent here, a person is guilty of assault in the first degree when, "[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he [or she] causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument" ( Penal Law § 120.10 [1 ] ). As also relevant here, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when he or she possesses a loaded firearm "with intent to use the same unlawfully against another" ( Penal Law § 265.03[1] [b] ).

At trial, several witnesses, including the victim's wife, testified that they had heard yelling and screaming outside in the neighborhood in the early morning. Frank Galaska, one of the victim's neighbors, stated that he went outside and saw a crowd of individuals fighting and arguing. The victim's wife testified that the victim went outside to take pictures of the crowd. As the victim was crouched down behind a vehicle and taking pictures, the victim's wife heard a male voice state, "And this is what you get," followed by a gunshot. The victim's wife then saw the victim lying on the driveway with blood all over the ground. Frank McGivern, another neighbor of the victim, testified that he watched the individuals fighting from inside his apartment and saw the victim taking pictures. McGivern further testified that he then saw "somebody's arm go up ... and heard a pop and seen a flash." At that point, McGivern saw the victim fall to the ground and everyone started running. McGivern visually followed the individual who apparently fired the gun and identified him as defendant.

Viewing the foregoing evidence in a neutral light, we are satisfied that the verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence (see People v. Mathews, 134 A.D.3d 1248, 1250, 21 N.Y.S.3d 465 [2015] ; People v. Valverde, 122 A.D.3d 1074, 1075–1077, 996 N.Y.S.2d 772 [2014], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 970, 36 N.Y.S.3d 631, 56 N.E.3d 911 [2016] ; People v. Rojas, 121 A.D.3d 1427, 1429–1430, 995 N.Y.S.2d 392 [2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 1221, 4 N.Y.S.3d 609, 28 N.E.3d 45 [2015] ).¹ Furthermore, the credibility of the witnesses, as well as any inconsistencies in their testimony, were fully explored at trial, and we perceive nothing in the record that renders their testimony incredible as a matter of law (see People v. Novak, 148 A.D.3d 1352, 1356, 50 N.Y.S.3d 577 [2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1084, 64 N.Y.S.3d 174, 86 N.E.3d 261 [2017] ; People v. Brabham, 126 A.D.3d 1040, 1043, 4 N.Y.S.3d 386 [2015], lvs denied 25 NY3d 1160, 1171, 15 N.Y.S.3d 292, 303, 36 N.E.3d 95, 106 [2015] ). According deference to the jury's credibility determinations, we find no merit in defendant's challenge to the verdict as against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Wright, 160 A.D.3d 1110, 1112, 75 N.Y.S.3d 320 [2018] ; People v. Gunn, 144 A.D.3d 1193, 1194, 40 N.Y.S.3d 634 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1145, 52 N.Y.S.3d 297, 74 N.E.3d 682 [2017] ).

Defendant contends that his right to be present at sidebar conferences was violated when County Court questioned juror Nos. 104 and 220 outside his presence during jury selection. The parties dispute whether it can be gleaned from the record whether defendant was excluded from these sidebar conferences. Even if defendant was erroneously excluded from the sidebar conferences, "the error is not reversible if that potential juror has been excused for cause by the court or as a result of a peremptory challenge by the People" ( People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318, 325, 653 N.Y.S.2d 79, 675 N.E.2d 833 [1996] ; see People v. Roman, 88 N.Y.2d 18, 27–28, 643 N.Y.S.2d 10, 665 N.E.2d 1050 [1996] ). Because the record makes clear that juror Nos. 104 and 220 were dismissed for cause, remittal for a reconstruction hearing (see e.g. People v. Duong H. Ha, 14 A.D.3d 877, 878, 787 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2005] ) or reversal for a new trial is not necessary (see e.g. People v. Roman, 88 N.Y.2d at 27–28, 643 N.Y.S.2d 10, 665 N.E.2d 1050 ; People v. Drake, 138 A.D.3d 1396, 1396, 31 N.Y.S.3d 328 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 929, 40 N.Y.S.3d 357, 63 N.E.3d 77 [2016] ).

We are unpersuaded by defendant's assertion that he was deprived of a fair trial when County Court permitted the People to elicit testimony about the victim's injuries notwithstanding the parties' stipulation that the victim sustained a serious physical injury (see People v. White, 79 A.D.3d 1460, 1463, 913 N.Y.S.2d 818 [2010], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 803, 929 N.Y.S.2d 111, 952 N.E.2d 1106 [2011] ). Furthermore, County Court limited any prejudice by sustaining defendant's objections to some of the People's questions and instructing the jury that it was "not allowed to consider sympathy or passion at any time" (see id. ). Based on the foregoing, defendant was not deprived of a fair trial on this ground.

Defendant argues that he should have been adjudicated as a youthful offender. We disagree. County Court weighed various...