People v. Patel

• Decision Date: 21 September 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 4-19-0917,4-19-0917
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mehul PATEL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2020 IL App (4th) 190917

163 N.E.3d 1282

444 Ill.Dec. 366

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Mehul PATEL, Defendant-Appellee.

NO. 4-19-0917

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

September 21, 2020

Don Knapp, State's Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and David E. Mannchen, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Simone A. Patras, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellee.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In June 2019, defendant, Mehul Patel, was charged by citation with one count of misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)). On June 24, 2019, at approximately 12 a.m., a Normal police officer observed defendant's speeding vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. The officer observed visible signs of intoxication, smelled alcohol emitting from defendant's car, and defendant admitted he had been drinking. After showing indicators of impairment on standard field sobriety tests, the officer arrested defendant for DUI. Defendant moved "to quash his arrest and suppress evidence pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/114-12," contending the police officer who stopped him for speeding had "no reasonable articulable suspicion that the [d]efendant was driving under the influence * * * to extend the initial detention." Following a hearing on defendant's motion, during which it first viewed the footage of the traffic stop from the officer's body and dashboard cameras and then heard testimony from the arresting officer and defendant, the trial court granted defendant's suppression motion.

¶ 2 On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in "determin[ing] * * * the police officer lacked * * * reasonable suspicion to request defendant to perform field sobriety tests." We agree and reverse.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 At approximately 12 a.m. on June 24, 2019, Officer Jordan Krueger of the Normal Police Department sat in his squad car in the 1000 block of East College Avenue monitoring for speeders on the 30-mile-per-hour thoroughfare. Upon observing a speeding vehicle and using a handheld radar unit, Krueger clocked the vehicle's speed at 49 miles per hour. He testified he had tested the radar gun before and after his shift and it worked properly during each test. He pursued the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop to issue a speeding citation. Krueger testified he observed no weaving, drifting, or erratic braking by the speeding car as he pursued it.

¶ 5 Once the speeding vehicle stopped, Krueger approached it on the driver's side and met with the car's lone occupant—the driver, defendant, who produced his license and proof of insurance without incident. Krueger informed defendant he stopped him for speeding and told him the clocked speed. Defendant said he thought he was driving 35 miles per hour, which he believed was the speed limit. While speaking with defendant, Krueger "noticed that [defendant's] eyes were glassy or glossy and * * * could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from the vehicle and him." Upon inquiry from Krueger, defendant reported he had just left a restaurant in downtown Bloomington, Bakery and Pickle. Defendant said he met his brother for dinner and a few drinks. He admitted consuming alcohol, specifically 2 ½ India pale ale (IPA) beers. From his training and experience, which included 72 hours of DUI training and over 250 DUI investigations, Krueger understood IPAs generally contained a higher alcohol content compared to standard beer. Krueger testified this initial discussion with defendant lasted approximately five minutes. He testified he then returned to his squad car to issue defendant a speeding ticket and "prepare for standardized field sobriety tests" because, based on his observation of and discussion with defendant, he suspected defendant "might be under the influence of alcohol." The footage of the stop confirmed Krueger's testimony by showing him advise his colleague (an unidentified officer at the scene) that he planned to conduct a "55" in front of his car. In his squad car, Krueger completed the speeding ticket and placed it and defendant's driver's license on his car's dashboard.

¶ 6 Krueger then returned to defendant's vehicle and asked him to step outside for field sobriety testing. Krueger confirmed he did not return the speeding ticket or driver's license to defendant. Based on defendant's performance during testing, Krueger arrested him for DUI ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)).

