People v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 25 January 1979
• Docket Number: Cr. 16868
• Citation: 88 Cal.App.3d 742,152 Cal.Rptr. 183
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ray Edward PATTERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 183

152 Cal.Rptr. 183

88 Cal.App.3d 742

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ray Edward PATTERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 16868.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 25, 1979.

Hearing Denied March 22, 1979.

Paul N. Halvonik, State Public Defender, Clifton R. Jeffers, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Jaime Alcabes, Linda Fentiman, Gary D. Sowards, B. E. Bergsen, III, Deputy State Public Defenders, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen. of the State of California, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Division, Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci, Timothy A. Reardon, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

KANE, Associate Justice.

Defendant was charged in Count 1 with violation of Penal Code, ¹ section 12020 (possession of a sawed-off rifle) and in Counts 2, 3, [88 Cal.App.3d 745] and 4 with violation of section 211 (robbery). The information also charged defendant with the use of a sawed-off rifle in the commission of the robberies charged in Counts 3 and 4. Defendant pleaded not guilty to all counts and denied the use charge.

Defendant's motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 was denied. At trial, defendant's motion to suppress the contents of the two statements he made to police was denied.

Defendant was tried by a jury and was found guilty of all counts as charged. The robberies were found to be in the first degree, and the use allegations were found to be true. The court ordered the defendant to be imprisoned in the state prison for the term provided by law, with the sentences to be served concurrently.

Defendant met his first victim, Victor Reynolds, in a bar in Hayward. The victim accompanied the defendant on a drive to direct him to a particular motel. Defendant stopped the car en route to the motel, leveled a sawed off rifle at the victim, and stated " 'Now, you know what this is.' " Defendant demanded Mr. Reynolds give him his wallet and place his wrist watch on the car's console. When defendant found the wallet contained only a couple of dollars, he stated, " 'You'd better have more than that, man; don't make me pull this trigger.' " The victim was told in a "crisp, business like, hard, demanding" manner to walk away from the car and " 'Don't look back.' " The rifle was leveled at Mr. Reynolds throughout the robbery.

The next victim, Leo Tschabuschnig, was confronted about two hours later in front of Fiesta Lanes in Hayward. Defendant's car pulled up behind the victim's car and blocked his exit. Defendant asked Mr. Tschabuschnig, " 'How do you get to Tennyson,' " but before the victim could respond he saw a weapon on the sill of defendant's car. Defendant asked " 'How about this,' " and then demanded " 'Toss me your wallet.' " After Mr. Tschabuschnig handed defendant his wallet he was told " 'Now get in your car' " and " 'Don't look back.' " The victim gave the police an accurate description of the robber's car, and observed that the driver wore a small leather cap.

The third robbery rook place approximately one-half hour later at a car-wash in San Leandro. The victim, Jimmie Baker, was rinsing off his car when a white car containing two men pulled up behind his car. The passenger, a white male with "light reddish" hair, asked him where Hays Street was, and then produced a "cut-off" rifle and demanded his wallet. After giving his wallet to the passenger, Mr. Baker was then told to go to the front of his car and continue washing it. The victim described the vehicle and its occupants to the police immediately after the robbers left the scene. Approximately three minutes after receiving a description of the robbery suspects, Officers Turner and Long stopped a white Chevrolet occupied by two males one black, one white. The defendant, who was driving, was wearing a leather cap similar to that described by the victims. The police found a loaded sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat and a brown paper bag containing three wallets. Mr. Reynolds' watch was also recovered.

The morning after the robberies, in statements made to the police, defendant admitted committing all three robberies. Defendant now claims he suffered from involuntary PCP (angel dust) intoxication, which made him unconscious of his actions during the robberies. Defendant's statements detailing the robberies cast doubt on his professed diminished capacity.

Two experts, a psychiatrist and a clinical researcher, testified on defendant's behalf in an attempt to show the effect PCP has on the ability to form specific intent. In rebuttal, the prosecution called Denzil Smith, an accomplice to the crime, who testified the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of PCP.

Defendant assails the judgment of conviction on four fundamental bases, by contending that: (1) his statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; (2) the trial court erred in excluding certain expert testimony; (3) the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the effect of voluntary intoxication; and (4) the sentences imposed upon him are in violation of section 654, prohibiting multiple punishment. For reasons which follow, we must reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Miranda Violations : The record indicates that shortly after midnight on the night of the robberies, Officer Long stopped defendant's car in order to question him about the reported robberies. During the conversation with the officer, defendant made a statement to the effect that he "hadn't committed any robbery." Subsequent thereto, defendant was identified by Mr. Baker, one of the victims, and was arrested and taken to the San Leandro police station. At about 7 a. m. on October 22, 1976, while in the custody of the police, defendant gave a statement to Officer Long admitting his participation in the commission of one of the robberies. At approximately 11:30 a. m. the same day, defendant gave another statement to Officer Wallace confessing to all three robberies. After a hearing held outside the presence of the jury, the trial court concluded that the statements made by defendant to the police were admissible in evidence. Defendant insists that the statements in question were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and hence should have been excluded. We disagree.

In reviewing the admissibility of the contested evidence, we observe at the outset that the statement given by defendant to the police during the on-the-scene investigation of the crimes falls outside the protective umbrella of Miranda. As consistently amplified in cases, the Miranda warning presupposes the existence of an accused whose questioning without warning would be for accusatory, rather than investigatory, purposes (Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 492, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977). Temporary detention, however, cannot be equated with custody; it is an investigatory, rather than accusatory, stage. As stated in People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 667-668, 74 Cal.Rptr. 423, 432, "Temporary detention only slightly resembles custody . . . . True enough, a person temporarily detained has been subjected to some restraint and his freedom of movement has been temporarily restricted. But the person detained is in no sense an accused but rather one merely suspected of misconduct. Since the police can make no valid accusation against him, we do not think the process has shifted from investigatory to accusatory . . . . Until such time as the police have probable cause to make an accusation, the relationship between suspect and police remains that of citizen and peace officer rather than accused and accuser." (Emphasis added.) The holding of Manis, that a detention not amounting to an arrest does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings, finds support not only in California cases (In re Richard T. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 382, 391, 144 Cal.Rptr. 856; People v. Wheeler (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 898, 903, 118 Cal.Rptr. 205; People v. Herrera (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 629, 636-637, 90 Cal.Rptr. 802), but also in Miranda itself.

In defining and limiting the applicability of Miranda, the United States Supreme Court explicitly stated that "General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process Is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 477-478, 86 S.Ct. at pp. 1629-1630; emphasis added.) But even the foregoing principles aside, the facts at bench demonstrate that the statement in question was made voluntarily by defendant and was not in response to any custodial interrogation (see discussion, infra). This circumstance, of course, provides yet another reason why the statement at issue does not fall within the proscription of Miranda and its progeny (cf. People v. Vargas (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 499, 504, 111 Cal.Rptr. 745; People v. Coleman (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 722, 731-732, 87 Cal.Rptr. 554).

We are also firmly of the opinion that the statement given by defendant to Officer Long on the morning of October 22, 1976, after his arrest and while in police custody, was equally admissible under the prevailing law and the circumstances of the instant case.

In drawing a proper line between admissible and inadmissible statements, Miranda underscores that the procedural protection against self-incrimination obtains only if two conditions are met: (1) the defendant is in police custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way, and (2) is subjected to police interrogation. In the language...