People v. Nichols
| Decision Date | 11 October 1961 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 3871 |
| Citation | 196 Cal.App.2d 223,16 Cal.Rptr. 328 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Glenn Brenton NICHOLS, Defendant and Appellant. |
David L. Skinner, Jr., Berkeley, for appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Arlo E. Smith, Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.
On this appeal from a judgment rendered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree burglary [Pen.Code § 459] and from the order denying his motion for a new trial, the defendant urges the insufficiency of the evidence and the erroneous admission of certain irrelevant and prejudicial evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search. We have concluded that there is no merit in any of these contentions.
The facts are as follows: On the afternoon of April 5, 1960, J. M. Burke, the janitor at the Lawton Elementary School at 1570-31st Avenue in San Francisco checked and locked the premises at about 4:30 p. m. When he returned the following morning [April 6] at 7:15 a. m., he saw broken glass in the hall in front of three offices. Papers were scattered about in one office, a medicine cabinet had been opened in another, and a storeroom door leading to the third had been pried open. An outside door in the hallway on the south end of the building showed pry marks and broken glass; the glass in an inside door in the same hallway was broken. In the north end of the building, two lower windows were open and another window showed pry marks.
At about 4:15 a. m. on April 6, officers DeAmicis and Swanson of the San Francisco Police Department were driving southwest along Market Street. Near Valencia Street, they first saw the defendant proceeding northeast in a green Buick; without signalling, the Buick turned from the main traffic lane into a darkened selfparking lot next to a hotel and furniture store. As the officers drove into the parking lot, they saw the defendant getting out of his car, and asked him if he lived in the vicinity. The defendant replied that he was visiting a friend in the hotel next door. The officers told him that because of a series of thefts in the neighborhood, they were suspicious of people around and about at that hour. At this time, the officers noticed a rubber mallet, crash bar, drift pin, crowbar and other heavy tools on the floor and under the front seat of the Buick.
Upon being asked for some identification, the defendant indicated that he had none, and no driver's license as well. After a check over the police telephone in the next block indicated no outstanding traffic warrants against the defendant, the questioning continued. The officers questioned the defendant about his reasons for being in the neighborhood at that hour, the tools in the car, and whether he had been involved in any burglaries or thefts. When the defendant denied the latter but admitted he was on parole and that he had violated his parole by leaving the state and driving the car without the permission of his parole officer, he was arrested and searched. The defendant had a large amount of small coins on his person. During the subsequent interrogation, the officers requested and received permission to search the Buick.
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty and denied the prior burglary conviction charged by the amended information. Although represented by counsel at the hearing on his motion made pursuant to section 995 of the Penal Code, the defendant refused all offers of counsel and chose to represent himself at the trial; he offered no evidence in his behalf, and did not testify. The tools found in his car and the money found on his person were admitted into evidence. The prosecution's expert witness testified that in his opinion the crowbar found in the defendant's car at the time of the arrest made the impressions found on the storeroom door at the Lawton school. The expert's opinion was based on certain scientific tests he had conducted.
The first argument on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment because there is no proof of defendant's specific intent to commit theft at the time of the breaking and entering. When a judgment is attacked on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support it, we must view the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in the trial court (People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681, 104 P.2d 778). Burglary may be proved by circumstantial evidence; it is not necessary that a witness actually see the defendant breaking and entering the premises or in the vicinity thereof (People v. Acosta, 114 Cal.App.2d 1, 249 P.2d 316; People v. Flynn, 73 Cal. 511, 15 P. 102).
Although it is necessary for the People to show that a person charged with burglary entered the premises with the requisite intent, such intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof, and must, therefore, ordinarily be inferred from the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence (People v. Franklin, 153 Cal.App.2d 795, 314 P.2d 983).
Here, the evidence unquestionably established an unlawful and forcible entry of the Lawton school. From this alone, burglarious intent could be reasonably and justifiably inferred (People v. Michaels, 193 Cal.App.2d 194, 13 Cal.Rptr. 900; People v. Stewart, 113 Cal.App.2d 687, 689, 248 P.2d 768). When the evidence is sufficient to justify a reasonable inference that such intent existed, the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal (People v. Franklin, 106 Cal.App.2d 528, 235 P.2d 402; People v. Smith, 84 Cal.App.2d 509, 512, 190 P.2d 941).
Furthermore, evidence of guilt may be furnished by the unexplained possession of burglar tools which, according to expert testimony, were used to commit the crime (People v. Wilkes, 44 Cal.2d 679, 284 P.2d 481). It was, of course, for the jury to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and to determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence (People v. Newland, supra). While here, as noted above, the defendant chose to represent himself and present no evidence on his...
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People v. Machel
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People v. Wilson
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People v. Lopez
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Virgil v. Superior Court, Placer County
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