People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 30 April 1985
• Citation: 489 N.Y.S.2d 152,478 N.E.2d 755,65 N.Y.2d 1
• Parties: , 478 N.E.2d 755 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Cullen TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 152

489 N.Y.S.2d 152

65 N.Y.2d 1, 478 N.E.2d 755

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Cullen TAYLOR, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 30, 1985.

Samuel J. Castellino, Public Defender, Elmira (William J. Lodico, Elmira, of counsel), for appellant.

James T. Hayden, Dist. Atty., Elmira, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Judge.

By pleading guilty, a defendant forfeits his right to seek reversal of his conviction on the ground that identification testimony or evidence of prior statements is inadmissible because the prosecution failed to provide the required notice of intention to offer such evidence at trial.

On May 24, 1982, a man and a woman entered an Anderson-Little store in the Town of Big Flats and purchased a suit with a check drawn on the account of Diane Gardner. The same day, they went to a Chess King store and bought a leather coat with a check drawn on the same account. Both checks were forgeries.

According to the officer assigned to investigate the crimes, suspicion centered on defendant and he was arrested on a parole violation on June 16, 1982. The officer took defendant to the Corning police station, where questioning resulted in a two-page statement transcribed by the officer but signed by defendant. Defendant said a woman known to him as "Al" approached him and displayed some blank checks, informing him that she could "deal the checks." He said he went with the woman to Anderson-Little and Chess King, and obtained a suit and a leather jacket paid for by Al with the blank checks. He admitted knowing that the checks did not belong to Al. Later in the day, however, at the Horseheads State Police barracks, defendant admitted that he, rather than Al, had obtained the checks.

The Grand Jury indicted defendant on two counts of second degree forgery on June 17, 1982. Also on that date, the People served defendant with notice that "during the trial of this matter, the People intend to offer evidence of a statement made by the defendant to a public servant." The prosecutor provided defendant with a copy of the written statement, but made no mention of the oral admission at the Horseheads barracks.

On June 30, 1982, an Anderson-Little employee identified defendant's picture from an array of six photographs, and on July 26, 1982 a Chess King employee identified defendant's photo from the same array. The People did not provide defendant with notice of intent to introduce identification testimony of these two witnesses.

Defendant moved to suppress his written statement and a Huntley hearing was held November 29, 1982. When the officer testified as to defendant's oral statement, defense counsel objected, stating that he had received no notice of intent to introduce the oral statement. The prosecutor responded that the defense was aware the People intended to introduce statements. He claimed that defendant was not prejudiced and could, if he desired, request an adjournment. No such request was made.

The prosecution announced in the course of the Huntley hearing that "Wade issues" would be involved. Defense counsel protested because he had received no notice under CPL 710.30. ^* He suggested that the court proceed with theHuntley hearing, and noted that the statute permitted the People to make an application to file a late notice. The prosecutor then explained that the testimony would concern a photo array, and that the two store employees were available to testify. The court said it would conduct the Huntley hearing and then adjourn for a Wade hearing. At the close of the Huntley hearing, the court scheduled the Wade hearing for the following afternoon. Defense counsel registered an objection to proceeding with the Wade hearing based on the lack of timely notice under CPL 710.30. The court responded that the "objection will be duly noted," and the Wade hearing went forward the next day.

By decisions dated November 30 and December 1, 1982, the court denied defendant's suppression motions, finding the statements voluntary and the identification procedures not unduly suggestive. On January 25, 1983, defendant pleaded guilty to second degree forgery and was sentenced as a predicate felon to a two- to four-year term of imprisonment. The Appellate Division, 102 A.D.2d 944, 477 N.Y.S.2d 805, affirmed, concluding that the People's failure to provide adequate notice under CPL 710.30 did not require reversal because the procedure employed in this case satisfied the goal of the statute--"to afford a defendant adequate time in preparing his case." We affirm, but for a different reason.

A guilty plea generally represents a compromise or bargain struck after negotiation between defendant and the People. As such, it marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation. More than a confession, a guilty plea signals defendant's "intention not to litigate the question of his guilt, and necessarily involves the surrender of certain constitutional rights, including the right to confrontation, the privilege against self incrimination and the right to trial by jury" (People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 201-202, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74, 269 N.E.2d 794; see also, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235). A guilty plea not only constitutes an actual waiver of certain rights associated with a trial, but also effects a forfeiture of the right to renew many arguments made before the plea. Examples include an alleged unconstitutional presumption in a statute (People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d 338, 441 N.Y.S.2d 650, 424 N.E.2d 537); a claimed deficiency in a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument (People v. Levin, 57 N.Y.2d 1008, 457 N.Y.S.2d 472, 443 N.E.2d 946; People v. Cohen, 52 N.Y.2d 584, 439 N.Y.S.2d 321, 421 N.E.2d 813); and an allegation of selective or vindictive prosecution (People v. Rodriguez, 55 N.Y.2d 776, 447 N.Y.S.2d 246, 431 N.E.2d 972) or preindictment prosecutorial misconduct (People v. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 448 N.Y.S.2d 448, 433 N.E.2d 513).

Not every claim is forfeited by a guilty plea. Some the Legislature has chosen to preserve for appellate review (see, e.g., CPL 710.70). There is no mechanical rule fixing when a claim is otherwise waived; however, since a plea usually removes the issue of factual guilt from a case, resolution of the question may be guided by determining whether the claim relates to the factual elements of the crime charged, or to some other, fundamental matter. A guilty plea does not forfeit the right to raise a jurisdictional defect, such as an insufficient accusatory instrument (People v. Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98, 396 N.Y.S.2d 841, 365 N.E.2d 872). Nor does it preclude certain rights of constitutional dimension, for example, the right to a speedy trial (People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763; People v. White 32 N.Y.2d 393, 345 N.Y.S.2d 513, 298 N.E.2d 659), the protection against double jeopardy (Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195), the unconstitutionality of statutory prohibition of certain admitted conduct (People v. Lee, 58 N.Y.2d 491, 462 N.Y.S.2d 417, 448 N.E.2d 1328), or the competency of a defendant to stand trial (People v. Armlin, 37 N.Y.2d 167, 371 N.Y.S.2d 691, 332 N.E.2d 870; People v. Francabandera, 33 N.Y.2d 429, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292). Also embraced within this general category is an attack on an accusatory instrument as void because of the prosecutor's knowledge that the only evidence supporting it is false (People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 108, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447).

The prosecutor's failure to provide timely notice of intent to introduce evidence at trial does not affect the court's jurisdiction, and it does not impinge on rights of constitutional dimension. The question, then, is whether defendant is permitted by statute to raise this issue after a plea of guilty.

According to CPL 710.70(2), "order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty." The Appellate Division held that this section includes an order permitting the People to file a late notice of intention under CPL 710.30. We disagree. Under CPL 710.20, the defendant in essence may move to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure, illegal eavesdropping, an "involuntarily made" confession, improper administration of a blood test, or an invalid pretrial identification procedure. CPL 710.30 provides where the prosecutor intends to offer at trial defendant's statement or identification testimony by a witness who previously identified defendant, the prosecutor must serve notice of intent to use the evidence...