¶ 7 In August 2019, defendant filed a "Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence," alleging Krueger unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop for field sobriety testing because he had "no reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant was driving under the influence." In December 2019, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion. Defendant moved to admit two exhibits showing the traffic stop: (1) 7 minutes and 46 seconds of footage from Officer Kruger's body camera and (2) 8 minutes and 10 seconds of footage from the dashboard camera in Krueger's squad car. The trial court admitted the videos without objection and watched them before hearing testimony from Krueger and defendant. During argument, defense counsel acknowledged, "I'm not contesting the initial basis for the stop, that there was speeding." She explained, "[w]e are however challenging the continued detention" because "glassy eyes, an odor of alcohol, and [defendant] admit[ing] to drinking at a bar" did not provide Krueger with reasonable suspicion defendant committed or was committing DUI. Defense counsel highlighted what Krueger did not observe that night—he did not see defendant's car weaving, drifting, or braking erratically; he did not see defendant disheveled; he did not see defendant struggle to produce his license or insurance; and he did not hear defendant slur his speech. The State countered by arguing defendant failed to make a prima facie case for an unreasonable seizure. The State maintained Krueger properly stopped defendant for speeding and quickly developed reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. The State argued, "there's no illegal search or seizure here" because Krueger observed "multiple [DUI] factors here, and they're reliable and they're reasonable mostly from the admission of the Defendant himself."

¶ 8 The trial court rendered its decision on the record, phrasing the issue as follows: "I think the big question is whether or not there was sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion for the officer to proceed forward with a DUI traffic stop or with the DUI investigation rather[.]" The court reiterated, "[t]he Defendant [is] not disputing the initial speeding violation." The court stated it considered the two videos and witness testimony in coming to a decision. It noted Officer Krueger's "observations * * * include[d] glassy eyes and an odor of alcohol along with the Defendant admitting drinking at a bar I believe it was just 35 minutes prior." The court explained:

"[W]e need to look at the totality of the circumstances, and that's what is of greatest concern to the Court, that so many times in these cases now what I'm finding is that I'm getting cherry picking and I see this happening again here. And I'm glad the officer is in here because I think the officer did an excellent job, but I'm concerned about the cherry picking that's going on."

¶ 9 The trial court noted Officer Krueger did not observe defendant driving erratically. It also noted defendant cooperated with Krueger and had no trouble speaking or producing his driver's license and proof of insurance. But in view of these nonobservations, it lamented:

"Again, so the Court is kind of in a quandary because, yes, if you want to take out the fact that there were—appeared to be an odor of alcoholic beverage, glossy eyes, and an admission to drinking, even just stopped drinking 35 minutes ago then that could be something. Yes, it is something that an IPA is typically stronger alcohol content than a regular beer. Yes, the officer is properly trained I think making good decisions here."

¶ 10 The court ultimately granted defendant's motion to suppress, finding "if we actually take the totality of the circumstances there's just not enough to believe that there was sufficient supporting facts taken in a whole. I don't know that I'm criticizing the officer. * * * [B]ut I'm concerned about the cherry picking. That's my main concern."

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Before we take up the analysis of this case, we would be remiss if we did not note, once again, our disapproval of the practice of filing meaningless motions "to quash arrest" when the true purpose of the motion is to suppress evidence. See People v. Dunmire , 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶¶ 28-31, 442 Ill.Dec. 540, 160 N.E.3d 113 ; see also People v. Evans , 2017 IL App (4th) 140672, ¶ 13, 411 Ill.Dec. 425, 73 N.E.3d 139 ; People v. Winchester , 2016 IL App (4th) 140781, ¶ 30, 408 Ill.Dec. 809, 66 N.E.3d 601 ; People v. Ramirez , 2013 IL App (4th) 121153, ¶¶ 59-68, 375 Ill.Dec. 171, 996 N.E.2d 1227 ; People v. Hansen , 2012 IL App (4th) 110603, ¶ 62, 360 Ill.Dec. 85, 968 N.E.2d 164. As we also noted numerous times before, if trial courts would refuse to accept such motions and instead require counsel to properly plead, the practice might end.

¶ 14 Turning next to the issues, the State argues "the trial court erred when it determined that the police officer lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to request defendant to perform field sobriety tests." We agree.

¶ 15 "Vehicle stops" for even minor traffic violations "are subject to the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement" because they amount to seizures of the persons in the car. People v. Hackett , 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20, 361 Ill.Dec. 536, 971 N.E.2d 1058 ;...