People v. Parilla

• Decision Date: 12 June 2007
• Docket Number: 76.
• Citation: 870 N.E.2d 142,8 N.Y.3d 654
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Scott PARILLA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

870 N.E.2d 142

8 N.Y.3d 654

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Scott PARILLA, Appellant.

76.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 12, 2007.

Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (Mark W. Zeno and Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant.

Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Yael V. Levy, Joseph N. Ferdenzi and Stanley R. Kaplan of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, J.

The issue in this appeal is whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file a motion to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds (see CPL 30.10). We conclude that defendant waived review of the statute of limitations issue when he entered his guilty plea.

In 1996, while in prison serving a 7½ to 15 year sentence on charges unrelated to the matter at bar, defendant produced a blood sample pursuant to Executive Law § 995-c for inclusion in the DNA data bank. In 2003, this sample linked him to a sexual assault, involving two victims, that had occurred on August 29, 1993. On or about March 19, 2003, defendant was charged with one count of first degree rape and one count of first degree sodomy.

The 1993 incident had been reported to the police and a semen sample was collected from the rape victim and preserved in a sexual assault evidence kit. The police report described the perpetrator, his clothing and his automobile. According to a complaint follow-up form dated September 4, 1993, the mother of the rape victim stated that her daughter had been sent to stay with family members in Massachusetts and that she wanted to drop the complaint. On or about September 13, 1993, the case was closed as "[u]nfounded" for the foregoing reasons, and also allegedly because no medical evidence supporting the allegations existed, the rape victim refused to view photographs, and after the complaint was filed, there was no contact between the police and the rape victim. The police records do not indicate whether the police attempted to contact the sodomy victim.

Defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds (see CPL 30.10). However, Supreme Court refused to entertain the motion because defendant was represented by counsel. The court warned defense counsel "not to advance frivolous motions." According to defendant, his counsel said she would adopt his pro se motion, but in an off-the-record discussion the court indicated that a CPL 30.10 motion would be denied. On the record, the court further indicated that counsel should consider the tolling provisions of CPL 30.10(4)(a)(ii). Ultimately, defendant's attorney did not file the motion.

Subsequently, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of first degree rape and one count of first degree sodomy in satisfaction of the indictment. As part of the plea agreement, defendant waived his right to appeal. Prior to the plea allocution, there was an extensive colloquy between the court and defendant concerning whether defendant would be credited for the time he had been incarcerated on his prior conviction. Defendant asked if the sentence would be "nunc pro tunc." The court advised defendant, "I can't credit you for time you never served by calling it nunc pro tunc." There was discussion about defendant's maximum expiration date on the case as well as the maximum expiration date on his prior conviction. After the discussion of his maximum expiration and conditional release dates, the court indicated that it would impose a sentence of 6 to 12 years on each count, as a predicate felon, to run concurrently with his previous conviction. During the plea allocution, the court explained defendant's right to trial by jury and his right to appeal, which he said he understood he was waiving by his guilty plea. In response to defendant's query regarding whether he would also be waiving any constitutional claims, the court responded in the following colloquy:

"THE COURT: You waived all your constitutional rights to trial.

"THE DEFENDANT: But fundamental constitutional rights you can't waive.

"THE COURT: What right would that be? . . .

"What would you want to do on appeal in this case? . . . There [are] no hearings and no rulings made on applications you made of a constitutional nature. What exactly are the rights you want to preserve?"

Defendant then asked the court about his exception to a ruling on the DNA evidence.

"THE COURT: That would be waived.

"THE DEFENDANT: That would be waived, the Fourth Amendment right?

"THE COURT: Absolutely.

"THE DEFENDANT: All right. I thought that you could only waive the statutory rights, not the constitutional rights.

"THE COURT: You can waive a constitutional right. It has to be entered in a free and knowing manner. I'm not forcing you to do it. I'm telling you this is an agreement. I know that you're not happy.

"THE DEFENDANT: It's part of the agreement. I'm going to have to take it."

On two occasions after defendant accepted the plea, he objected to the particular felony conviction presented as the "predicate" felony for sentencing. Finally, at sentencing, Supreme Court informed defendant that upon reading the probation report, it could no longer give him the promised sentence of 6 to 12 years and that defendant would be sentenced to 7 to 14 years. The court advised defendant that he could withdraw the plea and proceed to trial if he did not want to accept that sentence. Defendant declined to withdraw his plea, agreed to accept the sentence and was sentenced accordingly on September 16, 2003.

One day after sentencing, defendant moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPL 440.10, claiming (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not move to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds, (2) the court improperly enhanced his sentence when it reneged on the promised sentence of 6 to 12 years and (3) the State unconstitutionally obtained his blood sample.

Supreme Court denied defendant's motion, holding that his "plea of guilty operated as a waiver of his claimed statutory right to dismissal of the indictment under CPL § 30.10." In a footnote, the court stated that "[w]hile not being dispositive, . . . even if addressed on its merits, defendant's motion would be denied." The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction and the order denying defendant's CPL 440.10 motion to vacate (33 A.D.3d 363, 821 N.Y.S.2d 599 [2006]). A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal, and we now affirm.

We agree with Supreme Court that defendant waived the statute of limitations defense by pleading guilty. In People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 (2000), we explained that "[a] plea of guilty marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation" (id. at 230, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773, citing People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 [1985]). Generally, a defendant who admits guilt in open court "may not later seek review of claims relating to the deprivation of rights that took place before the plea was entered" (id. citing People v. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 448 N.Y.S.2d 448, 433 N.E.2d 513 [1982]). Thus, under a guilty plea, a defendant waives specific rights attached to trial and forfeits "the right to revive certain claims made prior to the plea" (id.).

Although a guilty plea does not extinguish every claim on appeal, only a limited number of claims survive a valid waiver. These are either jurisdictional matters, such as an insufficient accusatory instrument, or rights of a constitutional dimension that "go to the very heart of the process (such as the constitutional speedy trial right, the protection against double jeopardy or a defendant's competency to stand trial)" (id.). Certain claims are simply foreclosed by a guilty plea (see e.g. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 448 N.Y.S.2d 448, ...