People v. Pacherille

• Decision Date: 12 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 57,57
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony N. PACHERILLE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

25 N.Y.3d 1021

32 N.E.3d 393

10 N.Y.S.3d 178

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 04027

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent

v.Anthony N. PACHERILLE, Appellant.

No. 57

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 12, 2015.

Frank Policelli, Utica, for appellant.

John M. Muehl, District Attorney, Cooperstown, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURTMEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

In satisfaction of a four-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the second degree. Under the plea agreement, he was promised a sentence of 11 years in prison, followed by five years of postrelease supervision. He waived his right to appeal.

At sentencing, County Court was presented with letters from the community, defendant's sentencing memoranda and psychiatric reports, a letter from the victim and the presentence report concerning defendant's prospects for rehabilitation. Upon consideration of all the information before it, County Court denied defendant's request to be adjudicated a youthful offender. While acknowledging defendant's mental illness, County Court determined that the illness did not outweigh the “seriousness of the crime he committed [nor] its impact on the victim and the community.” As a result, the court concluded that the interests of justice would not be served by granting defendant youthful offender status (see CPL 720.20[1][a]

). Defendant was then sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed (106 A.D.3d 1136, 963 N.Y.S.2d 783 [2013] ).

As we have repeatedly observed, a plea of guilty generally “marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation”

(People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 [1985]

). The plea bargaining process includes “the surrender of many guaranteed rights” (People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022 [1989] ), such as the right to a trial by jury and to confrontation (see

People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 230, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 [2000] ).

A defendant may also waive the right to appeal as a condition of a plea bargain (see Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 5, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022

). “[G]enerally, an appeal waiver will encompass any issue that does not involve a right of constitutional dimension going to ‘the very heart of the process' ” (People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006], quoting Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d at 230, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 ). This Court has recognized that the right to a speedy trial, challenges to the legality of a court-imposed sentence, questions about a defendant's competency to stand trial, and whether the waiver was obtained in a constitutionally acceptable manner cannot be foreclosed from appellate review (see

People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 280, 590 N.Y.S.2d 46, 604 N.E.2d 108 [1992] ).

In People v. Rudolph, 21 N.Y.3d 497, 499, 974 N.Y.S.2d 885, 997 N.E.2d 457 (2013)

, we held that under CPL 720.20(1) “where a defendant is eligible to be treated as a youthful offender, the sentencing court ‘must’ determine whether he or she is to be so treated.” We further held that “compliance with this statutory command cannot be dispensed with, even where [a] defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request” (id. ). Thus, we created a narrow exception that when a sentencing court has entirely abrogated its responsibility to determine whether an eligible youth (see CPL 720.10 [1], [2] ) is entitled to youthful offender status, an appeal waiver would not foreclose review of the court's failure to make that determination. Here, the sentencing court did, indeed, consider defendant's youthful offender status upon his request.

It is well settled that once considered, a youthful offender adjudication is a matter left to the sound discretion of the sentencing court and therefore any review is limited (see CPL 720.20[1] [a]

). As we held in Lopez,

“when a defendant enters into a guilty plea that includes a valid waiver of the right to appeal, that waiver includes any challenge to the severity of the sentence. By pleading guilty and waiving the right to appeal, a defendant has forgone review of the terms of the plea, including harshness or excessiveness of the sentence” (People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006]

).

To the extent defendant appeals the harshness of his sentence or the sentencing court's exercise of discretion in denying youthful offender status, his appeal waiver forecloses the claim.

We therefore conclude that a valid waiver of the right to appeal, while not enforceable in the face of a failure to consider youthful offender treatment, forecloses appellate review of a sentencing court's discretionary decision to deny youthful offender status once a court has considered such treatment. Accordingly, our review of County Court's denial of defendant's request is precluded by his appeal waiver, the validity of which he does not contest (see People v. Brabham, 83 A.D.3d 1225, 1225, 920 N.Y.S.2d 736 [3d Dept.2011]

).

