People v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 20 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 71454,71454
• Citation: 167 Ill.Dec. 1045,588 N.E.2d 1175,146 Ill.2d 445
• Parties: , 167 Ill.Dec. 1045 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Vincent PATTERSON, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1175

588 N.E.2d 1175

146 Ill.2d 445, 167 Ill.Dec. 1045

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Vincent PATTERSON, Appellee.

No. 71454.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1992.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Donald D. Bernardi, State's Atty., Pontiac (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Sol. Gen., and Terence M. Madsen and Thomas L. Ciecko, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, and Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman and Timothy J. Londrigan, of the Office of the State's Attys. App. Pros., of counsel), for the People.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Arden J. Lang, Asst. Defender, of the Office of the State App. Defender, Springfield, for appellee.

Justin D. Smock, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for amicus curiae Ill. Dept. of Corrections.

Joseph A. Morris, Chicago (Maureen P. Cunningham, of Morris, Rathnau & De La Rose, of counsel), for amicus curiae Lincoln Legal Foundation.

Justice THOMAS J. MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Vincent Patterson, a prison inmate serving a natural life sentence for offenses unrelated to this case, was indicted for the unlawful possession of a weapon by a person confined in a correctional facility. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 24-1.1(b).) At trial, defendant moved to suppress statements he made to a prison official investigating the weapons incident, claiming that he had not been given Miranda warnings before the questioning. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) The circuit court of Livingston County granted defendant's motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed the order of suppression, with one justice dissenting. (207 Ill.App.3d 104, 151 Ill.Dec. 699, 564 N.E.2d 1361.) This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315). Briefs in support of the State's position have been filed by amici curiae, the Lincoln Legal Foundation and the Illinois Department of Corrections.

This case presents the question of whether a prison inmate must be given Miranda warnings prior to interviews with prison officials who are investigating security matters within the prison. For the reasons below, we hold that, under the circumstances peculiar to this case, such warnings need not be given.

While serving a natural life sentence at the Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac, Illinois, defendant was placed in segregation for six months after two "shanks" (knife-like instruments) were found in his one-person cell during a routine shakedown on June 29, 1989. Segregation is imposed by correctional institutions as a disciplinary measure. It limits an inmate's access to the general prison population, and is the most restrictive type of housing available in the institution. Inmates in segregation are locked in their cells 24 hours per day; are not permitted to attend classes or job assignments; are allowed limited opportunities to shower or exercise; are not permitted to make telephone calls; and are escorted in restraints when removed from their cells.

On August 1, 1989, Richard C. Irvin, an internal investigator with the Department of Corrections (Department) at Pontiac, acting upon directions from his superiors, requested an interview with defendant to discuss his possession of the "shanks." Irvin's primary duty at Pontiac is to investigate incidents and prepare cases for prosecution. If defendant had refused to speak with Irvin, Irvin could not have disciplined him. However, if such were the case here, a uniformed correctional officer might have given defendant a ticket (disciplinary report). Defendant consented to the interview.

Although Irvin knew that defendant was in segregation, he did not know that the segregation had been imposed as punishment for the "shanks" incident. Defendant was handcuffed and escorted to Irvin's office. Defendant's handcuffs were not removed until he returned to his cell.

Irvin's name and title were on the door of his office, which is in a group of offices connected to the cellhouse. The office contains a desk, three chairs, a credenza, and a filing cabinet. Irvin was dressed in civilian clothes, and was wearing a tag identifying him as an internal affairs official. No other prison personnel were in Irvin's office during the ensuing conversation. The guard who had escorted defendant waited outside the office door during the 10-minute interview.

The purpose of Irvin's interview was to discover whether defendant had possessed the shanks in order to protect himself from enemies within the prison, and in that case whether defendant wanted to be placed in protective custody. Further, Irvin wished to determine whether defendant would have grounds for a "necessity" defense at a possible criminal trial. No charges had been filed against defendant at the time of this interview, and he was not given Miranda warnings prior to his conversation with Irvin.

It is the policy of investigators at Pontiac, following instructions from the State's Attorney of Livingston County, not to give Miranda warnings in interviews with inmates who have been found with "shanks" during a shakedown for weapons. The policy was put into effect after a prisoner brought a successful necessity defense to a charge of possession of a weapon while in the institution. Moreover, Irvin had found that inmates become "terrorized" after receiving Miranda warnings, and thus refuse to speak of their safety concerns.

During the interview, defendant declined protective custody, and stated that he had no enemies at Pontiac. Although he did not specifically mention a necessity defense, defendant did indicate that he would be inclined to possess a weapon because he had seen a friend stabbed at another prison. Irvin did not ask defendant whether he had a shank on the day of the shakedown, and defendant did not comment on the events of that day. After the interview, defendant was taken back to segregation.

On October 2, 1989, defendant was indicted for the offense of unlawful possession of weapons by a person confined in a Department facility in violation of section 24-1.1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 24-1.1(b)). This is a Class 1 felony offense, and could result in additional incarceration for a term of 4 to 15 years or an extended term of 15 to 20 years. The State later filed a second charge against defendant, alleging possession of a weapon by a convicted felon in violation of section 24-1.1(a) of the Code. This charge is a Class 3 felony, carrying a potential prison term of 2 to 5 years, or an extended term of 5 to 10 years. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 24-1.1(a), (d), 1005-8-1(a)(6), 1005-8-2(a)(5).

On December 18, 1989, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements made to Irvin, contending that their use was in violation of defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as defined in Miranda. The trial court heard evidence that defendant could have refused the interview with Irvin or could have terminated it at any time. However, the court was persuaded that Miranda-type warnings were required prior to the interview, because defendant had been identified as a primary suspect for an offense, and an investigation had focused on him. Thus, the court granted defendant's motion to suppress. The State appealed.

On appeal, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed. 207 Ill.App.3d 104, 151 Ill.Dec. 699, 564 N.E.2d 1361. The court found that defendant was interrogated while "in custody" for Miranda purposes. Consequently, the failure of prison authorities to give Miranda-type warnings rendered any statements by defendant inadmissible. The dissenting justice concluded that Miranda has no application to the interrogation of prison inmates.

We begin our analysis with a review of the standards set out in Miranda. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. (U.S. Const., amend. V; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.) Procedural safeguards must be put into effect to protect the privilege; the individual must be warned prior to questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in court, that he has the right to an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for him prior to questioning if he so desires. (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.) In the absence of a Miranda warning or waiver, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against the individual. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.

The Miranda safeguards arose out of a concern that individuals interrogated while in custody might incriminate themselves due to physical or psychological coercion. (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446-58, 86 S.Ct. at 1613-19, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707-14.) The Miranda Court pointed out that the object of custodial interrogation is to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. The interrogation environment "carries its own badge of intimidation." (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 86 S.Ct. at 1619, 16 L.Ed.2d at 714.) Thus, unless adequate protective measures are employed to dispel the coercion inherent in the custodial environment, no statement obtained from the individual can truly be the product of his free choice. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 86 S.Ct. at 1619, 16 L.Ed.2d at 714.

Miranda safeguards become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of movement is curtailed to a " 'degree associated with formal arrest.' " (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 335, quoting California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279.) In Berkemer the Court...