People v. Oliver
| Decision Date | 19 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 7,Docket No. 66516,7 |
| Citation | 417 Mich. 366,338 N.W.2d 167 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory Kent OLIVER, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Edward Reilly Wilson, Chief Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., A. George Best, II, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for the People.
James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by John Nussbaumer, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
In the present case, we must address three interrelated issues. First, we must decide whether certain Wayne County Sheriff's deputies had probable cause under the Michigan Constitution to effect an arrest of defendant in his motel room without a warrant. Second, we must determine whether the federal constitutional requirement--that an arrest of a defendant in his home must be made with an arrest warrant absent exigent circumstances--extends to a motel room under the Michigan Constitution. 1 Third, under the Michigan Constitution, we must consider whether there were exigent circumstances which justified the warrantless arrest of defendant in his motel room.
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized, claiming that it was the fruit of the defendant's arrest in his motel room without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, stating that there was probable cause for the arrest and also exigent circumstances which justified the warrantless arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.
We hold that there was probable cause to justify an arrest of the defendant. The complete record reveals that there were sufficient facts to conclude that the defendant had committed a felony.
Furthermore, we hold under the Michigan Constitution that the federal constitutional requirement--that an arrest of a defendant in his home must be made with an arrest warrant absent exigent circumstances--is equally applicable to a motel room occupied by the defendant.
Finally, we hold that a motel room itself does not create an exigent circumstance under the Michigan Constitution. Moreover, after balancing several factors, we find that there were no exigent circumstances which justified defendant's arrest in his motel room without a warrant.
On March 1, 1978, the Wayne County Sheriff's Department received a telephone call from a Canton Township resident, Mary Mallard. She reported that she had been robbed in her house at approximately 5 p.m. on that day. When the officers arrived, she told them that she had been drying her hair in the basement when she heard glass breaking. When she went upstairs to investigate, she saw the defendant standing in her dining room, with a pair of her scissors in his hand. He threatened to kill her if she did not give him some money. He then reached over to the complainant's counter and removed five two-dollar bills and a Vienna sausage can which contained numerous coins. She stated that the defendant then ran out of her home in the direction of the Willow Acres Motel, which was across a highway. The officers traced a set of footprints from complainant's home to the southeast corner of the motel.
The officers then proceeded to local businesses to ask the proprietors of these establishments to watch for a slightly built young white man who was wearing a blue coat with a fleece lined collar who might be spending exceptional amounts of two-dollar bills or change. At about 7 p.m. that evening, the owner of a store alerted the sheriff's department after two men and a young woman had paid for merchandise with two-dollar bills. About 7:30 p.m., he reported the license plate numbers of a car that they were seen leaving in when one of them returned a second time.
About 9:30 p.m. that evening, the noted car was stopped by the sheriff's department. The driver informed the officers that he had picked up the defendant and his girlfriend earlier in the evening. He stated that they had stopped at a local party store, and that the defendant had attempted to pay for some merchandise with two-dollar bills and then with change. In addition, he stated that the defendant and his girlfriend were in room 10 of the Willow Acres Motel.
About 10 p.m. that same night, five officers of the sheriff's department approached and knocked on the door of room 10. A voice asked who was at the door. When the officers identified themselves, a scuffling noise was heard, and defendant opened the door. He stepped back and asked the officers if they had a warrant. The officers entered the room, arrested the defendant, seized a blue jacket, a lady's purse, and a Vienna sausage can which were located on a table in the room.
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the items seized from the motel room, alleging that they were fruits of an illegal arrest. The trial judge, who had read the preliminary examination transcript, denied the defendant's motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Thereafter, the defendant waived his right to a jury trial and presented a defense in which he claimed that he was so intoxicated at the time of the crimes that he lacked the specific intent to commit the crimes charged. Nevertheless, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.110; M.S.A. Sec. 28.305 and of felonious assault, M.C.L. Sec. 750.82; M.S.A. Sec. 28.277. He was sentenced to serve 4 to 15 years in prison for the breaking and entering conviction and 2 to 4 years for the felonious assault conviction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.
We granted leave to appeal on November 4, 1981, following the defendant's delayed application in propria persona. 412 Mich. 854.
In the instant case, the defendant initially contends that the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence arising from defendant's warrantless arrest made in his motel room because the intrusion and arrest were effected without probable cause under the Michigan Constitution. 2 The defendant states that the basis of the prosecutor's assertion that the police had probable cause was information provided by an individual who was a suspect in the felonies committed by the defendant. While the defendant admits that independent corroboration of otherwise "insufficiently trustworthy information" can provide police with probable cause, he believes that "the quantum of corroboration required should be especially great where, as here, the source of the information is * * * a suspected perpetrator of the crime." We believe, however, that the legal standards traditionally employed by appellate courts indicate that the information acted upon by the police met the requirements under the Michigan Constitution.
The first rule in determining whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest is whether there are any facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the suspected person has committed a felony. E.g., People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 196 N.W. 971 (1924). Secondly, a police officer's belief that a defendant has committed a felony must be based on facts which are present at the moment of the arrest. E.g., People v. Stewart, 232 Mich. 670, 206 N.W. 337 (1925). 3
Thus, this Court laid down the following standard to be employed by Michigan appellate courts when applying these two rules:
4
In undertaking this factual review, it is important to note that information indicating probable cause for an arrest must be comprised of sufficient facts to permit an independent determination that the person supplying the information is reliable and that the information is based on something more substantial than casual rumor. United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227, 232-233 (CA 4, 1980).
In deciding that the officers had probable cause to arrest, the Court of Appeals wrote the following:
Thus, we hold that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant under article 1, Sec. 11 of the Michigan Constitution. 5
While we have found that the police in the instant case had probable cause to arrest the defendant, this conclusion alone does not make the...
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