RIVERA

, J. (dissenting).

In People v. Rudolph, we held that CPL 720.20(1)

mandates “a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even where the defendant fails to request it, or agrees to forgo it as part of a plea bargain” (21 N.Y.3d 497, 501, 974 N.Y.S.2d 885, 997 N.E.2d 457 [2013] ). We thus foreclosed any role for a negotiated plea constraining youthful offender (YO) determination because the legislative mandate that “a court decide whether [YO] treatment is justified” provides an opportunity for juveniles to “have a real likelihood of turning their lives around,” and therefore “is just too valuable, both to the offender and to the community, to be sacrificed in plea bargaining” (id. ).

The majority acknowledges that Rudolph prohibits the defendant's waiver of YO consideration, but holds that a defendant may expressly waive the right to appellate review of the sentencing court's denial of YO status (majority mem. at 1023, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 179, 32 N.E.3d at 394). I disagree with this interpretation of the statute and Rudolph. Allowing for such a waiver merely serves to reestablish YO consideration as a legally valid “chip” to be leveraged in the plea bargaining process. The majority's decision thus undermines the legislative intent of CPL 720.20(1)

, ignores the considerations we highlighted in Rudolph regarding the life-changing impact of YO treatment for juvenile offenders, and flies in the face of hard data on the ability of juveniles to fully understand their legal rights and the consequences of their choices. I therefore dissent.

Defendant, who is White and at the time of the crime was a high school student, was charged with various hate crimes for the attempted murder of an African–American fellow student. Just prior to the attack, defendant composed a suicide note that included a diatribe against African–Americans, Jews, and people of other racial and ethnic groups. Under the plea arrangement,

the People and defendant agreed that he would plead to attempted murder in the second degree, as a non-hate crime, in full satisfaction of the indictment, and in exchange for an 11–year sentence recommendation.

In extending the plea offer, the People demanded that defendant admit that he chose the victim due to his race, that defendant wrote the suicide note and that he agree to its introduction into evidence as part of the record, and that he not allege that he was the victim of bullying or make any other excuses for his actions. The People also required that defendant waive his right to appeal. During the plea allocution defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the second degree, and admitted that he had shot the victim “because he was African American.” As agreed, defendant made no mention of bullying by the victim.

Prior to sentencing, defendant submitted a lengthy memorandum requesting that the court grant YO treatment, arguing that his crime was the result of mental illness, a mitigating factor. Then at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that defendant should be adjudicated a youthful offender, pointing to defendant's mental illness and asserting that the victim had bullied defendant in the past. The presentence report prepared by the Otsego County Probation Department recommended that defendant not be adjudicated a youthful offender, and the prosecutor also objected to a YO finding.

County Court denied YO treatment and, pursuant to the plea agreement, imposed a determinate sentence of 11 years, with five years' postrelease supervision. At the sentencing hearing, the court stated it considered the seriousness of the crime and its racist and bigoted nature. The court further discussed defendant's mental illness, and concluded, “[a]lthough his psychological needs are a mitigating factor to be considered in determining the length of his sentence, the Court feels obligated to note that his mental illness does not justify his conduct.” The court then stated:

“Today [defendant] asks the Court to vacate, that is essentially erase his conviction, and sentence him to little or no additional jail time as a youthful offender.

“The Court has considered this request and denies it. Due to the violent nature of his crime and its resulting harm and his admission during the plea allocution [that] his actions were racially motivated, the Court cannot say the interests of justice would be served by granting youthful offender status or by not imposing the agreed upon sentence.”

The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction (People v. Pacherille, 106 A.D.3d 1136, 1137, 963 N.Y.S.2d 783 [3d Dept.2013]

). As relevant to the matter before us, the Court concluded that defendant's waiver of his right to appeal foreclosed his abuse of discretion challenge to County Court's denial of his request for YO treatment. After the ...