People v. Paulin

• Decision Date: 22 April 1968
• Citation: 61 Misc.2d 289,305 N.Y.S.2d 607
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff v. Janet Elura PAULIN, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 607

305 N.Y.S.2d 607

61 Misc.2d 289

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff v. Janet Elura PAULIN, Defendant.

Saratoga County Court.

April 22, 1968.

[61 Misc.2d 290] James A. O'Connor, Dist. Atty., for the People.

E. Stewart Jones, Troy, for defendant, Thomas J. O'Connor, Troy, James Straney, Latham, of counsel.

DECISION

EDWARD T. SULLIVAN, Judge.

Hearing held March 18 and March 19, 1968 on two pre-trial motions to suppress evidence in the above action wherein the defendant is being prosecuted on a charge of Murder in the Second Degree, § 1046 of the former Penal Law, under Indictment #1609--67 of the Grand Jury of Saratoga County, September 1967 Term of the Supreme Court. After arraignment and a subsequent bail application wherein same was fixed and defendant released thereon, the case was transferred by the Supreme Court to Saratoga County Court.

By stipulation, to avoid repetition of the same testimony, one hearing was held for both motions; and the hearing proceeded initially on the motion for suppression of an alleged oral admission and an alleged oral confession under § 813--g, Code Crim.Pro., and then proceeded on the motion for suppression of evidence alleged to have been obtained as a result of unlawful search and seizure under § 813--c, Code Crim.Pro.; and by consent, the hearing was held with all witnesses, except the witness actually testifying and the defendant, remaining outside the closed hearing room.

Defendant was arraigned on June 12, 1967 on an information charging Murder in the First Degree under § 1044 of the former Penal Law before Malta Town Justice, Morgan E. Bloodgood; entered a plea of 'not guilty'; and requested a preliminary hearing. On August 17, 1967 a preliminary hearing under § 190 et seq., Code Crim.Pro. was held before the same Justice, who found that the crime of Murder in the First Degree had been committed, that there was reasonable ground to believe the defendant guilty thereof, and ordered that she be held to answer for the same. A photocopy of the transcript of the preliminary hearing was made a part of the motion for the suppression of the alleged oral admission and oral confession.

Defendant brings her initial motion upon the ground that her alleged statements, confession and/or admission, either inculpatory or exculpatory, either oral or written, were and are inadmissible as evidence against her in that they were obtained from her during impermissive pre-arraignment, in-custodial interrogation by the New York State Police The companion motion for suppression of tangible property, including a metal cooking pot and a knife, is based on the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guaranteering that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and guaranteeing the condition of issuance of warrants.

in violation of her constitutional guarantees under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as proclaimed and fixed as guidelines for state law enforcement officials and state trial courts by the United States Supreme Court on June 13, 1966 in (1) Miranda v. Arizona, (2) Vignera v. New York, (3) Westover v. United States, and (4) California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, all of which are herein called The Miranda case.

PART I

The facts established by the preliminary hearing and the admissibility hearing are as follows:

Shortly before 10:00 A.M. on Monday, June 12, 1967, defendant's son, Michael Okon, reported via telephone to the N.Y. State Police his discovery of the dead body of his step-father, Joseph Paulin, a N.Y. State Police Sergeant, in the family residence, 18 Barcelona Drive, Clifton Knolls, Town of Clifton Park, Saratoga County, N.Y. Uniformed Lieutenant Raymond J. Kuzia, pursuant to radio dispatch, telephoned Acting Troop Commander, Captain James Smith, at Troop Headquarters, Loudonville, N.Y., who advised him of the report and instructed him to proceed to Sgt. Paulin's house. Lt. Kuzia arrived at about 10:00 A.M. and was led by the step-son to the guest room clothes closet, wherein he saw the dead body which was later identified as that of the victim.

Lt. Kuzia was asked: (p. 11, l. 6)

'Q What did you do then?

A Well, as I say, I dropped the covering back over the body. I asked Michael if he knew anything about this and as I recall he said no but it must have happened Friday, as * * *'

Significantly, Michael Okon was not questioned again and the record establishes that he was not subjected to any form of detention. Further, the record establishes that it is State Police policy, practice and instruction to handle every death as a homicide (Lt. Kuzia: p. 21, ls. 6--15; p. 23, ls. 1--6; Capt. Chieco: p. 44 ls. 1--14).

