People v. P.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1967
• Citation: 286 N.Y.S.2d 225,21 N.Y.2d 1,233 N.E.2d 255
• Parties: , 233 N.E.2d 255 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 225

286 N.Y.S.2d 225

21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 30, 1967.

Gerald S. Kirschbaum, James J. McDonough and Matthew Muraskin, Mineola, for appellant.

William Cahn, Dist. Atty. (Henry P. De Vine, Mineola, of counsel), for respondent.

KEATING, Judge.

Daniel W. was arrested by the police on May 19, 1966 in connection with the theft of a 1963 Chevrolet. After some questioning he identified the appellant, Rodney P., then 16 years old, as his accomplice. Since he knew where Rodney lived (but not the precise address) Daniel directed two detectives to Rodney's home. They arrived there at about 8:00 P.M. Detective Lally left Daniel in the car with his fellow detective and approached three boys standing by the side of the defendant's house. He asked which of the boys was Rodney. The appellant identified himself, whereupon the detective asked the other two boys if they would leave, which they did.

The detective questioned Rodney about being with Daniel W. that afternoon and taking the car. Rodney admitted to Detective Lally that he had taken the car with Daniel W. This interrogation lasted three to four minutes. The detective and Rodney next went inside the house and the officer spoke to Rodney's father over the telephone regarding his son's arrest. Rodney was taken to police headquarters where the sum and substance of his conversation with the detective was reduced to writing and signed by him. He was not advised at any time of his rights either with regard to the assistance of counsel or of his right to remain silent.

Subsequently Rodney was arraigned and pled not guilty to the charge of grand larceny in the first degree. Thereafter he was approved for youthful offender treatment. Upon his plea of guilty, Rodney was adjudicated a youthful offender and received a three-year suspended sentence.

Prior to the plea, a hearing was held upon a motion to suppress the oral admissions and the written statement. The court granted the motion as to the written statement on the ground that the appellant had not been warned of his rights as required by Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The court, finding that the warnings were not required during the brief interrogation at Rodney's home, refused to suppress the oral admissions.

The appellant's conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division (Second Department) with one Justice dissenting. The defendant appeals to this court by permission of an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division.

The single ground urged for reversal on this appeal is that the oral admissions made to the police officer were unconstitutionally obtained and should have been suppressed. ¹

This case presents a problem raised by Miranda v. State of Arizona (supra)--the problem of defining precisely the circumstances and conditions in which the police are required to advise an individual of his constitutional rights before proceeding with interrogation.

The Supreme Court held in Miranda that a person who is taken into custody or deprived of his freedom in any significant way must be advised that he is not obligated to answer any questions; that, if he does speak, anything he says may be used against him in court; that he is entitled to the assistance of counsel prior to and during the questioning, and that, if he desires counsel and is unable to retain one, counsel will be assigned to him.

That such warnings must be given after a person is formally arrested and physically detained is clear. The problem arises when a person is not formally arrested and taken into police custody; where, as in the present case, he is questioned briefly at his home by a policeman who, it is reasonably clear, intends to arrest him but who has not done so at the time of the questioning.

The determination of this problem cannot be made in a vacuum but must instead be based upon a careful examination of the holding of Miranda, the purpose of the Supreme Court in requiring the four-fold warning and the evil which the court resolved to eradicate.

In Miranda, the Supreme Court commenced its analysis of the question of police interrogation by stating that 'essential' to the determination of the issues raised in the case was '(a)n understanding of the nature and setting of this in-sustody interrogation' (384 U.S., supra, p. 445, 86 S.Ct. p. 1612).

The court noted that in the recent past incommunicado interrogation was marked by physical beatings and brutality and that such practices were not unknown even today. (See, e.g., People v. Portelli, 15 N.Y.2d 235, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931, 205 N.E.2d 857 (1965).) The court observed that 'Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved--such as these decisions (in Miranda and the others decided therewith) will advance--there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future' (384 U.S., supra, p. 447, 86 S.Ct. p. 1613).

The court went on to stress that even the more restrained modern practice is predicated upon psychological coercion. The court quoted from a police manual describing the tactics to be employed: "If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law" (384 U.S., supra, p. 449, 86 S.Ct. p. 1645).

After reviewing in considerable detail the various police tactics designed to wear down the will of the individual, the Chief Justice, writing for the court, examined the circumstances under which Miranda and the defendants in the other cases were detained and interrogated in police stations and concluded: 'It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished principles--that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the Compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice' (384 U.S., supra, pp. 457--458, 86 S.Ct. p. 1619, emphasis added).

It is in this context that the Supreme Court formulated the four-fold warning. As the Chief Justice wrote (p. 467, 86 S.Ct. p. 1624): 'In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.'

Most recently the Supreme Court had occasion to discuss the purpose of the four-fold warning again. After noting that a necessary element of any claim predicated upon a violation of the privilege against compulsory self incrimination is still 'some kind of compulsion', the court stated that its decision in Miranda was 'predicated * * * upon the conclusion 'that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely ". (Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304, 87 S.Ct. 408, 414, 17 L.Ed.2d 374.)

No one can read the Supreme Court's explanation of the purpose of the warnings and not conclude that an examination of the circumstances and the atmosphere in which the interrogation takes place is essential to a determination of whether a person, who has not actually been physically detained or formally placed under arrest, has been deprived of his freedom in any significant way so as to require the police to give the necessary warnings.

It is true, as some have suggested (see Sobel, The New Confession Standards, 57--63), that when an examination of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, i.e., the existence of probable cause to arrest, indicates that the officer intends to make an arrest the individual is no longer free to go as he chooses and may, therefore, technically be deemed to be in custody. That does not mean, however, that any questioning which may then take place must be preceded by the Miranda warnings regardless of the individual's awareness of the police officer's intent.

A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967)) illustrates what wer regard to be the rather undesirable results which may follow from a holding that, any time the evidence indicates an intent to arrest, the Miranda warnings must be given.

The defendant had been convicted of murder growing out of a stabbing which had taken place on a public street. Shortly after the incident a police officer who was on patrol proceeded to the hospital to investigate. In the hospital accident ward he found several persons, including the defendant. In answer to his inquiry and to questions of a second police officer, who arrived a short time later, the defendant made certain inculpatory statements without first being warned that she had the right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel during the questioning.

Upon entering...