People v. One 1948 Chevrolet Convertible Coupe

• Decision Date: 29 November 1955
• Docket Number: No. I,No. FAA,I,FAA
• Citation: 290 P.2d 538,55 A.L.R.2d 1272,45 Cal.2d 613
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 55 A.L.R.2d 1272 PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ONE 1948 CHEVROLET CONVERTIBLE COUPE, LicenseP 46718, Engine433685, Defendant, Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, a national banking association, Legal Owner and Respondent. L. A. 23728.

Page 538

290 P.2d 538

45 Cal.2d 613, 55 A.L.R.2d 1272

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ONE 1948 CHEVROLET CONVERTIBLE COUPE, License No. I P 46718, Engine No. FAA 433685, Defendant Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, a national banking association, Legal Owner and Respondent.

L. A. 23728.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Nov. 29, 1955.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 28, 1955.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Donald D. Stoker and W. B. Thayer, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Samuel B. Stewart, Jr., San Francisco, Hugo A. Steinmeyer and Joseph S. Potts, Los Angeles, for respondent.

TRAYNOR, Justice.

In this proceeding the People seek the forfeiture of an automobile for being used in violation of section 11610 of the Health and Safety Code. The notice of seizure and intended forfeiture, Health & Safety Code, § 11612 et seq. was directed to Mrs. V. E. Phillips, the registered owner, Ronald Leon Phillips, her son, and the Bank of America, the legal owner. Mrs. Phillips defaulted. The bank answered, denying that the vehicle was used in violation of the narcotics laws and that any narcotic was unlawfully in the possession of any occupant thereof.

The cause was tried by the court sitting without a jury. See, People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal.2d 283, 300, 231 P.2d 832. Officer Brogan of the Long Beach Police Department testified that on August 3, 1953, he and officer O'Rourke saw the vehicle parked at the curb of a city street near school grounds where no cars are ordinarily parked. They decided to investigate and found four occupants in the vehicle. Clothier was in the front seat behind the wheel, see, People v. One 1951 Ford Sedan, 122 Cal.App.2d 680, 691-692, 265 P.2d 176, Dean and DeCordova were also in the front seat, and Phillips was in the rear seat. As they were getting from the vehicle to the sidewalk following orders of the officers, Clothier dropped a can containing marijuana into the bushes. The four suspects were arrested, and the vehicle was seized. Thus, by competent evidence, independently of any extrajudicial statements, the People proved that a narcotic had in fact been in the vehicle. People v. One 1941 Buick Club Coupe, 72 Cal.App.2d 593, 596, 165 P.2d 44; People v. One 1940 Buick 8 Sedan, 70 Cal.App.2d 542, 545-546, 161 P.2d 264.

Phillips' plea of guilty in a criminal action for unlawful possession of the marijuana was admitted in evidence against the registered owner but was excluded as against the bank. See, Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Cal.2d 586, 593-596, 191 P.2d 432; People v. One 1940 Oldsmobile Club Coupe, 80 Cal.App.2d 372, 377-378, 181 P.2d 950; Langensand v. Obert, 129 Cal.App. 214, 218, 18 P.2d 725; People v. Sanderson, 129 Cal.App. 531, 533, 18 P.2d 982. Inspector Doyle, the officer in charge of the Narcotics Division of the Long Beach Police Department testified that at '2:15 in the morning of the day of the arrest' he questioned the suspects and that 'at a later time after the arrest', in the presence of Clothier and the other occupants of the vehicle, he had a conversation with Phillips in which Phillips stated in effect that he knew before and at the time of the arrest and seizure that an occupant of the vehicle and marijuana in his possession. ¹ This statement was also admitted against the registered owner but excluded as against the bank.

The court found that Phillips had no interest in the vehicle, that at the time of the arrest and seizure Phillips was in possession of the vehicle, that it was being used to transport marijuana on the person of Clothier, an occupant thereof, that, as against the registered owner only, on the basis of the admissions, Phillips was aware of the presence of marijuana on the person of an occupant of the vehicle at the time of seizure. The court also found that the bank had not made a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character, and reputation of the purchaser before its lien was created, Health & Safety Code, § 11620, that as against the bank, the admission of Phillips that he knew Clothier had marijuana at the time of the seizure was inadmissible hearsay, and that there being no other sufficient evidence of that fact, Phillips had no knowledge of the presence of any narcotic in the vehicle. Accordingly, judgment was entered forfeiting the vehicle to the state subject to the interest of the bank in the sum of $855.02. Since that sum was in excess of the value of the vehicle at the time of the seizure, it was ordered that the vehicle be released to the bank in satisfaction of its lien. The People appeal.

