People v. Naulls, 95CA0009

• Decision Date: 16 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95CA0009,95CA0009
• Citation: 937 P.2d 778
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James NAULLS, Defendant-Appellant. . V
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 778

937 P.2d 778

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James NAULLS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95CA0009.

Colorado Court of Appeals Div. V.

May 16, 1996.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

Oct. 10, 1996.

Certiorari Denied May 19, 1997.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Clement P. Engle, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Katherine Brien, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.

Defendant, James Naulls, appeals the judgment of conviction entered after the court denied his motion to dismiss the charges against him based upon the People's failure to bring him to trial within the limitation period outlined in the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), § 16-14-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A). We reverse.

On September 23, 1993, while serving a sentence in the Department of Corrections as the result of a previous conviction, defendant was charged with two counts of distribution of a controlled substance and one count of possession of a controlled substance. The People subsequently lodged a detainer against the defendant, and on November 24, 1993, the district court received the defendant's request for a final disposition of the new charges pursuant to the provisions of the UMDDA.

Defendant's arraignment was initially scheduled for February 3, 1994, which was within the 90-day limitation period specified in the UMDDA. On that date the parties presented a written stipulation to the court in which a continuance was requested. According to the stipulation, defendant was in "Boot Camp" in the Department of Corrections. He believed that the scheduled arraignment date would cause a disruption in the Boot Camp regimen and would jeopardize his status there. The stipulation concluded with the following language:

4. Mr. Naulls has requested counsel to obtain a continuance of the arraignment date to avoid conflict with Boot Camp. He understands this requires him to waive his right to speedy trial pursuant to § 16-14-104.

WHEREFORE, Mr. Naulls and the prosecution stipulate to continue this matter and Mr. Naulls agrees to waive his right to speedy disposition of the detainer accordingly.

The court granted the continuance and continued the arraignment to March 8, 1994, specifically noting defendant's waiver of his speedy trial rights. On March 8, defendant entered a not guilty plea to the charges and the court, over defendant's objection, set a trial date of July 11, 1994.

Defendant maintained that the scheduled trial date was beyond the 90-day limitation period outlined in the UMDDA. The court, however, concluded that defendant had forever waived all of his rights under the UMDDA when he submitted the stipulation for the continuance. Hence, the court concluded that the only speedy trial rights to which the defendant was entitled existed under the general speedy trial statute, § 18-1-405, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B). Accordingly, defendant was given a trial date within 6 months of his arraignment.

Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the stipulation had merely tolled the limitation period in the UMDDA. He maintained that his rights under the Act had not been forever waived and that he had not withdrawn his request for speedy disposition under the UMDDA. He further asserted that, when he stipulated to a continuance of his arraignment date, there were 19 days remaining of the 90-day period. Thus, he contended, the speedy trial period under the UMDDA expired 19 days from his arraignment date of March 8, or March 27, 1994. Alternatively, defendant asserted that he was entitled to "restart" the 90-day limitation period from the rescheduled arraignment date.

The court disagreed, concluding that the plain language in the stipulation served to waive forever all of defendant's rights under the UMDDA. Thereafter, defendant further asserted that, assuming he had initially waived his right to speedy trial under the UMDDA by signing the stipulation, he was able to reassert that right at his arraignment. The court also disagreed with this argument.

Defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him. He maintains that the court lost jurisdiction over his case because the stipulation for a continuance was only a waiver of his rights under the UMDDA for the specific period during which he was in Boot Camp and until an arraignment could be conducted. We agree that the court lost jurisdiction under the circumstances here.

The UMDDA, which governs intrastate detainer cases, was enacted to provide a mechanism for prisoners to insist upon...