People v. Patrick

• Decision Date: 20 September 1966
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 65--56
• Citation: 220 N.E.2d 243,75 Ill.App.2d 93
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy PATRICK, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 243

220 N.E.2d 243

75 Ill.App.2d 93

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy PATRICK, Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 65--56.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Sept. 20, 1966.

Robert E. Richardson, State's Atty., Ottawa, for appellant.

John Berry, Streator, for appellee.

CORYN, Presiding Justice.

The grand jury of LaSalle County returned an indictment against the defendant, Nancy Patrick, for the crime of theft charging that:

'Between the first day of April, 1963, and the 21st day of April, 1965, at and within the county of LaSalle, Nancy Patrick committed the offense of theft in that she knowingly obtained unauthorized control over the sum of $21,513.04, the property of the Streator TV Cable Company, a corporation, situated at 607 East Main Street, Streator, LaSalle County, Illinois, Nancy Patrick thereby intending to deprive Streator TV Cable Company, a corporation, permanently of the use or benefit of said property, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the same people of the State of Illinois.'

The defendant thereafter filed a motion to quash this indictment for failure to specify the time of the commission of the alleged offense with sufficient particularity to enable her to know with what offense she is charged. 'The State,' she argues, 'might attempt (under this indictment) to prove that * * * she * * * obtained unauthorized control of the money in question on any one of 751 days. Again, it might attempt to prove that she obtained control of money on a large number of occasions within that two year period. Is the indictment alleging one offense or a number of offenses?' she inquires. 'It is very possible,' her argument continues 'that * * * (the State) * * * might attempt to prove a large number of offenses, each one of which imposes an amount less than the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny. It may attempt to add these together and claim they are one offense.' For failure to adequately designate a specific time, it is also suggested by defendant that the indictment is multifarious for aggregating a number of small thefts to charge a grand theft.

The trial court accepted defendant's argument, and ordered the indictment dismissed, with the following observation:

'There is a presumption of innocence that attaches to all defendants charged with a crime, and that individual has a right to know whether he is being charged with one taking of twenty-one thousand dollars, on a specific date, or a series of takings over a period of two and one-half years, totalling twenty-one thousand dollars, and this you cannot tell by looking at this indictment.'

The State has perfected this appeal from the order dismissing the indictment, and argues that the indictment states one offense of theft; that the law does not require the State to allege in the indictment whether the theft charged was committed by a single act, or by a series of successive acts constituting one continuous offense; and that the order of the trial court requiring such specificity to sustain the validity of the indictment is erroneous.

At Article II, § 9 of the Constitution of Illinois (1870), S.H.A., it is provided that, 'In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and to have a copy thereof * * *.' This constitutional guaranty was designed 'to secure to the accused such specific designation of the offense charged against him as will enable him to fully prepare for his defense, and to plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.' People v. Peters, 10 Ill.2d 577, 580, 141 N.E.2d 9, 10. To implement these requirements of the Constitution, the Legislature, by the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (ch. 38, § 100--1 et seq., Ill.Rev.Stat.) provided that, 'A charge (indictment) shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: (1) Stating the name of the offense; (2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated; (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged; (4) Stating the time and place of the offense as definitely as can be done; and (5) Stating the name of the accused. * * *' (Ch. 38, § 111--3(a), Ill.Rev.Stat. (1963)).

The nature and elements of the offense of theft are set forth at ch. 38, § 16--1, Ill.Rev.Stat. (1963) as follows: 'A person commits theft when he knowingly: (a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner; or (b) Obtains by deception control over property of the owner; or (c) Obtains by threat control over property of the owner; or (d) Obtains control over stolen property knowing the property to have been stolen by another * * *. A person convicted of theft of property from the person or exceeding $150 in value shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary from one to 10 years.'

The indictment here states the name of the offense, and we conclude that it also adequately describes its nature and elements by alleging, in the language of the statute, that Nancy Patrick knowingly obtained unauthorized control over the described property of another with the requisite intent. We do not think the indictment fatally defective for failure to cite 'the statutory provision alleged to have been violated.' In People v. Hill, 68 Ill.App.2d 369, 216 N.E.2d 212, the court correctly held that where an indictment adequately informs the accused of the nature and elements of the charge against him, failure to cite the proper statutory provision alleged to have been violated is not a basis for dismissal under § 114--1, or for an arrest of judgment under § 116--2. It is, rather, a basis for sustaining a motion for a Bill of Particulars under § 111--6.

The question presented by defendant's motion here, then, is whether this indictment complies with § 111--3(a)(4), requiring that the date of the offense be stated as definitely as can be done, and if it does not, whether the indictment for that reason, fails to state an offense, and is accordingly subject to dismissal under § 114--1(a)(8) or § 116--2(b)(1).

Our Supreme Court of Illinois, in the cases of People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill.2d 527, 212 N.E.2d 97, and People v. Petropoulos, 34 Ill.2d 179, 214 N.E.2d 765, has had recent occasion to interpret Articles 111, 114 and 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, including §§ 111-- 3(a), 114--1(a)(8), and 116--2(b) (1), of ch. 38, Ill.Rev.Stat. (1963). In Blanchett it was held that a pre-trial motion, pursuant to § 114--1(a)(8), to dismiss an indictment for failure to state an offense, and a posttrial motion, pursuant to § 116--2(b)(1), in arrest of judgment for failure of the indictment to state an offense, are sustainable only where the defect in the indictment relates to non-compliance with § 111--3(a)(3), which requires a description of the nature and elements of the offense. Such motions were held not sustainable where the alleged deficiency relates merely to the question of whether the time and place, or date and county, of the alleged offense are stated under § 111--3(a)(4) as definitely as might have been done. The Supreme Court ruled further in Blanchett that the requirements of due process and those of the Code of Criminal Procedure (i.e., ch. 38, § 111--3(a)(4), Ill.Rev.Stat.) are met, so far as describing the time and place, or date and county, of the alleged offense, if the...