Even though the bank did not make the investigation required by section 11620, its interest is not subject to forfeiture in the absence of a proper forfeiture of Mrs. Phillips' interest, People v. One 1937 Plymouth 6 4-Door Sedan, 37 Cal.App.2d 65, 72-74, 98 P.2d 750, and despite the fact that she defaulted, the bank may protect its own interest by asserting any defense she had to the forfeiture. People v. One 1939 La Salle 8 Touring Sedan, 45 Cal.App.2d 709, 713, 115 P.2d 39. The basic question on this appeal, therefore, is whether there was a proper forfeiture of Mrs. Phillips' interest in the vehicle.

It was not necessary that Mrs. Phillips know of the illegal use. '* * * certain uses of property may be regarded so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. The law thus builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner.' Van Oster v. State of Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467, 47 S.Ct. 133, 134, 71 L.Ed. 354. The purpose of the statutes is to curb the narcotic traffic, and 'The public interest to be protected against the drug and its victims outweighs the loss suffered by those whose confidence in others proves to be misplaced'. People v. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, 26 Cal.2d 503, 508, 159 P.2d 641, 643. By entrusting the vehicle to her son, Mrs. Phillips accepted the risk that it would be used contrary to law. People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe, 36 Cal.2d 471, 476, 224 P.2d 677; People v. One 1933 Plymouth Auto, 13 Cal.2d 565, 568, 90 P.2d 799; People v. One 1951 Ford Sedan, 122 Cal.App.2d 680, 687, 265 P.2d 176; Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 398, 402, 24 L.Ed. 637; Van Oster v. State of Kansas, supra, 272 U.S. 465, 467, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354; Goldsmith Jr., Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512-513, 41 S.Ct. 189, 65 L.Ed 376. When, as in this case, the narcotic is found on an occupant of the vehicle, there is no presumption or inference that the registered owner or person entrusted with the vehicle had knowledge thereof (see People v. One 1941 Buick Sport Coupe, 28 Cal.2d 692, 695, 171 P.2d 719) as there is when the narcotic is found on the person of the registered owner or his entrustee, People v. One 1952 Chevrolet, 128 Cal.App.2d 414, 417, 275 P.2d 509; People v. One 1940 Chrysler, 77 Cal.App.2d 306, 314, 175 P.2d 585, and the People must establish by other evidence that the registered owner or the person entrusted with the vehicle had knowledge of the presence of a narcotic therein. People v. One 1951 Mercury Sedan, 116 Cal.App.2d 692, 693-694, 254 P.2d 140. The People established that knowledge herein by Phillips' plea of guilty in the criminal action and by his statement to Inspector Doyle. These admissions were admissible to forfeit Mrs. Phillips' interest (for the reasons set forth below) and were therefore admissible to forfeit the bank's, for once the vehicle is shown to have been illegally used as to the registered owner, the only defense available to the lien claimants is Health and Safety Code, section 11620. People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe, supra, 36 Cal.2d 471, 474, 224 P.2d 677.

The proceeding under section 11610 is in rem, People v. One 1933 Plymouth Auto, supra, 13 Cal.2d 565, 569, 90 P.2d 799, even though it is a kind of in rem proceeding in which the claimants to the property are entitled to a jury trial, People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d 283, 286, 300, 231 P.2d 832, and the declarations as well as the acts of the person in control of the vehicle bind the vehicle and thereby bind all claimants thereto. Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, supra, 96 U.S. 395, 398-402, 24 L.Ed. 637; Interstate Securities Co. v. United States, 10 Cir., 151 F.2d 224, 226; United States v. One Buick Automobile, D.C., 21 F.2d 789, 790-791; United States v. One 1952 De Soto Club Coupe, D.C., 122 F.Supp. 568, 569. In United States v. One 1949 Pontiac Sedan, 7 Cir., 194 F.2d 756, 761, certiorari denied Moses v. United States, 343 U.S. 966, 72 S.Ct. 1061, 96 L.Ed. 1363, cited for a contrary rule, the court declared, 'Howevered, in view of our further conclusions, the propriety of the exclusion of this evidence is not decisive of the issues herein.' In United States v. Packard Sedan, 23 F.2d 865, 869, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reached a contrary result without reference to the Dobbins' Distillery case and similar cases. If Mrs. Phillips had been in possession of the vehicle and made these admissions, there could be no doubt that they would bind the vehicle and justify the forfeiture of her interest and necessarily therefore the interest of the bank. People v. One 1951 Ford V-8 Coupe, 119 Cal.App.2d 612, 613, 259 P.2d 693. She entrusted the vehicle to Phillips, and while he had the right to its possession and responsibility for its use, he had authority to speak for it and his admissions are as binding on it as hers would have been. Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, supra, 96 U.S. 395, 398-402, 24 L.Ed. 637; United States v. One Buick Automobile, supra, 21 F.2d 789, 791. The statement in People v. One 1950 Mercury, 116 Cal.App.2d 746, 751, 254 P.2d 666, that the driver's admissions do...