Lt. Kuzia then reported via the basement telephone his finding to Captain Smith and requested assistance. He returned upstairs to the living room area and, for the first time that day, saw the defendant. He testified she was barefooted, wearing a blue housecoat and was coming from the direction of the master bedroom. She asked him who he At this point in the chronology of events, there is a variance in the testimony of the two key witnesses for the People. At both the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing, Captain Chieco testified that upon his arrival at about 11:15--11:30 A.M., Lt. Kuzia, in briefing him on events up to that time, told him that when the Lieutenant first saw the defendant, that she mentioned something about having a terrible fight, that he observed a cut on her left hand, and that believing she might possibly be a suspect, he immediately advised her of her rights under The Miranda case.

was and what he was doing there. Lt. Kuzia identified himself and told her he 'was there to see about Joe'.

According to Lt. Kuzia's testimony, he began questioning the defendant about 10:20 A.M. concerning what happened to her husband (p. 22, ls. 3 & 4) and continued this interrogation for about twenty (20) minutes before he gave her the constitutional warnings to which she was entitled under The Miranda case. With reference to the homicide, of which he said he believed her to be a suspect, and obviously the only suspect at that time, he asked her ten (10) or twelve (12) times what had happened. Defendant did not answer his questions. Later, during the hearing, defendant testified that (p. 119) she knew she was being accused of killing her husband, that she knew she was being detained, that she knew she was being held for killing her husband, and that she requested the presence of her lawyer because of this knowledge.

After the ten (10) or twelve (12) questions with reference to the homicide, Lt. Kuzia asked her several times what was wrong with her hand and then she finally answered. This was followed by several questions as to how the hand injury happened and she ultimately answered him. Thereupon Lt. Kuzia gave her The Miranda warnings.

Lt. Kuzia's testimony, (p. 12, ls. 15--22; p. 13, ls. 1--5) was as follows:

'A * * * We both walked into the living room area. I asked her what happened several times. I got no answer. We sat down. I asked her in substance if she could tell me what happened here. I got no answer several times, and I then asked if she would like me to make some coffee and Mrs. Paulin then told Michael to make the coffee. We sat there for a while and repeatedly I asked her if she could tell me what happened. Again no answers. We had some coffee eventually, smoked some cigarettes, and as we sat there I noticed Mrs. Paulin had a bandage on her left hand. I asked what had happened, what was wrong with her hand again several times, again no answer, and finally she said, 'My husband cut it,' and I asked how that had happened and again I asked it several times and got no answer Then, according to the testimony of Lt. Kuzia (p. 13, ls. 7--15), for the first time, he advised her of her constitutional rights and gave her The Miranda warnings.

and then finally she said, 'We had an awful fight, an awful fight."

While defendant was in her own home, and it may be considered factually similar to People v. P. (anon.), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255, the situation herein was far from identical, and, in the opinion of thiS court is clearly distinguishable. upon the whole evidence given at the day and one-half hearing, the atmosphere of her residence was overwhelmingly police dominated. From the moment Lt. Kuzia first saw defendant until she was conveyed by two (2) state police Investigators and an acting police matron in a state police patrol car to the Malta police station for booking, she was constantly and closely accompanied by one, two or more police officers or Department female employee, even to entering the bathroom with her. The number of police personnel in and about the house, garage and yard rose to twelve (12) or thirteen (13) from 10:00 A.M. to sometime after 1:30 P.M.

As to the time for giving the required warnings required by Miranda, whether the former standard as the rule was understood to be on June 12, 1967, i.e. when the officer knew she was 'not free to go' if she failed to answer a question or the later modification of the standard expressed in P. (anon.) 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 232, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260, Supra, as 'whether the subject * * * is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is (significantly) restricted by such interrogation', the warnings came too late. This Court finds that the above facts establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was interrogated by a uniformed police officer, that she was significantly detained, that the officer knew that her freedom of action and movement was being restricted in a police dominated atmosphere by the interrogation, and that she knew and believed the same. The...