People v. Padilla

• Decision Date: 10 June 2020
• Docket Number: B297213
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mario Salvador PADILLA, Defendant and Appellant.

50 Cal.App.5th 244

263 Cal.Rptr.3d 784

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Mario Salvador PADILLA, Defendant and Appellant.

B297213

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Filed June 10, 2020

As Modified July 2, 2020

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MANELLA, P. J.

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, appellant Mario Salvador Padilla was convicted of a murder he committed when he was 16 years old, and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Appellant later successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his sentence in light of an intervening decision by the United States Supreme Court. The trial court held a resentencing hearing and again imposed the LWOP term. On appeal, we reversed the new sentence and remanded for another resentencing in light of yet another intervening decision by the Supreme Court. At the second resentencing, the trial court again imposed the LWOP sentence.

In the interim, the electorate passed Proposition 57, the "Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016." Among other things, Proposition 57 prohibits prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court. (People v. Superior Court (Lara ) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22 (Lara ).) "Instead, they must commence the action in juvenile court. If the prosecution wishes to try the juvenile as an adult, the juvenile court must conduct ... a ‘transfer hearing’ to determine whether the matter should remain in juvenile court or be transferred to adult court. Only if the juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult." (Ibid . ) The California Supreme Court has held that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to cases not yet final at the time it was enacted. (Lara, supra, at 304, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.)

In this appeal, appellant claims he is entitled to a transfer hearing under Proposition 57 because his judgment is not yet final. Respondent asserts that appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the new law's retroactive application for two reasons. First, respondent argues that appellant's judgment of conviction became final long before Proposition 57's enactment, and his subsequent habeas and resentencing proceedings did not reopen its finality for purposes of that measure. Second, respondent contends that our Supreme Court's holding in Lara concerning Proposition 57's retroactive application does not apply to appellant because he is now too old to benefit from rehabilitation as a juvenile.

Because appellant's original sentence was vacated and his sentence is no longer final, and because Proposition 57's primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender's sentence, we conclude that the measure applies to preclude imposition of sentence on appellant as an adult, absent a transfer hearing. Regardless of his current age, appellant fits within our Supreme Court's holding that the voters intended Proposition 57 to apply as broadly as possible. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse appellant's sentence and remand for appellant to receive a transfer hearing in the juvenile court.¹

BACKGROUND

In 1998, appellant was charged with first degree murder with special-circumstance allegations and conspiracy to commit murder. He committed the offenses that same year, when he was 16 years old. He was tried as an adult, following a hearing at which he was determined not fit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.

The following year, a jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the court imposed the then-mandatory sentence of LWOP. On appeal, this court reversed one of the special-circumstance findings, but otherwise affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied appellant's petition for review in 2001, and he did not petition for a writ of certiorari.

In 2014, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, which held that mandatory LWOP sentences for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The trial court agreed appellant was entitled to resentencing, vacated appellant's sentence, and following a resentencing hearing, again imposed the LWOP term.

While appellant's appeal from his resentencing was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599, which among other things, clarified its holding in Miller v. Alabama . Because the trial court had exercised its resentencing discretion without the guidance of Montgomery , we reversed and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing. (See People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 661, 674, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 209.)

In 2019, on remand from this court, the trial court held a second resentencing hearing and once again sentenced appellant to LWOP. Appellant timely appealed. He contends that in light of Proposition 57, enacted after our opinion on appeal from his first resentencing, he is entitled to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Principles

1. Proposition 57

At the time appellant was charged in 1998, " ‘a child could be tried in criminal court only after a judicial determination ... that he or she was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.’ " (Lara , supra , 4 Cal.5th at 305, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.) Absent such a determination, " ‘any individual less than 18 years of age who violate[d] the criminal law [came] within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court ....’ " (Ibid. ) "Amendments to [the Welfare and Institutions Code] in 1999 and 2000 ... changed this historical rule. Under the changes, in specified circumstances, prosecutors were permitted, and sometimes required, to file charges against a juvenile directly in criminal court, where the juvenile would be treated as an adult." (Lara , supra , at 305, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.)

In November 2016, voters passed Proposition 57, again changing the procedure for charging juveniles. (Lara , supra , 4 Cal.5th at 303, 305, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.) According to the text of this measure, it was intended to "[s]top the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles" and to "[r]equire a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court ...." (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141, (2016 Voter Guide).) The voters mandated that Proposition 57's provisions be "broadly construed to accomplish its purposes." (2016 Voter Guide, supra, at § 5, p. 145.)

" ‘Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the Welfare and Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing by prosecutors. Certain categories of minors ... can still be tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor's maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated.’ "²

(Lara , supra , 4 Cal.5th at 305, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.) "Only if the juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult." (Id. at 303, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.)

While Proposition 57's transfer hearing is similar in some respects to the fitness hearing conducted prior to the 1999 and 2000 amendments, there are key differences. Notably, under prior law, juveniles age 16 or older who were accused of certain offenses, including murder, were subject to a rebuttable presumption that they were unfit for juvenile court treatment. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.) No such presumption applies in transfer hearings under Proposition 57, and the People have the burden to show that the juvenile should be treated as an adult. ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a) ; Castillero , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at 398, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 90 ; J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 715, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 220.) In addition, in fitness hearings under prior law, a juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over a juvenile age 16 or older accused of certain offenses, including murder, only if it found the individual suitable for juvenile court treatment under each of five criteria. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (c) [court must find juvenile suitable "under each and every one of the above criteria"].) In a transfer hearing under current law, the court must consider those five criteria, but has broad discretion in applying them, and need not find that all five support juvenile court treatment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3) ["the court shall consider the criteria specified"]; Castillero , supra , at 398, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 90 [court has broad discretion to apply these statutory criteria].)³

One Court of Appeal to consider the effect of Proposition 57 concluded that its primary benefit to juvenile defendants is in potentially affording them the dispositions rendered in juvenile court, rather than the generally much more severe criminal sentences in adult court.⁴ (People v. Cervantes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 569, 612, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 174, (Cervantes ) disapproved on another ground in Lara , supra , 4 Cal.5th at 314-315, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.) Indeed, the court noted that "adult criminal sentencing is the biggest disadvantage to being ‘tried in adult court.’ " (Cervantes , supra , at 612, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 174.) Despite its conclusion that Proposition 57 did not apply retroactively (a holding disapproved by Lara , as discussed...