People v. Padgett

• Decision Date: 11 October 1943
• Docket Number: No. 69.,69.
• Citation: 306 Mich. 545,11 N.W.2d 235
• Parties: PEOPLE v. PADGETT.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

306 Mich. 545

11 N.W.2d 235

PEOPLE

v.PADGETT.

No. 69.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 11, 1943.

William H. Padgett, alias William Hayden, was convicted of first degree murder perpetrated in the commission of a felony and sentenced to life imprisonment, and he appeals.

Conviction and sentence set aside and new trial granted.Appeal from Circuit Court, Washtenaw County; George W. sample, judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

Isaac M. Smullin and Walter M. Nelson, both of Detroit, for appellant.

Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, Francis W. Kamman, Pros. Atty., of Ann Arbor, (Albert J. Rapp, of Ann Arbor, of counsel), for appellee.

BOYLES, Chief Justice.

Defendant appeals from a conviction by jury of the crime of murder of the first degree perpetrated in the commission of a felony, and from a sentence of life imprisonment. We find two errors relied upon for reversal that require consideration.

On March 21, 1935, a police officer of the city of Ann Arbor was shot and killed during the perpetration of a felony (robbery) in a retail store in that city. The two owners of the store, Mr. Wetherbee and Mr. Conlin, and a single customer, a Mr. Akers, were in the store about three o'clock in the afternoon, when two men entered, and one of them asked to look at some topcoats. As one of them was trying on a topcoat, he produced a gun and said it was a holdup. The other immediately joined the two, produced another gun. The two owners and the customer were ordered to go to the back of the store, and as one of the two holdup men went toward the cash register an officer of the Ann Arbor police department entered the store. One of the owners called to him to ‘look out,’ ‘it's a stick-up.’ One of the two holdup men, later identified as the defendant herein, walked up to the back of the officer, stuck a gun against his back, and ordered him to ‘stick them up.’ The other bandit joined in, and in the ensuing scuffle the officer was shot and killed.

At the trial, the defendant attempted to prove an alibi. The only issue of fact for the jury was the question of identity. One of the owners, shortly after the crime, identified a photograph of the defendant Padgett as being one of the perpetrators of the crime. Padgett was apprehended in California a year later, extradited, tried by jury and convicted. Two eyewitnesses testified to his identity as one of the two men who committed the crime. The testimony of the third eyewitness was waived by the defendant. On behalf of the defendant, testimony was received that he was elsewhere on the day of the crime—a perfect alibi if believed by the jury. The defendant was sworn and in his own behalf testified as to where he claimed to have been, in another state, on the day of the crime. While there were some discrepancies in the testimony of the two eyewitnesses, on behalf of the people, their testimony tended strongly to prove the identity, and the guilt, of the defendant.

Near the outset of the trial court's charge to the jury, he instructed them as follows: ‘It is the charge of the people in this case, represented by the prosecuting attorney, that this murder was committed, the killing of Clifford A. Stang, in an attempt to rob the Wetherbee Clothing Store. And that is all there is this jury has to find out in this case: Was the defendant the right party. Was he one of those two parties who came in to rob. You don't have anything else to bother you at all. * * * By elimination, these were the only two men in the store with guns, and Clifford Stang was shot. It would be a silly thing to come to any other conclusion than that he was shot by one of these two men who had guns.’

We are inclined to agree that the only issue of fact of any moment to be considered by the jury was the question of the identity of the defendant Padgett. It then becomes of importance to consider what the trial court said to the jury in that regard. The court correctly instructed the jury as to the meaning and effect of an alibi. Unfortunately, in a charge otherwise marked for its fairness the trial judge expressed his opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses and the guilt of the defendant in no uncertain terms. After a correct charge as to the law, the court, relying on the statute (referred to later herein), said to the jury:

‘This is an important case. Important to the people and important to the defendant. And because there are so many people, the responsibility must not be divided in behalf of the people. It is just as important to every single individual in this State as it is to the defendant. If this defendant is guilty of this crime, he has classed himself as a felon and a felon of the worst type. I wouldn't call him names, except to say, that he is a felon of the worst type. He isn't entitled to one iota of sympathy from this jury and it ought not be in your minds a minute, if he is found guilty of this offense, because he has deliberately chosen with his eyes open and his ears open, and he knows how to read and write, he has chosen to classify himself as a felon and I hope that the jury, if they find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt that the will not consider one minute any sympathy in his behalf. I am sorry, on the other hand, I always feel sorry that anyone violates the law, but apart from that when it comes to my part in the administration of the law, I don't allow sympathy to enter into it, and I think this jury without a single exception is of that type. Sympathy for a man who wrongly classifies himself in society, why, it is misguided sympathy. There isn't any place for it. There really isn't any place for it, I was going to say as individuals, but I rather contradicated myself in that, so I think I will not enforce that statement.

* * *

‘Under the testimony in this case and under the statutes, although I haven't the power to say to the jury that they cannot bring in such a verdict, but the legislators have thought wise to give the court the right to comment on the testimony in the case. The jury is not bound by what they think the court thinks about the testimony. You can still disregard everything that the court says about it and decide your own way. But, in this case, the testimony of Mr. Akers and Mr. Wetherbee convinced the court that they were telling the truth and the conceivable truth. Neither one described, as far as the court could determine, anything that appeared to be aroused by prejudice or doubt or anything that they could have done, except what was right in the case. Disinterested, practically, participants interested like every other citizen ought to be in the fact that the law ought to be enforced to the letter, but never taking away, by their testimony, anything that appeared to be prejudicial in their testimony, a single right of the defendant.

‘Something has been said—counsel for the respondent has done his best and done fine, presented everything that the defendant had to present, and might have cast, by his vigorous defense, might have cast some little discrepancy in some juror's mind as to whether or not this man can be recognized. How is it that we can tell John Doe in the morning and after I pass him, I can't describe his features? But I know him. I could't sit here and describe the features of my own son. You can't describe the features of very many people if you turn your back on them and your back on their faces. Very few you can describe. Features of people, looking them face to face, but not that God given right that you have of recognizing your friends, your neighbors and your family. In some intrinsic way you do know one man from another, and I feel that when Mr. Wetherbee testified as positively as he does, and defendant was in that store that morning, that they had an occasion to have an impression of his features—although they may not have been able to describe them vividly—that would last them all their lives, and yet they might not be able to say unless they were face to face with the man, ‘that was the man.’ So that is the difficulty. My judgment is there is nothing to the question of a description of this man's features. It is a question of whether Mr. Akers knew him by his drawl, or his walk, or his conversation, or his face, and it is a question as to whether Mr. Wetherbee was describing him. Neither of these men, in my judgment, as they testified here, and that's the only way I am commenting on their testimony, is what they say here, not how I have known them personally. But neither of these men would want to just pick anybody out of a crowd and say, ‘You must do time’ if they had any doubt. If they had any doubt of whether this man was the guilty man they would have said so. Well, the only other person's testimony that I figure is important in this case is the defendant...